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C H A P T E R  1
Disquiet on the Weather Front: 
Implications of Climate Change for 
Poverty Reduction
Emmanuel Skoufias
Introduction
The continued decline in global poverty over the past 100 years— 
particularly in the past three decades—is a remarkable achievement. 
In 1981, 52 percent of the world population lived on less than $1.25 a 
day.1 By 2005, that rate had been cut in half, to 25.0 percent (Chen and 
Ravallion 2010), and by 2008 to 22.2 percent (World Bank 2012). 
Preliminary estimates for 2010 indicate that the extreme poverty rate has 
fallen further still; if follow-up studies confirm this, the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving world poverty will have been 
reached five years early (World Bank 2010).2
In recent years, poverty reduction has continued in most countries, 
even after the financial, food, and fuel shocks of 2008–09. Although 
poverty remains widespread in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, pro-
gress has been substantial: Extreme poverty fell in South Asia from 
54 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2008 (World Bank 2012). In Sub-
Saharan Africa, where population growth exceeded the rate of poverty 
reduction, the number of extremely poor people increased from 
290 million in 1990 to 356 million in 2008, yet over 2005–08, the 
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region’s poverty rate nonetheless “fell 4.8 percentage points to less than 
50 percent—the largest drop in Sub-Saharan Africa since international 
poverty rates have been computed,” according to the latest edition of the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2012). Although 
progress has been slower at the $2-a-day poverty line, the WDI noted 
that an increase in the absolute number of people living on $1.25–$2.00 
a day reflects both the upward movement from extreme poverty and 
“the vulnerabilities still faced by a great many people in the world.”
The positive overall trend is expected to continue, especially if devel-
oping countries manage to sustain the rapid per capita income growth 
rates they achieved over the past decade. On that score, too, there is cause 
for optimism. The April 2012 edition of the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook predicted (despite continuing 
uncertainty over Europe’s prospects) a post-financial-crisis acceleration 
of economic growth overall by 3.5 percent in 2012 and by more than 
4.0 percent by 2013 (IMF 2012).
Indeed, the emerging markets of Asia, Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe should regain some collective momentum, with overall growth of 
5.7 percent in 2012 and 6.0 percent in 2013—and India and China 
 gaining by 7.0 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively (IMF 2012). If devel-
oping  countries maintain their income growth rates, poverty headcounts 
at the $1- or $2-per-day income levels could turn out to be almost obso-
lete as measures of well-being over the next 50 to 100 years.
Amid this good news, however, strange new weather patterns have 
been unfolding worldwide. Concerns have grown that climate change 
could corrode or even reverse progress on poverty reduction. Scientific 
evidence shows that the Earth’s mean surface temperature is already 
 rapidly raising because of increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(IPCC 2007). The resultant pressure of climate change on environmental 
systems could particularly imperil the livelihoods of rural poor people—
a population that will continue to grow despite increasing urbanization. 
While the eyes of the world have been riveted on polar bears, Antarctic 
penguins, and other endangered inhabitants of the Earth’s shrinking ice 
caps, relatively few researchers have turned serious attention—until 
recent years—to quantifying the prospective long-term effects of climate 
change on human welfare. 
Even before rising sea levels may send coastal residents packing for 
higher ground, rural populations are arguably among the first to feel the 
effects of increasingly erratic weather patterns as well as the most vulner-
able to those effects. To examine even the short-term impact of climate 
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change on those populations—and the effectiveness (or not) of their 
adaptation strategies—is to provide a preview of a global problem. 
Climate Change in a Rural Context
Climate change is likely to reduce agricultural productivity, especially in 
the tropical regions, and to directly affect poor people’s livelihood 
assets—including health, access to water and other natural resources, 
homes, and infrastructure (World Bank 2010). Moreover, increasing 
 climatic variability—manifesting as more frequent and erratic weather 
extremes, or “weather shocks”—will likely make poor households even 
more vulnerable, which could in turn exacerbate the incidence, severity, 
and persistence of poverty in developing countries. 
Such concerns are rooted in these countries’ greater dependence on 
agriculture and other climate-sensitive natural resources for income and 
well-being, compounded by their lack of sufficient financial and techni-
cal capacities to manage increasing climate-related risks. In this context, 
climate change represents a serious challenge to poverty reduction efforts 
around the globe. 
This volume not only surveys the research terrain concerning the 
effects of climate change on poverty but also looks closely at vulnerable 
rural populations (in a developing country, Indonesia, and in the newly 
industrialized Mexico) where weather shocks have measurable short-
term if not immediate effects on the farming livelihoods many depend on 
for both income and subsistence. The low-income farmers of rice in 
Indonesia and of corn and other staple crops in Mexico are at the human 
forefront of climate change. 
Climate change is a long-term problem that has been unfolding over 
many decades.3 Despite uncertainty over the exact magnitudes of the 
global changes in temperature and precipitation, climatologists and policy 
makers alike widely accept that climate variability will likely deviate 
 significantly from its historical patterns (IPCC 2007). It is likely to lead not 
only to changes in the mean levels of temperatures and rainfall but also to 
a significant increase in the variability of climate and in the frequency 
of extreme weather events. 
Erratic weather and increased climatic variability (weather shocks) 
will affect agricultural productivity, which could translate into reduced 
income and reduced food availability at the household level. Consequently, 
much depends on the effectiveness of households’ risk management strat-
egies. Considering that millions of poor households in rural areas all over 
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the world depend on agriculture, there are increasing concerns that the 
change in climatic variability patterns will seriously challenge develop-
ment efforts globally. In view of this imminent threat to the poor, it is 
critical to deeply understand the effectiveness of household adaptation 
strategies as well as targeted measures that could mitigate the poverty 
impacts of erratic weather. 
Pioneering Research Models
Climate change may affect household welfare through a variety of chan-
nels, and the emerging literature has focused largely on the impacts on 
agricultural productivity, given its close nexus with weather conditions. 
The earliest estimates of the impact of climate change on poverty, to 
our knowledge, are based on an integrated assessment model (IAM)—a 
general equilibrium model using microevidence to quantify the socioeco-
nomic dimensions of climate change and aggregate those measurements 
to estimate net effects on national incomes.4 IAMs (which chapter 2 
discusses in more detail) model climate-economy interactions and, in the 
policy sphere, form the basis of many recommendations for GHG emis-
sion control. 
Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, and Hertel (2009) is the only study to date to 
apply a general equilibrium model to estimate the channels and poverty 
impacts of extreme weather events such as extreme heat, droughts, and 
floods. They apply the model to 16 countries, comparing two 30-year 
periods a century apart (1971–2000 and 2071–2100) in the simulations 
under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) A2 
 climate-change scenario (under which global mean temperature increases 
by 3.9°C by 2100).5 In the simulations, all 16 countries exhibit substan-
tial increases in the occurrence and magnitude of extreme heat events, 
with the occurrence of the present 30-year-maximum event increasing by 
more than 2,700 percent in parts of the northern Mediterranean and the 
magnitude of the 30-year-maximum event increasing by 1,000–2,250 
percent (or even more) in much of central Africa. Most of the countries 
also display increases in the occurrence and magnitude of extreme dry 
events, with peak changes of greater than 800 percent and 60 percent, 
respectively, occurring over Mediterranean Europe.
The magnitude and spatial heterogeneity of changes in climate volatil-
ity suggest that the impacts on poverty could be large and heterogeneous 
as well. Among the 16 countries analyzed, those with the highest shares 
of populations entering poverty because of these extreme events include 
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Bangladesh, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. For 
example, in Malawi and Zambia, a simulated 75 percent decline in grains 
productivity causes the poverty headcount to increase by about 7 per-
centage points relative to the countries’ total populations. 
Introducing Heterogeneity
Although recent research generally agrees on the significant overall nega-
tive impact of global warming on agricultural productivity and household 
welfare, the studies also find considerable heterogeneity in these impacts—
even within a single country. As chapter 2 explains further, a relatively 
recent study of Brazil found that, on average, agricultural output per hect-
are could decrease by 18 percent by 2040 as a result of  climate change but 
that, at the municipality level, the impacts could range from a decrease of 
40 percent to an increase of 15 percent (Assunção and Chein Feres 2009). 
Although the authors predict that the poverty rate of rural areas in Brazil 
will increase by 3.2 percentage points overall, again, there is significant 
geographical variation, with already-poor regions being more affected than 
more prosperous regions. Although the Brazilian study highlights the 
importance of capturing heterogeneous results, its major shortcoming is its 
overestimation of the impacts of  climate change on poverty because it 
does not take into account the potential increase in mean per capita 
income from economic growth over the next 40 years.
In another recent study, in India, household-level data also showed 
significant heterogeneity in the impact of climate on per capita consump-
tion across the country’s rural districts (Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias 
2011). The authors estimated that increases in mean surface temperature 
by 2040 could lead to consumption impacts ranging from no change in 
some locations to an 11 percent decrease in others.
Importance of Diversified Household-Level Data
Such widely ranging outcomes are linked in the literature to several inter-
related variables, including geographical location and household-specific 
characteristics such as the following: 
• Whether the household is a net producer or a net consumer of food
• The household’s current and potential (diversified) income sources
• The types of assets owned by the household
• The household’s ability to adapt to income disruptions and smooth 
consumption
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• The structure of household expenditures
• The household’s ability to access credit or social safety-net programs.
For instance, climate change (or even one growing season’s weather 
shock) might reduce physical productivity on a farming household’s 
cereal land. But a general decline in agricultural productivity will also 
raise food prices, benefiting that same household as long as it is a net 
producer of cereals. Also, the extent to which a decline in agricultural 
productivity translates into lower rural wages depends on the diversifica-
tion of the local economy and the ability of labor to move into other 
occupations.
Further, climate change impacts tend to be regressive, falling more 
heavily on the poor than the rich. This result can be decomposed into 
three effects, as chapter 2 discusses further:
• Returns to land—the rich lose proportionately more than the poor 
because they hold the lion’s share of land.
• Returns to labor—productivity declines translate into wage reductions, 
which is distributionally neutral.
• Cereal prices—rising prices affect the poor more than the rich.
Some broader perspectives, also discussed in chapter 2, look at econo-
mywide impacts using a general equilibrium model of global production, 
trade, and income distribution.
A key finding in these studies is that the most significant climate 
change impacts on poverty are likely to occur among urban wage laborers, 
who are the most negatively affected by food price increases. With food 
being a major expenditure, urban residents’ consumption falls as prices 
rise, pushing many below the poverty threshold of consumption. In con-
trast, agricultural, self-employed households in rural areas are less affected 
because they benefit from higher prices: as consumers, they are generally 
hurt by the adverse productivity shock, but as producers, they also tend 
to benefit from the higher food prices.
Role of Adaptation and Risk Management Strategies
The effect of climate change on poverty also depends on the extent of 
households’ adaptation to emerging circumstances. Jacoby, Rabassa, 
and Skoufias (2011) calculate the welfare benefits from autonomous 
adaptation in agriculture in India. In this context, “autonomous adapta-
tion” can be defined as market-based responses to climate change by 
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individuals, households, or firms, typically by adjustments over time in 
their production and consumption patterns.6 
These forms of adaptation (that is, changes in cropping patterns, input 
use, and technology) reduce the average long-term loss in per capita con-
sumption from climate change by about half (the decline in  consumption 
is 11 percent in the case of a weather shock, compared with 6 per-
cent when autonomous adaptation is factored in) (Jacoby, Rabassa, and 
Skoufias 2011).
Migration, the most extreme adaptation measure, can also help reduce 
the potential longer-term welfare impacts of climate change. In Brazil, 
allowing for labor mobility across sectors or across municipalities reduces 
the climate-based increase in the rural poverty rate from 3.2 percentage 
points to 2.0 percentage points (Assunção and Chein Feres 2009).
These studies of adaptation show that households’ adaptability to cli-
mate change over the longer term is vital and that this ability can be 
strengthened by disseminating information about longer-term risks and 
anticipatory investments. However, longer-term impact reduction through 
adaptation would not necessarily diminish the substantial adjustment 
costs. The impact on household welfare will depend in part on the risk 
management strategies employed by households,7 how effective those 
strategies are in mitigating the impacts, and the general distribution of 
impacts across many different households. Some mitigating factors 
include the following:
• Autonomous adaptation, such as the ability to migrate or switch 
employment between agricultural and nonagricultural occupations
• Policy-induced adaptation through prices and explicit government 
safety-net programs, such as access to credit and insurance (Cline 2007; 
Hertel and Rosch 2010)
• Distribution of productive endowments (such as irrigated and nonir-
rigated land or skilled and unskilled labor)
• Rural households’ dual role as both consumers and producers of food—
and whether they are net consumers or net producers.
On a global scale, however, researchers should bear in mind that eco-
nomic growth—often absent in discussions of the future impacts of a 
warming world—will have a tremendous ameliorating effect as food 
expenditures decrease as a share of total expenditures and as the agricul-
ture sector decreases relative to national gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Nordhaus 1993).
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Contributions of This Volume
Profound uncertainties pervade every stage of climate-change model-
ing, starting with the foundation—climatic reaction to rising GHG 
concentrations—and proceeding to the economic and social dimensions. 
Yet to be discerned are the extent of future output growth, the pace 
and direction of technological change (particularly for low-carbon 
energy sources), the shift in migration patterns, and the economic and 
eco logical responses to changing climate and how impacts should be 
 discounted.
Given these uncertainties and limitations in knowledge surrounding 
climate change, its impact on economic growth, and the impacts of 
growth on poverty, the analyses in this volume should be viewed as 
indicative only of the potential consequences of climate change on global 
poverty. Yet these chapters do advance the consideration of key research 
issues and their implications for poverty reduction and widespread adap-
tation during the world’s transition to a new climate equilibrium. Their 
distinct contributions, as further described in the synopses below, include 
the following:
• Emphasis on providing quantitative evidence on the impacts of climate 
change on different dimensions of household welfare: consumption 
and child health (the latter measured by a standard nutritional 
 indicator—child height)
• Use of historic weather data, matched as closely as possible to the 
households’ location, to analyze the relationship between weather and 
welfare
• Attention to timing of climatic shocks, their potential channels of 
impact, household heterogeneity in coping with and adapting to such 
shocks, and the role of public programs in mitigating the effects of the 
shocks.
Chapter 2—The Forecast for Poverty: A Review of the Evidence
Numerous studies have examined the impacts of natural disasters and 
extreme weather-related shocks on the economic and social dimensions 
of welfare. In a literature review, Emmanuel Skoufias, Mariano Rabassa, 
and Sergio Olivieri highlight three main strands of analysis:
• Economywide growth models that incorporate climate-change impacts 
to work out consistent scenarios for how climate change might affect 
the path of poverty
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• Sector-specific studies, primarily those focusing on the poverty impacts 
of climate change in the agricultural sector
• Studies that explore how past climate variability has affected poverty.
As their review shows, most estimates of the poverty impacts tend to 
ignore the effect of aggregate economic growth on poverty and house-
hold welfare. The empirical evidence available to date suggests that 
 climate change will slow the pace of global poverty reduction, but the 
expected poverty impact will be relatively modest—far from reversing 
the major decline in poverty expected over the next 40 years as a result 
of continued economic growth.
In addition, the authors find that the sector-specific studies—focusing 
on how climate change may affect agricultural yields, for example—are 
generally poor predictors of the poverty impacts of climate change at the 
national level because of heterogeneity in households’ ability to adapt. 
Unsurprisingly, the impacts of climate change are generally regressive—
falling more heavily on the poor than on the rich—but the most vulner-
able population of all may be the urban wage-labor-dependent stratum 
because, as net food consumers rather than net food producers, they may 
have greater exposure to food price increases. Agricultural households are 
less exposed because, although weather shocks may hurt productivity and 
reduce their incomes, such households also would benefit to some extent 
from the higher food prices.
Certain key messages and policy considerations can be extracted from 
the surveyed studies, which are quite heterogeneous in terms of data, 
methods, and focus. Some of these messages are caveats: For example, 
although many previous studies have been unduly pessimistic for  failing 
to incorporate sufficient economic growth assumptions, continued 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries will depend on 
whether those countries can maintain growth while also burning less 
 fossil fuel. In addition, although aggregate projected damages from cli-
mate change are projected to be low to moderate through the middle of 
the 21st century, a longer timeline could see larger effects on poverty, 
especially if more extreme climate-change scenarios play out. Nor do the 
aggregate figures reflect the likelihood that Africa and South Asia could 
see more substantial climate-induced increases in poverty.
The good news is that the same policies that reduce the poverty impact 
of climate change also promote sound development, poverty reduction, 
and economic growth in general. The remaining chapters  discuss some of 
these policies in a country-specific rural context.
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Chapter 3—Too Little, Too Late: Welfare Impacts of Rainfall 
Shocks in Rural Indonesia
Emmanuel Skoufias, Roy S. Katayama, and Boniface Essama-Nssah use 
data from rural Indonesia to consider the effects of two rainfall-related 
shocks: (a) a delay in monsoon onset and (b) a significant shortfall of rain 
during the 90-day post-onset period. Focusing on households with family 
farm businesses, they find that rice-farming households in areas experi-
encing low rainfall following the monsoon’s onset are negatively affected: 
the shortfall is associated with a 14 percent reduction in those house-
holds’ per capita expenditures. Moreover, in the face of weather shocks, 
these households protected their food expenditures at the expense of 
nonfood expenditures. The findings are consistent with households’ 
reduction of expenditures on health and education—reductions that ulti-
mately may have a longer-term effect on poverty by reducing investment 
on the human capital of children. 
 The Indonesia study also sheds light on potential policy instruments 
that might moderate the welfare impact of climate change. Access to 
credit and public works projects in communities can help households 
cope with weather shocks and thereby play a strong role in protection. 
This is an important consideration for the design and implementation of 
adaptation strategies.
Chapter 4—Timing Is Everything: How Weather 
Shocks Affect Household Welfare in Rural Mexico
Skoufias and Katja Vinha examine whether climatic variability—namely, 
deviations of rainfall and temperature from their long-run means— 
significantly affects the average well-being of rural households in Mexico. 
They report that the timing of the rainfall or temperature shock (in rela-
tion to the annual growing cycle) makes a substantial difference in the 
shock’s estimated impact on welfare. 
For example, during the period studied, per capita expenditures were 
14 percent higher if the preceding agricultural year (October to 
September) was at least one standard deviation drier than the average of 
a previous 35-year period (1951–85). However, if a rainfall shock (either 
a drier-than-average or a wetter-than-average period) were to occur dur-
ing the wet season of that year (April to September), the shock did not 
appear to significantly affect per capita expenditures. 
Furthermore, the results show that a household’s ability to protect its 
consumption from weather shocks depends not only on the nature of 
the shock and when in the agricultural year the shock occurs but also on 
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a household’s particular climatic region. Some households cannot smooth 
consumption; in particular, those in arid climates were prone to lower 
expenditures after either colder- or drier-than-average weather at certain 
points in the agricultural year. Differences in household vulnerability 
(ability to smooth consumption) also depend on other location character-
istics, including households’ proximity and access to transportation (bus 
stations). 
Because of the great degree of heterogeneity in household responses to 
different weather shocks, the results highlight the necessity to account for 
the underlying climatic variation through more region-specific analyses, 
more fine-tuning of shock definitions, and inclusion of more municipali-
ties. Only then can the effectiveness of both autonomous (household-
level) and government risk management strategies (such as social safety-net 
programs)—and the potential implications of each for public policy—be 
better evaluated. 
Chapter 5—Growing Precious Resources: Climate Variability 
and Child Height in Rural Mexico
The final chapter in this volume turns to a health indicator, child height, 
as another way to measure the impact of weather shocks on poverty. 
The shocks—defined as either rainfall or growing degree days (GDD, a 
cumulative measure of temperature) that deviate by more than one stan-
dard deviation from their respective long-run means—are assessed in 
terms of their impact on the growth of rural children in Mexico between 
12 and 47 months of age. 
Exploring the consequences of weather on the health of these vulner-
able individuals, Skoufias and Vinha found three consistent results:
• After a positive rainfall shock (significantly increased rainfall), children 
were shorter than they would have been under normal conditions, no 
matter where they lived or the altitude. 
• Negative temperature shocks (significantly cooler temperatures) also 
had a negative impact on height, albeit only in certain regions: the  central 
and southern parts of the country as well as higher  altitudes. 
• Positive temperature shocks (unusually warm weather) had no average 
impact on the overall child population being measured. However, cer-
tain subpopulations (boys, children between 12 and 23 months at the 
time of measurement, and children of less-educated mothers) were 
negatively affected. 
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The results suggest that either reduced consumption, increased com-
municable disease prevalence, or both potentially contribute to negative 
effects on child growth. Again, further research is warranted considering 
the evidence linking childhood health to various aspects of later well-
being, including educational outcomes and adult cognitive abilities, pro-
ductivity, and employment.
Conclusions and Some Policy Implications
Climate change may slow the pace of global poverty reduction but will 
probably not reverse the progress already made, assuming (unlike most 
estimates to date of the poverty impacts of climate change) that aggre-
gate economic growth will continue to reduce poverty and improve 
household welfare. However, some qualifications are in order:
• Much of the poverty impact is likely to be concentrated in Africa and 
South Asia, both of which would see more substantial increases in 
 poverty relative to a baseline without climate change.
• The occurrence of less probable but more extreme climate damage 
scenarios would naturally result in larger poverty increases.
• Aggregate projected damages are relatively low over the time horizon 
analyzed here (to mid-21st century). As climate change continues to 
unfold during this and the next century, aggregate damages could be 
substantial and have a larger effect on poverty.
Adaptation Is Key
Recent empirical studies confirm that changes in climatic means and vari-
ability can have substantial impacts on agricultural output, household 
welfare, and poverty, but that there is considerable heterogeneity in out-
comes based on geographical location; a household’s assets and income-
earning potential; whether the household is a net agricultural producer or 
consumer; and the opportunities for adaptation and risk management 
available to the household. Effective adaptation strategies can reduce the 
poverty impacts of climate change substantially. 
Policy Makers’ Role
Policy makers can do much to help the poor better adapt to and cope 
with climate change and extreme weather events without compromising 
human capital, which is the long-term foundation of household welfare. 
Fortunately, many of the policies that can effectively mitigate, or help 
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people adapt to, the impacts of climate change on poverty are the same 
strategies that promote sound development, poverty reduction, and eco-
nomic growth in general:
• Creating well-targeted, scalable safety nets
• Improving the access of poor people to credit and insurance markets
• Investing in human capital to increase employment opportunities for 
the poor 
• Reducing impediments to occupational mobility and facilitating migra-
tion to help poor people reach areas with better economic opportunities 
• Improving governance of common-pool natural resources 
• Enhancing international trade to smooth the food-price and other 
 commodity-related impacts of regional or country-specific climate 
shocks
• Investing in transportation and communication infrastructure
• Investing in irrigation and water management to anticipate and address 
extreme precipitation events
• Investing in adaptive agricultural research and in information and 
extension services.
The regressive impacts of climate change mentioned previously, com-
bined with the emerging evidence that access to social protection and 
credit programs moderate the welfare impacts of climate change, suggest 
that the establishment of safety-net programs and the strengthening of 
the institutions to implement and scale up such programs should be a 
critical component of country-level adaptation strategies. 
In particular, countercyclical safety-net systems such as conditional 
and unconditional cash transfers; workfare programs (food- or cash-for-
work); and social funds (community-level programs in infrastructure, 
social services, training, and so on) can have immediate payoffs because 
they enable countries to deal with economic crises and other shocks that 
may not be related to climate change and climatic variability. 
The need for climate action and leadership has entered a watershed 
period. At the December 2011 United Nations Conference on Climate 
Change in Durban, South Africa, the world’s governments struggled 
anew to reach a comprehensive, binding global agreement to limit ever-
rising GHG emissions lest the IPCC’s projected climate-change scenario 
of catastrophic, irrevocable climate change become a reality. The Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action, adopted by all 194 participating countries, 
at least set a direction for continuing climate negotiations; and a Green 
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Climate Fund was also launched to help developing countries in their 
climate-change adaptation and mitigation efforts.
Meanwhile, rural households will keep using time-tested, traditional 
methods to adapt as best they can to a world of increasingly unpredict-
able weather shocks. It is incumbent on local, regional, country-level, 
and multilateral leaders to help the most vulnerable to prepare for, and 
respond to, these unknown perils ahead. There is no better time to bring 
innovative leadership and political will to bear in a way that aligns 
 climate-change preparation with development objectives and continuing 
poverty- reduction strategies.
Notes
 1. The World Bank defines extreme poverty as per capita income of less than 
$1.25 per day in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms; it represents 
the mean of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 percent of countries 
ranked by per capita consumption. The median poverty line for developing 
countries is $2 a day in 2005 PPP terms. Poverty measures are prepared by the 
World Bank’s Development Research Group. For more information on poverty 
definition, measurement, and trends, see http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/ 
and http://povertynet.org/. For details on data sources and methods used in 
deriving the World Bank’s latest estimates, see http://iresearch.worldbank
.org/povcalnet.
 2. For more information about the United Nations MDGs, see http://www
.un.org/millenniumgoals.
 3. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “climate” 
refers to the statistical description of quantities such as temperature and pre-
cipitation (in terms of mean and variability, for example) over a period of 
time ranging from months to thousands of years. The norm is 30 years, as 
defined by the World Meteorological Organization. “Climate” therefore dif-
fers from “weather”—the atmospheric conditions in a given place at a specific 
time. The term “climate change” indicates a significant variation (in a statisti-
cal sense) in either the mean state of the climate or its variability for an 
extended period of time, usually decades or longer (Wilkinson 2006). In 
general, the studies described in this volume deal with the two different com-
ponents of climate change: precipitation and temperature. 
 4. Here we refer to Anderson’s (2006) estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia based on PAGE 2002 (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect) 
(Hope 2006). The PAGE model (an IAM used extensively by The Stern Review 
[Stern 2007]) estimates future output and growth with and without climate 
change. Under the IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) 
A2 climate-change scenario (in which global mean temperature increases by 
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3.9°C by 2100) (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart 2000), PAGE 2002 predicts that 
climate change in India and Southeast Asia and in Africa and the Middle East 
will cause GDP losses of about 2.5 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively. 
 5. The IPCC’s SRES A2 scenario (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart 2000) might not accu-
rately represent the expected GDP and population growth rates and the 
consequential emissions path. As a result, the A2 scenario is an extreme one 
that overestimates the negative impact that climate change will have on pov-
erty reduction efforts.
 6. Autonomous adaptation is typically distinguished from planned adaptation, 
which refers to policy-based actions that are needed when market failures or 
other coordination problems hinder relevant collective responses to climate 
change.
 7. World Bank (2010) surveys private and public risk mitigation strategies in the 
face of natural hazards.
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C H A P T E R  2
The Forecast for Poverty: A Review 
of the Evidence
Emmanuel Skoufias, Mariano Rabassa, and 
Sergio Olivieri
Introduction
Given the complexities involved in analyzing the impacts of climate 
change on poverty, different approaches may be helpful. One is to use 
economywide growth models that incorporate consistent climate-change 
scenarios to show how climate change might affect the path of poverty 
over the next decades. Another approach is to learn about sector-specific 
channels (such as agricultural productivity) through which longer-term 
climate change affects poverty, the size of such impacts, the potential 
heterogeneity of those impacts, and the types of policies that may 
 alleviate the adverse impacts. The information generated by this approach 
is useful in tackling poverty today and in preparing for future adaptation 
to climate change. Yet another approach is to explore how current cli-
mate variability affects poverty to predict the impacts of increased vari-
ability on future poverty. 
This chapter reviews recent studies that have estimated the poverty-
related and distributional impacts of climate change in these complemen-
tary directions. Given the multidimensional nature of welfare and the 
myriad ways in which climate change can affect the different dimensions 
of household well-being, we limit our discussion to monetary measures 
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(that is, consumption or income per capita), especially because these 
measures are used to calculate poverty rates. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that climate change may also have serious effects on health 
(an important dimension of welfare, which chapter 5 of this volume 
addresses further) and on ecosystem services (apart from agriculture)—
both of which are difficult to measure monetarily. 
The next section analyzes the potential effects of climate change on 
poverty from an aggregate perspective without considering the potential 
heterogeneity of impacts across the population.1 The “Introducing 
Heterogeneity” section then describes analyses of the channels through 
which climate change will affect specific sectors of the population based 
on household-level data. The chapter concludes with key messages from 
this emerging literature as well as policy recommendations. 
Climate Change and Global Poverty: The Aggregate Perspective
Before reviewing the empirical literature, it is worth asking what is 
involved in predicting the poverty impacts of climate change using aggre-
gate data. In general, such predictions require five pieces of information: 
• The output-climate elasticity, which provides estimates of the percent-
age change in output due to a change in climate based on historical data 
and is useful for predicting the effect of future climate change on eco-
nomic activity
• The poverty-output (or poverty-growth) elasticity, also based on his-
torical data, which translates percentage changes in output per capita 
into changes in the poverty rate 
• Estimated future climate change 
• Estimated future trajectory of either gross domestic product (GDP) or 
income per capita in the absence of climate change
• Estimated population growth. 
In general, the papers cited in this section differ regarding their esti-
mates of these elasticities and the type of information they use for future 
projections.
Looking to the Past: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Historical Data
A number of recent studies have opted for a “backward-looking” approach 
to analyze the effects of climate change on economic activity and ulti-
mately on poverty. These studies, mimicking the approach emphasized in 
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the growth and development literatures, examine the relationship 
between climate and aggregate economic variables in cross-sections of 
countries or regions. 
One advantage of this approach is that, by direct examination of aggre-
gate outcomes, one can avoid relying on a priori assumptions about which 
mechanisms to include in the climate-economy interactions, how these 
mechanisms might interact, and ultimately how they influence macro-
economic outcomes. Another advantage is that the use of cross-sectional 
data yields estimates of the long-run relationship between climate and 
aggregate output, taking into account historical adaptation. 
For example, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009) use cross-sectional data 
from 134 countries to examine how temperature affects GDP. Their 
output-climate elasticity estimate, based on historical data, reveals that 
each additional degree Celsius is associated with a statistically significant 
reduction of 8.9 percentage points of per capita GDP. The authors also 
provide evidence of this elasticity at the subnational level by considering 
the temperature-income relationship using municipal-level data for 12 
countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Remarkably, they 
find that temperature increases correlate with income decreases within 
countries and even within states within countries.2 However, they make 
no attempt to either simulate the impacts of the predicted temperature 
increase on income or to estimate its effect on poverty.
In a similar vein, Andersen and Verner (2010) examine the relation-
ship between temperature and welfare at the municipality level within 
five countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). 
The coefficients of temperature (and temperature squared) provide an 
estimate of the long-run relationship between temperature and welfare 
(that is, the output-climate elasticity) inclusive of adaptation. The esti-
mated relationships are then used to simulate the impact of the climate 
changes that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
projects for the next 50 years (IPCC 2007a, 2007b). 
The authors’ poverty analysis, however, is crude. They do not attempt 
to estimate the poverty-output elasticity; they simply assume that a 
negative relationship exists between per capita income and poverty. As 
previously explained, income per capita and population growth projec-
tions are needed for more precise 50-year projections of the number of 
poor people. Therefore, the authors are careful to warn that their simula-
tion results should not be interpreted as forecasts but as simply indicative 
of the direction and magnitude of the effects that might be expected 
from climate changes. Table 2.1 summarizes the estimated impacts of 
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increased temperature on the mean level of welfare along with the likely 
direction of the effects of anticipated future climate change on poverty 
and income inequality. 
A few points are worth highlighting: First, the presented estimates 
(derived from the country-specific elasticities and climate projections) 
refer to the percentage change in per capita income as a result of climate 
change relative to a world without it. Second, the direction of the poverty 
impact of climate change is derived by assuming a distribution-neutral 
change in the mean level of welfare. Third, as in the case of per capita 
income changes, the increase or decrease in poverty projects a situation 
relative to a world without climate change, not relative to the current 
situation. Therefore, a prediction that poverty will increase in Brazil does 
not imply that poverty will necessarily be higher relative to the present 
but that it will be higher in 2058 relative to the no-climate-change sce-
nario. Finally, caution should be applied when looking at the reported 
effects on poverty and inequality because they are based on the distribu-
tion of income (per capita) among municipalities, not households. 
Assunção and Chein Feres (2009) estimate the poverty impacts of 
climate change based on cross-sectional data at the municipality level in 
Brazil. They first estimate the impact of climate change on agricultural 
productivity (a proxy for the output-climate elasticity), measured as agri-
cultural output per hectare in each municipality. Next, they use IPCC’s 
temperature and rainfall projections for 2030–49 to build a different cli-
mate vector for each municipality, from which they obtain the percent-
age change in agricultural productivity induced by climate change. They 
Table 2.1 Projected Income and Poverty Effects of Climate Change by 2060 from 
Municipality-Level Data in Selected Latin American Countries
Effect of climate change 
on average incomes 
(percentage change) Effect on poverty Effect on inequality
Boliviaa 2.9 Decrease Decrease
Brazil –11.9 Increase Increase
Chile –6.7 Increase Neutral
Mexico 0 Neutral Neutral
Peru –2.3 Increase Neutral
Source: Andersen and Verner 2010.
Note: Four explanatory variables are included in the regression models: temperature, rainfall, education, and 
urbanization rates. Temperature and rainfall estimates are based on 50-year IPCC projections (2008–58). 
The estimates project changes relative to a baseline of no climate change, not relative to current conditions.
a. In four of the five countries, the dependent variable in the analysis is income per capita, whereas in Bolivia, 
consumption per capita is used.
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estimate that global warming will decrease the agricultural output per 
hectare in Brazil by 18 percent, with the municipality-specific estimates 
ranging from −40 to 15 percent.
The authors explore the link between agricultural productivity and 
poverty by means of a cross-sectional regression of the poverty rate at the 
municipality level against the log of the agricultural output per hectare 
and the log of the total population in the municipality. Using instrumen-
tal variable methods to account for the correlation between agricultural 
output and the error term of the regression, they estimate that doubling 
agricultural productivity reduces poverty at the municipality level by 
12.8 percentage points. Based on this estimate, they predict that climate 
change will increase the poverty rate in rural areas by 3.2 percentage 
points. Considering that the current poverty rate is 40 percent, the 
authors claim that the number of poor people in Brazilian rural areas will 
increase by 8 percent. 
The estimates also reveal interesting geographical variations in the 
poverty impacts of climate change. Although the North region will be the 
most affected area in absolute terms (its rural poverty rate increasing by 
6.2 percentage points), the South region is projected to benefit from a 
poverty rate reduction of 0.9 percentage points.3 
To allow for more adaptation options than those considered by the 
simple Ricardian approach to estimating climate-change impacts on agri-
cultural productivity, Assunção and Chein Feres (2009) consider two 
alternatives: 
• First, they consider a measure of total poverty—taking into account all 
residents in each municipality (that is, including all urban households 
as well as rural households). This alternative measure of poverty cap-
tures the fact that some individuals might adapt to the new climate 
conditions by changing sectors or occupations. 
• Second, they build a migration-adjusted poverty measure.4 Using this 
adjusted sample, they compute a poverty measure for each municipal-
ity, for both urban and rural areas. After allowing for labor  mobility 
across sectors or across municipalities, the absolute poverty-rate 
increase in rural areas goes down—from 3.2 percentage points (the 
earlier estimate, without accounting for labor mobility) to 2.0 percent-
age points. 
In sum, these results suggest that climate change is likely to generate 
heterogeneous effects within Brazil, with poverty increasing in the 
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already poorer North and decreasing in the already richer South. 
Moreover, the poverty impacts of climate change are likely to be less 
severe depending on the extent to which households can adapt by 
migrating across municipalities or switching sectors of employment. 
The major shortcoming of the Assunção and Chein Feres (2009) study 
is that it overstates the estimated impacts of climate change on poverty 
in Brazil because it does not take into account the potential increase in 
mean per capita income from economic growth over the next 40 years. 
In other words, the authors consider climate change as it would happen 
tomorrow, predicting the impact of a warming climate based on today’s 
poverty rate instead of on the prevailing poverty rate in 2050 relative to 
a world without such a warming. The proper way to present poverty 
estimates associated with future climate change is to project both output 
and population growth and then use the elasticities to predict climate 
change’s impact on poverty. 
Accounting for Future Growth: Evidence from 
Integrated Assessment Models
An integrated assessment model (IAM) is a general equilibrium model 
that relies on microevidence to quantify various socioeconomic dimen-
sions of climate change and then aggregates these to estimate a net effect 
on national income. IAMs are used extensively in the climate-change lit-
erature to model climate-economy interactions, and they form the basis of 
many policy recommendations regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions control. The typical outputs of an IAM are the future trajectories of 
key economic variables—including GDP per capita with and without 
climate change—as well as income paths under different policy scenarios.5
The PAGE model. The earliest IAM-based estimates of the impact of 
climate change on poverty, to our knowledge, are Anderson’s (2006) esti-
mates for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia based on PAGE 2002 
(Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect).6 The PAGE model estimates 
future output and growth with and without climate change. Under the 
IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A2 climate-change 
scenario (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart 2000)—in which global mean tempera-
ture increases by 3.9°C by 2100—PAGE 2002 predicts that climate 
change in India and Southeast Asia and in Africa and the Middle East will 
cause GDP losses of about 2.5 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively, 
compared with what could have been achieved in a world without 
climate change. 
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Anderson converts these output and growth projections into poverty 
impacts by using regional poverty-output elasticity estimates, population 
forecasts, and two assumptions: (a) that average household income grows 
at 0.8 times the rate of GDP per capita7 and (b) that the distribution of 
income remains constant. Based on these projections, the author reports 
that, by 2100, climate change could mean that up to 12 million more 
people in South Asia and 24 million more people in Sub-Saharan Africa 
will be living on less than $2 a day.8
Although the poverty predictions are based on a highly aggregative 
and simplified model that does not take adaptation into account, the 
illustrative results suggest that climate change will negatively affect pov-
erty. As The Stern Review (Stern 2007) rightly noted, these poverty 
impacts are likely to be smaller if aggregate growth in these countries and 
regions proceeds faster than what the IPCC’s SRES A2 scenario assumes 
(including a high global population [15 billion] by 2100 and world GPD 
growth of 2 percent per year). In fact, recent GDP and population growth 
trends suggest that the A2 scenario’s view has been pessimistic, and hence 
Anderson’s poverty impacts might overestimate the actual impact. 
The RICE model. To update Anderson’s estimates to more realistic pro-
jections, we model the long-term impacts of climate change on poverty 
using the Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy 
(RICE) developed by Nordhaus (2010) under three scenarios: 
• Baseline simulates a world without climate change. 
• Business as usual (BAU) reflects the impact of current trends in eco-
nomic growth and GHG emissions on the climate, estimating the 
impact of climate change on the overall economy without any emission 
abatement policies.9 
• Optimal abatement is based on Nordhaus’s calculation of an emission 
abatement path with full participation by all countries that maximizes 
global intertemporal economic welfare. 
We translate the implications for poverty of these different growth 
scenarios by using historical estimates of growth-poverty elasticities (for 
the full dataset, see annex 2A).10 Table 2.2 summarizes the main impacts 
of climate change on global poverty under the three scenarios. 
Under the baseline (no climate change) scenario, the model projects an 
annual global real per capita output growth rate of 2.2 percent up to 
2055.11 This outcome contributes to cutting the world poverty rate 
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(per capita income of $2 a day or less) by more than half—from 
32.3  percent in 2005 to 14.1 percent by 2055. Under the RICE model’s 
BAU scenario (climate damage along the current trajectory), world GDP 
growth in 2055 would be 1.5 percent lower than in the baseline (amount-
ing to 2.167 percent). 
Under the BAU scenario, the estimated number of poor in 2055 would 
be modestly higher (by about 10 million) than under the  no- climate-change 
scenario, with most of the additional poor living in Africa and South Asia. 
It is worth stressing that this analysis focuses on the expected or mean 
value of the probability distribution of damage from climate change. 
Obviously, looking at more extreme outcomes (a lower probability) 
would increase the estimates for GDP losses and poverty. 
Under the optimal abatement scenario, the extra number of people in 
poverty due to global warming in 2055 is projected to be only slightly 
lower (about 9 million) because the effects of global GHG emission 
abatement on aggregate economic damages necessarily accrue more to 
higher-income countries. Unlike adaptation strategies, emissions mitiga-
tion does not specifically target the poor. The major gains in poverty 
averted by following the optimal abatement strategy would indeed occur 
on a longer time horizon—by 2100 and beyond.
Even though the aggregate impacts of climate change on poverty 
seem to be modest by mid-century, the findings do not imply that the 
impacts will be equally distributed among the population. To analyze 
how climate change will affect specific population sectors, one must use 
Table 2.2 Three Scenarios for Climate-Change Impacts on World Poverty, 2005–55
Scenarios
Number of poor people (millions) Headcount poverty rate (%)
2005 2055 Change 2005 2055 Change
Baselinea 2,069.4 1,259.1 (810.3) 32.3 14.1 (18.2)
BAUb 2,069.4 1,269.2 (800.2) 32.3 14.2 (18.1)
Different from baseline 0 10.1 10.1 0 0.12 0.12
Optimal abatementc 2,069.4 1,268.5 (800.9) 32.3 14.2 (18.1)
Different from BAU 0 (0.7) (0.7) 0 (0.01) (0.01)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the RICE model of Nordhaus 2010. 
Note: Business as usual (BAU) scenario is a continuation of current trends without emission abatement. Poverty is 
defined as income per capita of $2 a day or less in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. The use of 
p arentheses designates negative numbers.
a. The baseline scenario (no climate change) projects annual world per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth of 2.2 percent until 2055. 
b. The BAU scenario (current climate-change trends with no GHG emission abatement) projects annual world 
GDP growth of 1.5 percent less than the baseline.
c. The optimal abatement scenario (maximized emission-abatement participation worldwide) projects annual 
world GDP growth of 1.25 percent less than the baseline. 
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household-level data and explicitly model the channels through which 
future warming will affect economic activity.
Introducing Heterogeneity: The Microeconomic Approach
The discussion so far has relied on the evidence emerging about the 
 relationship between climate (temperature and precipitation) and growth 
(or GDP) in a cross-section or panel of countries or municipalities within 
selected countries. Although informative, these studies shed no light on 
the channels through which climate change can affect household welfare. 
For example, climate change may reduce agricultural pro ductivity and 
also negatively affect poor people’s livelihoods through its effects on 
health, access to water and other natural resources, and infrastructure. 
Considering the complexities involved in modeling some of these chan-
nels, the literature has focused largely on the poverty impacts related to 
agricultural output, and this section reviews those quantitative estimates.
Over the past few years, a large literature has attempted to quantify 
the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity at the regional 
and country levels.12 The general consensus emerging from this literature 
is that climate change will negatively affect agricultural productivity and 
yields and that the impacts will vary both across countries and within 
countries. To the extent that yield changes are good predictors of the 
changes in rural household welfare—and ultimately of the changes in 
poverty rates, at least in rural areas—these findings suggest that climate 
change would significantly affect poverty rates. Yet the impacts on agri-
cultural yields may actually be a rather poor predictor of the impacts on 
poverty. 
A variety of mediating factors, including the following, can mitigate 
the impacts on household welfare as well as the distribution of these 
impacts across different households: 
• The extent of autonomous adaptation by households, such as the abil-
ity to migrate or switch employment between agricultural and nonag-
ricultural occupations 
• The extent of policy-induced adaptation through prices and explicit 
government programs, such as access to credit and insurance13 
• The distribution of productive endowments (such as irrigated and non-
irrigated land or skilled and unskilled labor) 
• The dual role of rural households as consumers and producers of 
food—and whether they are net consumers or net producers. 
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Economic growth—often absent in discussions of the future impacts 
of a warming world—will have a tremendous ameliorating effect as food 
expenditures decrease as a share of total expenditures and as the agricul-
ture sector decreases as a share of national GDP (Nordhaus 1993). 
General Equilibrium Modeling
Hertel, Burke, and Lobell (2010) analyzed the impacts of climate change 
through a more careful modeling of the channels and heterogeneity of 
impacts in the context of economic growth. They use disaggregated data 
on household economic activity (stratified by primary source of income) 
within 15 developing countries and a general equilibrium global trade 
model (the Global Trade Analysis Project, or GTAP) to explore how 
changes in agricultural productivity will affect poverty in poor countries. 
Although their model allows for only limited heterogeneity, a key feature 
is that it allows different types of households to be affected differently by 
the prices of agricultural goods.14 
The authors use three scenarios of how climate change affects agricul-
tural productivity (low, medium, or high productivity) to evaluate the 
resulting changes by 2030 in global commodity prices, national economic 
welfare, and poverty headcount rate (the portion of a nation’s population 
living on less than $1 a day).15 The poverty consequences of a decline in 
agricultural productivity are evidenced through two channels: changes in 
earnings and changes in the real cost of living at the poverty line. 
The impact of a food price rise on earnings depends on the income 
sources for a given household group (estimated from household survey 
data). If earnings rise faster than the cost of living for households at the 
poverty line in a given socioeconomic stratum, the poverty headcount 
falls and vice versa. The responsiveness of the stratum poverty headcount 
to a given real income shock is determined by the density of the stratum 
population in the neighborhood of the poverty line (also estimated from 
the household survey data). When combined with information about the 
distribution of national poverty across socioeconomic strata, the authors 
can estimate the change in the national poverty headcount.
A number of interesting findings emerge from this modeling effort: 
• Large changes in grain prices do not translate into large changes in the 
cost of living16 because consumers adjust their consumption bundle to 
account for the new pattern of prices, and staple grains are only one 
part of total consumption. “While world prices for staple grains rise by 
an average of more than 30% in the low productivity scenario, the 
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average impact on the real cost of living at the poverty line is more 
modest—just 6.3%” (Hertel, Burke, and Lobell 2010).
• The portion of the poverty change driven by cost-of-living changes is 
largest for the urban wage labor household stratum. (The cost-of-living 
change is the product of the percentage change in the real cost of living 
at the poverty line and the stratum-specific elasticity of poverty with 
respect to real income.) This is because the density around the poverty 
line in the urban wage labor household stratum is relatively high. In 
contrast, the agriculture-dependent households show the smallest 
change.17 
• In the “low productivity” scenario (higher temperature), rising world 
commodity prices translate into increased returns to factors employed 
in agriculture. Consequently, earnings increase sharply and the pov-
erty rate drops among the agricultural self-employed households. On 
the other hand, poverty rises among the nonagricultural specialized 
households because their earnings fall given the relative price decline of 
nonagricultural commodities compared with agricultural goods. 
Under the “high productivity” scenario, these results are reversed, with 
no apparent effect on poverty for the medium-climate-change 
 scenario. 
• The combined poverty impacts on agricultural self-employed 
 households are positively correlated with the size of the productivity 
shock—with lower global productivity generating higher agricultural 
prices and reduced poverty among these households. The opposite is 
true of the nonagricultural self-employed households. The net change 
in national poverty depends on the contribution of each stratum to 
overall poverty.
In sum, the overall (and by stratum) poverty changes across all 
 countries for the low-productivity climate-change scenario show that, in 
nearly all countries, poverty increases in some strata and decreases in 
 others. The notable exceptions are most African countries, where the yield 
impacts of climate change are severe and no single stratum experiences 
significant poverty reductions.
The Hertel, Burke, and Lobell (2010) study provides a  promising 
approach for studying the impacts of climate change, taking into account 
general equilibrium effects between agricultural productivity, cost of  living, 
and earnings. However, as in most models, there are serious  trade-offs 
between the tractability of the general equilibrium effects and the het-
erogeneity incorporated into the model. 
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Heterogeneity Galore
The study by Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) applies a flexible 
framework for quantifying the distributional impacts of climate change in 
rural economies. In this study, focusing on India, welfare is measured by 
consumption per capita and is modeled based on the households’ resource 
endowments (such as land and labor) and the returns from farm and 
nonfarm activities. The authors introduce more heterogeneity into the 
model by distinguishing between the type of land owned by households 
(irrigated and nonirrigated) and type of labor (skilled and unskilled). Each 
of these endowments may have different returns and responses to climate. 
Using a comparative statics framework, the impacts of climate change 
on household consumption can be expressed as the impact of changes in 
temperature on the returns to land (a summary measure of agricultural 
productivity) multiplied by (a) the proportion of income derived from 
owned land; (b) the impacts of temperature on the returns to labor mul-
tiplied by the proportion of income derived from labor; and (c) the 
impacts of climate change on the price of food multiplied by the net 
consumption ratio (that is, the value of the net marketed surplus of food 
by the household).18 
Using microdata representative for all India and following the 
Ricardian approach proposed by Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw 
(1994), the authors estimate the impacts of climate change in 2040 on 
agricultural productivity and wages, taking into account adaptation (using 
district-level cross-sectional data) and assuming imperfect mobility of 
labor.19 They also estimate the impacts of climate change on agricultural 
productivity in the absence of adaptation, using panel data at the district 
level (Deschenes and Greenstone 2007). Combining these estimates of 
the impacts of climate change on the returns to land and labor with the 
household-specific information on endowments of land and labor, they 
derive household-specific impacts of the climate change on consumption, 
which is a prerequisite for a proper distributional analysis.20
The main results of the Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) study are 
as follows: 
• The substantial fall in agricultural productivity (17 percent overall inclu-
sive of adaptation) that is predicted as a result of warming by 2040 will 
translate into a much more modest consumption decline (of 6 percent 
on average) for most households. This is because these households derive 
the bulk of their income from wage employment, and (rural) wages are 
estimated to fall by only a third as much as agricultural productivity. The 
same general pattern is observed in the case of no adaptation.21 
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• Climate change will have heterogeneous impacts across geographical 
areas and across the income distribution, as shown in figure 2.1. 
 Ignoring cereal price effects, climate change appears to have a 
 progressive effect because wealthier households suffer proportionally 
greater consumption losses. A household in the top percentile of the 
per capita expenditure distribution would experience a decline in 
consumption nearly 2 percentage points greater than a household in 
the bottom percentile. This progressivity is driven by the skewed land 
distribution and the fact that larger landowners are concentrated in 
the higher percentiles. By contrast, temperature-induced wage 
declines are relatively more costly to the poor than to the rich, mainly 
because the poor tend to engage in climate-sensitive agricultural 
employment. 
• Once the welfare effects of rising cereal prices are taken into account, 
climate change impacts are regressive, falling more heavily on the 
poor than the rich. This is true in both urban areas (where it is 
Figure 2.1 Climate-Change Incidence Curves for Rural Population in India, 2040
Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias 2011. 
Note: In the figure, following a baseline Ricardian approach, the warming projection for 2040 is based on a 
Hadley Centre Coupled Model, version 3 (HadCM3 model) (IPCC 2001). The curves assume a 17 percent decline 
in agricultural productivity from a projected 1.25°C temperature increase for the country as a whole by 2040, 
although there is spatial variability on the projected changes in temperature.
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assumed that cereal price effects are the only welfare consequence of 
climate change) and rural areas (where the beneficial impact of 
higher prices to agricultural producers offsets the decline in land 
productivity).
Although the model employed by Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias 
(2011) is primarily equipped for estimating the distributional rather than 
the poverty impacts of climate change, the effects on poverty can be 
predicted with the help of some additional assumptions. As discussed 
previously, in estimating the poverty impacts of climate change, it is 
important to take into account the growth in the economy over time and 
the associated decline in the share of food in household consumption.
Table 2.3 underscores the importance of this point by estimating the 
poverty rates in 2040 assuming different annual growth rates in the aver-
age standard of living. Even with very low growth in mean consumption 
(equal to the 1951–90 average growth rates in mean consumption in 
India), the urban poverty rate in the presence of climate change is likely 
to be less than half (15.7 percent) what the urban poverty rate would 
have been without any growth (32.3 percent).22
Taking into account average income growth up to 2040, the national 
poverty rate will rise by 3.5 percentage points compared with the coun-
terfactual of zero warming (see table 2.4). Given the current population 
projections, climate change is predicted to result in around 50 million 
more poor people than there otherwise would have been in that year. 
Table 2.3 Projected Impact of Climate Change on Poverty Rates under 
Three Growth Scenarios in India, 2004–40
percent
Base year No growth Low growtha Medium growthb High growthc
2004/05 2040 2040 2040 2040
Rural 48.8 54.8 35.8 18.3 2.1
Urban 31.1 32.3 15.7  5.8 0.2
All 44.5 49.4 31.0 15.3 1.1
Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias 2011, using annual mean consumption growth rates (from National 
Sample Surveys) drawn from Datt and Ravallion 2011.
Note: The poverty rate is defined using the official state-level poverty lines of 2009. The warming projection for 
2040 is based on the HadCM3 model (IPCC 2001), projecting a 1.25°C temperature increase for the country as a 
whole by 2040, although there is spatial variability on the projected changes in temperature. 
a. Low growth = annual average mean consumption growth in India for 1958–91 (0.58 percent rural, 
0.79 percent urban).
b. Medium growth = annual average mean consumption growth for 1991–2006 (1.17 percent rural, 
1.49 percent urban).
c. High growth = double the rate of the medium growth scenario (2.34 percent rural, 2.98 percent urban).
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The Impacts of Increased Climate Variability on Welfare and Poverty
Although there is a great deal of uncertainty over the exact magnitudes 
of the global changes in temperature and especially precipitation, it is 
widely accepted that significant deviations of climate variability from its 
historical patterns are likely (IPCC 2007b). Erratic weather and increased 
climatic variability will affect agricultural productivity, which—depend-
ing on how effectively urban and rural households have employed risk-
management strategies before and after the fact—may translate into 
reduced income and reduced food availability at the household level.
Numerous studies have examined the impacts of natural disasters and 
extreme weather-related shocks on different dimensions of welfare (see 
Baez and Mason 2008; World Bank 2010a for a thorough review of this 
literature). In general, they show that extreme weather events are likely 
to negatively affect agricultural incomes (and thus food; basic nonfood 
consumption; and investments in human capital, health, nutrition, and 
productive physical assets). Many of these studies, however, tend to rely 
on the respondents’ perceptions about the incidence of different types of 
shocks, or they use rainfall and temperature data as tools (for example, as 
instrumental variables) to analyze how shocks to income affect other 
outcomes, such as consumption or investments in human capital.23 
Hardly any studies use actual weather data to analyze the general rela-
tionship between weather and the level of welfare. 
In chapter 4 of this volume, Skoufias and Vinha examine whether 
climatic variability—namely, deviations of rainfall and temperature from 
their long-run means—significantly affect the average well-being of rural 
Table 2.4 Projected Impact of Climate Change on Poverty Rates under Three 
Growth Scenarios in India by 2040
percentage points
Low growtha Medium growthb High growthc
Rural 5.9 4.4 0.7
Urban 1.1 0.6 0.1
All 4.8 3.5 0.6
Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias 2011.
Note: Poverty rate changes are relative to a no-climate-change scenario, not to current trends. The poverty rate is 
defined using the official state-level poverty lines of 2009. The warming projection for 2040 is based on the 
HadCM3 model (IPCC 2001), projecting a 1.25°C temperature increase for the country as a whole by 2040, 
although there is spatial variability on the projected changes in temperature.
a. Low growth = annual average mean consumption growth in India for 1958–91 (0.58 percent rural, 
0.79 percent urban).
b. Medium growth = annual average mean consumption growth for 1991–2006 (1.17 percent rural, 
1.49 percent urban).
c. High growth = double the rate of the medium growth scenario (2.34 percent rural, 2.98 percent urban).
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households in Mexico. They report that the timing of the rainfall or tem-
perature shock makes a substantial difference in its estimated impact on 
welfare. For example, per capita expenditures are 14 percent higher if the 
prior agricultural year (October to September) was at least one standard 
deviation drier than the average of a previous 35-year period (1951–85). 
However, if the rainfall shock were to occur during the wet season of that 
same year (April to September), neither positive nor negative rainfall 
shocks appeared to significantly affect household per capita expenditures. 
Also using such insights, in chapter 3, Skoufias, Essama-Nssah, and 
Katayama use data from rural Indonesia to consider the effects of two 
rainfall-related shocks: (a) a delay in the onset of monsoon and (b) a sig-
nificant shortfall in the amount of rain in the 90-day postmonsoon period. 
Focusing on households with family farm businesses, they find that rice-
farm households in areas experiencing low rainfall following the  monsoon’s 
onset are negatively affected: such a shortfall is associated with a 14  percent 
reduction in the households’ per capita expenditures. Moreover, rice-
farming households manage to protect their food expenditures in the face 
of weather shocks at the expense of nonfood expenditures. The findings 
regarding the impacts of climatic variability on nonfood consumption 
expenditures are consistent with households’ reduction of expenditures on 
health and education—reductions that ultimately may have a longer-term 
effect on poverty by reducing investment on the human capital of children. 
The Indonesia study also sheds light on some potential policy instru-
ments that might moderate the welfare impacts of climate change. Access 
to credit and public works projects in communities can help households 
cope with shocks and thereby play a strong role in protection from 
weather-related shocks. This is an important consideration for the design 
and implementation of adaptation strategies.
Potentially large poverty increases. The preceding studies focus on how 
weather-related shocks affect the mean level of welfare, though not nec-
essarily poverty. The negative effects on welfare suggest that the current 
risk-coping mechanisms have a limited capacity in protecting welfare 
from erratic weather patterns. Considering that coping mechanisms are 
backward looking (in the sense that they develop over time based on 
weather variability observed over very long periods of time), there is a 
concern about the extent to which such mechanisms can adjust to the 
changes in climatic variability predicted over the next 50 to 90 years. All 
in all, these observations imply that the predicted changes in climatic 
variability patterns are likely to reduce the effectiveness of the current 
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coping mechanisms even more and thus increase household vulnerability 
and poverty further.
Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, and Hertel (2009) is the only study to date 
making an effort to model the channels and estimate the poverty impacts 
of extreme weather events such as extreme heat, droughts, and floods. 
They apply the GTAP comparative static computable general equilib-
rium model (practically identical to that in Hertel, Burke, and Lobell 
[2010], discussed above) to 16 countries. The two studies differ mainly 
regarding the origin of the shocks to agriculture, which Ahmed, 
Diffenbaugh, and Hertel (2009) derive from three sources: 
1. The percentage of annual total precipitation from events exceeding the 
95th percentile in the 1961–90 period 
2. The maximum number of consecutive dry days 
3. The heat wave duration index. 
The authors compare two 30-year periods a century apart (1971–2000 
and 2071–2100) in the simulations under the IPCC’s A2 scenario.24 All 
16 countries exhibit substantial increases in the occurrence and magnitude 
of extreme heat events, with the occurrence of the present 30-year- 
maximum event increasing by more than 2,700 percent in parts of the 
northern Mediterranean and the magnitude of the 30-year-maximum 
event increasing by 1,000–2,250 percent (or even more) in much of central 
Africa. Most countries also display increases in the occurrence and magni-
tude of extreme dry events, with peak changes of greater than 800 percent 
and 60 percent, respectively, occurring over Mediterranean Europe.
The magnitude and spatial heterogeneity of changes in climate volatil-
ity suggest that the impacts on poverty could also be large and heteroge-
neous. Among the 16 countries analyzed, those with the highest shares of 
populations entering poverty because of these extreme events include 
Bangladesh, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. For 
example, in Malawi and Zambia, a simulated 75 percent decline in grains 
productivity causes the poverty headcount to increase by about 7 per-
centage points relative to the countries’ total populations.
Greater vulnerability of urban populations. There is also tremendous 
heterogeneity in the poverty vulnerability across different population seg-
ments (differentiated by primary income source). As in Hertel, Burke, and 
Lobell (2010), the analysis reveals that the most vulnerable group is the 
urban wage-labor-dependent stratum. Although the urban labor group 
contributes modestly to total poverty in the sample of 16 countries, it 
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appears to be highly vulnerable to extreme climate events (in Malawi, for 
example, the poverty rate for this group doubles). Mexico and Zambia 
also show high vulnerability in this group. 
The source of vulnerability of the urban poor is their extreme expo-
sure to food price increases. (With food being a major expenditure, this 
group’s consumption falls with rising prices, pushing them below the 
poverty threshold of consumption.) Agricultural households, on the other 
hand, are much less exposed: as consumers, they are generally hurt by the 
adverse productivity shock, but as producers, they also tend to benefit 
from the higher food prices.
Given that the shares of developing countries’ populations living in 
rural areas are projected to decrease by more than one-third between 
2010 and 2050 (UN 2009), climate extremes may increasingly affect 
national-scale poverty in the future because of higher population concen-
trations in the more-sensitive urban strata. 
Risk management for rural populations. The poverty impacts estimated 
above are based on simple approximations of how extreme climate 
events influence poverty by affecting agricultural productivity and raising 
prices of staple foods. However, it is important to bear in mind that an 
extensive literature also documents an association between weather vari-
ability (in the absence of credit and insurance markets) and a set of risk 
management strategies (before and after the fact) by rural households 
aimed at protecting household welfare.
For example, rural households may undertake income-smoothing 
strategies, such as the following, before the fact to spread the effects of 
weather-induced shocks through difficult times: 
• Adopt low-return, low-risk crop and asset portfolios (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger-Mkhize 1993) 
• Draw upon savings (Paxson 1992) 
• Take loans from the formal financial sector (Udry 1994) 
• Sell assets (Deaton 1992) 
• Diversify the occupations held by the adult members of the household 
(Menon 2009). 
Additional strategies include the management of income risk through 
after-the-fact adjustments to supplement income, such as the following:
• Sending children to work instead of school (Jacoby and Skoufias 
1997) 
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• Holding multiple jobs 
• Engaging in other informal economic activities (Kochar 1999; 
Morduch 1995). 
These risk management strategies themselves are associated with 
increased poverty and lower investment and growth (poverty traps) 
because poor households that are credit constrained will choose activities 
that reduce income variability but that also generate lower expected 
incomes than the activities chosen by wealthier (less constrained) house-
holds (Elbers, Gunning, and Kinsey 2007). 
Key Messages and Policy Considerations 
Although the studies surveyed are quite heterogeneous in terms of data 
(country-level versus household-level data and cross-sectional versus 
panel data); methods (partial equilibrium versus computable general 
equilibrium); and focus (regional versus country-specific), a number of 
messages can be extracted. 
Mitigating Effects of Economic Growth Are Often Ignored
Most estimates of the poverty impacts of climate change tend to ignore the 
effect of aggregate economic growth on poverty and household welfare. 
Thus, many of them provide unduly pessimistic, if not unrealistic, scenar-
ios. However, it is also important to bear in mind that the extent to which 
developing countries can sustain the high growth and the associated large 
poverty reduction rates of the recent past depends critically on whether 
they can maintain high growth rates while also burning less fossil fuel.
Climate Change Will Slow, but Not Reverse, 
Global Poverty Reduction
Climate change will slow the pace of global poverty reduction, but—
based on the mean or expected value of climate damages used in main-
stream analyses such as Nordhaus’s (2010) RICE model or The Stern 
Review (Stern 2007)—the expected poverty impact will be relatively 
modest and far from reversing the major decline in poverty that is 
expected to occur over the next 40 years as a result of continued eco-
nomic growth. However, some qualifications are in order: 
• Much of the poverty impact is expected to be concentrated in Africa 
and South Asia, both of which would see more substantial increases in 
poverty relative to a baseline without climate change. 
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• The occurrence of less-probable but more extreme climate damage 
scenarios would naturally result in larger poverty increases. 
• Aggregate projected damages are relatively low over the time horizon 
(mid-century) analyzed here. As climate change continues to unfold 
during this and the next century, aggregate damages could be substan-
tial and have a larger effect on poverty.
For the Full Story, Take Heterogeneity into Account
The estimated impacts of climate change on agricultural yields are gener-
ally poor predictors of the poverty impacts of climate change at the 
national level. The studies reviewed here suggest that the decline in agri-
cultural productivity resulting from climate change translates into much 
smaller poverty increases at the national level, primarily because of these 
two factors: 
• Heterogeneity in how climate change affects different geographical 
areas within countries as well as across the national income 
 distribution 
• Heterogeneity in the households’ ability to adapt: for example, moving 
across space and across sectors of employment. 
It is important to keep in mind that the heterogeneity of climate-
change impacts across space is not synonymous with heterogeneity in the 
ability of households to adapt (before or after the fact) to the climate 
changes. 
Regressive Impacts Will Hurt the Urban Poor the Most
It also appears that the impacts of climate change are generally 
regressive—that is, falling more heavily on the poor than on the rich. 
However, the higher food prices associated with the global increase in 
temperatures are likely to hurt households that are net consumers of food 
and to benefit those that are net producers of food. 
Moreover, increasing urbanization suggests that the number of net 
consumers of food is likely to increase substantially over the next few 
decades. This suggests that both results of climate change—gradual 
global warming and the increased incidence of extreme weather—are 
likely to hurt households dependent on urban wage labor much more 
than those dependent on rural labor (that is, those self-employed in 
agriculture).
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Although uncertainty abounds about whether the global decline in 
agricultural productivity will translate into large increases in grain prices, 
some evidence indicates that price increases on the order of 30 percent 
by 2030 will translate into considerably smaller changes in the cost of 
living for those households close to the poverty line. 
Mitigation and Adaptation Policies Also Foster Growth
Fortunately, many of the policies that can effectively reduce the impacts 
of climate change on poverty are the same strategies that promote sound 
development, poverty reduction, and economic growth. The most impor-
tant policy elements are these: 
• Enhancement of international trade to smooth the price impacts of 
regional or country-specific climate shocks
• Investment in human capital to increase employment opportunities for 
the poor 
• Facilitation of migration to help the poor reach areas with better 
 economic opportunities 
• Provision of access to credit and developing insurance markets 
• Investment in transportation and communication infrastructure
• Investment in irrigation and water management to deal with extreme 
precipitation events
• Investment in adaptive agricultural research and in information and 
extension services 
• Improvement of common-pool natural resource governance 
• Creation of well-targeted, scalable safety-net systems. 
The regressive impacts of climate change mentioned above, combined 
with the emerging evidence that access to social protection and credit 
programs moderate the welfare impacts of climate change, suggest that 
the establishment of safety-net programs and the strengthening of the 
institutions needed to implement and scale up such programs should be 
a critical component of country-level adaptation strategies. 
In particular, countercyclical safety-net systems such as conditional 
and unconditional cash transfers; workfare programs (for example, food- 
or cash-for-work); and social funds (community-level programs in infra-
structure, social services, training, and so on) can have immediate 
payoffs because they enable countries to deal with economic crises and 
other shocks that may not be related to climate change and climatic 
variability.
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Annex 2A Using the RICE Model to Estimate Poverty 
Impacts of Climate Change
Methodology
To project the impacts of climate change on poverty, it is necessary to 
estimate (a) how climate change will affect the welfare measure (for 
example, per capita gross domestic product [GDP], per capita private 
consumption expenditure [PCE] from national account statistics, or 
household mean income); and (b) how these changes in welfare measures 
translate into poverty numbers.
Focusing on the second relation, a simple and straightforward concept 
is the poverty-growth elasticity. This relationship is derived from the fact 
that any poverty measure, such as the headcount ratio, can be expressed 
(for a given poverty line) as a function of the mean of the distribution and 
the parameters of the Lorenz curve25:
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Differentiating the previous equation with respect to time, we obtain 
the dynamic counterpart:
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π , (2A.2)
which shows how changes in poverty relate either to economic growth or 
to changes in the Lorenz curve. The first term on the right-hand side, also 
known as the growth component, can be estimated with a regression of 
the proportionate changes in poverty on the proportionate changes in the 
welfare measure, with or without controls (X):
 
dH
H
d
X= − + +α β μ
μ
γ ε , (2A.3)
where b is the poverty-growth elasticity with respect to the mean con-
sumption given by m.26
For consistency, we replace the household mean income or consump-
tion with the per capita PCE in the estimation of the parameter of inter-
est. This empirical decision was made because projections from the 
Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) are 
available only for PCE per capita.
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There exist differences between estimating the poverty-growth 
e lasticity based on household mean income and estimating it based on 
per capita PCE. Panel a of figure 2A.1 shows the proportionate changes 
in the poverty rate against the average income growth rate. The overall 
poverty-growth elasticity (defined as $2 a day at  purchasing power 
parity [PPP]) is −2.02 with a (heteroskedasticity corrected) standard 
error of 0.82.
In contrast, panel b of figure 2A.1 plots the proportionate changes in 
the same poverty rate against the growth rate in PCE per capita. Though 
similar, the estimated elasticity of −1.44 (standard error of 0.60) is not as 
strong as before.27 It is important to note that these estimations are based 
on the same countries and time spells to make both welfare measures 
comparable across both space and time.28
Data
The data requirement for this exercise might be divided into two: 
 historical data and projections. Historical data are needed to compute the 
Figure 2A.1 Changes in Poverty Headcount Ratio
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poverty-growth elasticity. For this purpose, we construct a dataset with 
the following variables: poverty measure ($2-a-day headcount ratio), 
household mean income or expenditure, and per capita PCE. Our dataset 
includes 91 countries, 75 of which have at least two surveys from the 
early 1990s until 2000 (last year available). Table 2A.1 lists the countries 
and survey dates used in the simulation. 
Following Ravallion and Chen (1997), we define a “spell” as the maxi-
mum distance between two surveys for one country within the time 
range defined in table 2A.1. We restrict the sample of countries’ poverty 
measure and mean income (or expenditure) to those years that were 
computed over the same measure of living standards and area. In some 
cases, different subperiods use different measures for a given country; for 
instance, surveys may switch from income to consumption or extend the 
survey sample from urban to country representativeness.29 Given that we 
are computing poverty-growth elasticities based on PCE, we complete 
Figure 2A.1 (continued)
–1.0
–0.5
0
0.5
1.0
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 $
2-
a-
d
ay
 p
o
ve
rt
y 
ra
te
–0.10 0.05–0.05 0.100 0.15
Percentage change in PCE
b. Changes in poverty rate against per capita PCE
growth, at constant PPP
Source: Authors’ estimations based on data from World Bank 2010b and PovcalNet, the online tool for poverty 
measurement developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org/
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Note: Poverty is defined as per capita income of $2 a day or less. PCE = personal consumption expenditure, 
PPP = purchasing power parity.
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Table 2A.1 Coverage of the Dataset for Poverty-Growth Elasticity Simulations 
Region Country Survey dates Welfare indicator Region Country Survey dates Welfare indicator
European Union Czech Republic 1993 1996 Income Africa Algeria 1995 — Expenditure
Hungary 1998 2004 Expenditure Benin 2003 — Expenditure
Poland 1992 2005 Expenditure Botswana 1994 — Expenditure
Slovak Republic 1996 — Income Burkina Faso 1994 2003 Expenditure
Turkey 1994 2006 Expenditurea Cameroon 1996 2001 Expenditure
Cape Verde 2001 — Expenditure
Russia Russian Federation 1993 2007 Expenditurea Central African Republic 2003 — Expenditure
Comoros 2004 — Expenditure
EurAsia Albania 1997 2005 Expenditure Congo, Rep. 2005 — Expenditure
Armenia 1996 2007 Expenditurea Egypt, Arab Rep. 1991 2005 Expenditure
Azerbaijan 1995 2005 Expenditure Ethiopia 1995 2005 Expenditure
Belarus 2000 2005 Expenditure Guinea 1991 2003 Expenditure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 2007 Expenditurea Guinea-Bissau 1991 2002 Expenditure
Bulgaria 1994 2003 Expenditure Gabon 2005 — Expenditure
Croatia 1998 2005 Expenditure Kenya 1992 2005 Expenditure
Estonia 1995 2004 Expenditure Lesotho 1993 2003 Expenditure
Georgia 1996 2005 Expenditure Madagascar 1993 2005 Expenditure
Kazakhstan 1996 2003 Expenditure Malawi 1998 2004 Expenditure
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 2004 Expenditure Mali 1994 2006 Expenditure
Latvia 1998 2007 Expenditurea Mauritania 2000 — Expenditure
Lithuania 1996 2004 Expenditure Morocco 1991 2007 Expenditure
Macedonia, FYR 1998 2006 Expenditurea Mozambique 1997 2003 Expenditure
(continued next page)
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Table 2A.1 (continued)
Region Country Survey dates Welfare indicator Region Country Survey dates Welfare indicator
Moldova 1997 2004 Expenditure Namibia 1993 — Income
Romania 1998 2007 Expenditurea Niger 2005 — Expenditure
Slovenia 1998 2004 Expenditure Senegal 1991 2005 Expenditure
Tajikistan 1999 2004 Expenditure South Africa 1993 2000 Income
Ukraine 1996 2008 Expenditurea Swaziland 1995 2001 Expenditure
Tanzania 1992 2000 Expenditure
India India-Urban 1994 2005 Expenditure Tunisia 1990 2000 Expenditure
India-Rural 1994 2005 Expenditure Uganda 1992 2005 Expenditure
Zambia 1991 2004 Expenditure
Middle East Iran, Islamic Rep. 1990 2005 Expenditure Latin 
America Argentina-Urban 1996 2006 Income
Jordan 1992 2006 Expenditure Belize 1995 — Income
Bolivia 1991 2007 Incomea
China China-Urban 1990 2005 Expenditure Brazil 1990 2007 Income
China-Rural 1990 2005 Expenditure Chile 1990 2006 Income
Colombia 1995 2006 Income
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Other Asian Bangladesh 1992 2005 Expenditure Costa Rica 1990 2007 Incomea
Cambodia 1994 2007 Expenditurea Dominican Republic 1992 2006 Incomea
Lao PDR 2002 — Expenditure Ecuador 1994 2007 Income
Malaysia 1992 2004 Incomea El Salvador 1995 2007 Incomea
Mongolia 2005 — Expenditure Guatemala 1998 2006 Income
Pakistan 1991 2005 Expenditure Honduras 1990 2006 Income
Philippines 1991 2006 Expenditure Mexico 1992 2008 Incomea
Thailand 1992 2004 Expenditure Nicaragua 1993 2005 Income
Vietnam 1998 2006 Expenditure Panama 1991 2006 Income
Paraguay 1990 2007 Income
Peru 1990 2007 Income
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 — Income
Uruguay-Urban 1992 2006 Income
Venezuela, RB 1993 2006 Income
Source: PovcalNet, the online tool for poverty measurement developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org/povcalnet).
Note: — = not available.
a. Poverty headcount $2-a-day and private consumption expenditure from National Accounts available but not household mean income or expenditure.
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the dataset with the per capita household expenditure PPP in 2005 
 constant terms. All rates of change are compound annual rates.30 
To maintain consistency, we grouped countries according to the RICE 
classification and estimated the poverty-growth elasticities based on PCE 
instead of mean household income because climate change projections 
from RICE are available only for per capita consumption. 
A second dataset includes per capita consumption projections for 
10-year intervals from 2005 to 2055 based on the 2010 runs of the RICE 
model (Nordhaus 2010). From this model, we obtain growth rate trajec-
tories for two scenarios under climate change: business as usual (BAU) 
and optimal abatement. The BAU scenario assumes that no  climate-change 
policies are adopted. In contrast, under the optimal abatement scenario, 
those climate-change policies that maximize global economic welfare are 
adopted, with full participation by all nations starting in 2010. These two 
macro projections are the net of climate-change damages and abatement 
costs. To make these scenarios comparable, we create a baseline scenario 
(without climate change) based on the RICE 2010 model of Nordhaus 
(2010).31 We modify the present investment as a function of the gross 
present output instead of the net present output of abatement and cli-
mate change.32
Simulation Results
Figure 2A.2 shows estimates of how climate change would affect global 
average PCE per capita according to RICE projections. Each of the three 
climate-change scenarios presents positive annual growth rates for the 
rest of the century, albeit with a decreasing trend. However, the growth 
gap widens between the baseline (no climate change) and the BAU or 
optimal scenarios. 
Table 2A.2 presents estimations of poverty-growth elasticities for dif-
ferent countries and regions.33 All coefficients are negative, meaning that 
a higher PCE per capita will translate into lower poverty rates. However, 
some regions respond faster to economic growth than others. For instance, 
with a 2 percent annual rate of growth and an initial headcount index of 
40 percent in a relatively inelastic region such as Africa (with a poverty-
growth elasticity of −0.45), the headcount index will fall by less than 
1 percent per year (or 0.35 percentage points in the first year). The head-
count index will be halved in approximately 78 years. By contrast, in a 
relatively more elastic region such as Latin America with an elasticity of 
−1.35 (triple Africa’s elasticity), it will take about 26 years to halve the 
initial poverty rate.
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Tables 2A.3 and 2A.4 present poverty projections (measured as the 
number of people living below the $2-a-day poverty line) under the BAU 
and optimal scenarios, respectively, compared with the baseline (no cli-
mate change) scenario for each region or country. In the absence of global 
warming, the world’s headcount ratio would fall by more than 50 percent 
over the next 50 years, implying that 1.26 billion people would remain 
in poverty, most of them living in Africa and India. In absolute terms, 
climate change would result in 9.4–10.0 million more poor people glob-
ally by mid-century for the BAU and the optimal scenarios, respectively. 
The poverty impacts of climate change also show regional disparities, 
with India and Africa being the most affected. 
Figure 2A.3 shows how many more people will be living in poverty 
between now and 2055 under the BAU and optimal scenarios relative to 
a world without global warming. Both curves slope upward through 
Figure 2A.2 Estimated PCE per Capita Growth under 
Three Climate-Change Scenarios
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on Nordhaus 2010.
Note: The “baseline” scenario assumes a world without climate change. The “BAU” scenario assumes business as 
usual, following current climate-change trends. The “optimal” scenario assumes a world undergoing climate 
change but globally implementing strategies for optimal abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. 
PCE = personal consumption expenditure.
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Table 2A.3 Potential Impact of Climate Change on Poverty under Baseline versus 
BAU Scenarios, Selected Regions and Countries, 2005–55
people living on less than $2 a day (millions) 
2005
2055
DifferenceBaseline BAU
Region
 European Union 24.36 0.87 0.93 0.06
 Eurasia 26.98 0.24 0.25 0.01
 Middle East 67.16 19.80 20.37 0.58
 Africa 482.46 342.21 347.94 5.72
 Latin America 95.08 7.49 7.67 0.18
 Other Asian 70.58 23.78 24.33 0.55
Country
 Russian Federation 2.12 0.03 0.03 0
 China 473.27 0 0 0
 India 827.40 864.72 867.69 2.98
Total 2,069.40 1,259.13 1,269.21 10.08
Headcount rate 32.28 14.11 14.23 0.11
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Nordhaus 2010.
Note: The “Baseline” scenario assumes a world without climate change. “BAU” designates a business-as-usual 
scenario, extending current climate-change trends.
Table 2A.2 Poverty-Growth Elasticity, Selected Regions and Countries, 2010
Coefficient
Robust standard 
error t p>|t|
95% confidence 
interval
Region
 European Union −2.523 4.167 −0.610 0.606 −20.454 15.408
 Eurasia −1.863 0.286 −6.510 0 −2.473 −1.253
 Middle East −1.060 0.199 −5.320 0.118 −3.593 1.472
 Africa −0.446 0.170 −2.620 0.017 −0.803 −0.090
 Latin America −1.348 0.448 −3.010 0.008 −2.294 −0.403
 Other Asian −1.142 0.166 −6.880 0 −1.548 −0.736
Country
 Russian Federation −2.078 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 China −1.112 0.620 −1.790 0.324 −8.987 6.763
 India −0.130 0.019 −6.890 0.092 −0.369 0.110
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank 2010b and data from PovcalNet, the online tool for poverty 
measurement developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org/
povcalnet).
Note: Results are weighted based on share of country population over total region population. Estimates were 
obtained using Ordinary Least Squares, regressing the annualized change in the FGT(0), or poverty headcount 
index, between household surveys on the time elapsed between the surveys and the annualized change in the 
personal consumption expenditure of national accounts (constant 2005 purchasing power parity). Standard 
 errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. n.a. = not applicable.
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Table 2A.4 Potential Impact of Climate Change on Poverty under Baseline without 
Climate Change versus Optimal Scenarios, Selected Regions and Countries, 2005–55
people living on less than $2 a day, millions
2005
2055
DifferenceBaseline Optimal
Region
 European Union 24.36 0.87 0.92 0.06
 Eurasia 26.98 0.24 0.25 0.01
 Middle East 67.16 19.80 20.36 0.57
 Africa 482.46 342.21 347.45 5.24
 Latin America 95.08 7.49 7.66 0.17
 Other Asian 70.58 23.78 24.32 0.54
Country
 Russian Federation 2.12 0.03 0.03 0
 China 473.27 0 0 0
 India 827.40 864.72 867.53 2.82
Total 2,069.40 1,259.13 1,268.54 9.40
Headcount rate 32.28 14.11 14.22 0.11
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Nordhaus 2010.
Note: The “baseline” scenario assumes a world without climate change. The “optimal” scenario assumes a world 
undergoing climate change but globally implementing strategies for optimal abatement of GHG emissions.
Figure 2A.3 Potential Impact of Climate Change on Global Poverty under BAU and 
Optimal Scenarios, 2005–55
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on Nordhaus 2010.
Note: “BAU” designates a business-as-usual scenario, projecting current climate-change trends. The “optimal” 
scenario assumes a world undergoing climate change but globally implementing strategies for optimal 
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions.
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 mid-century, implying that climate change will have a negative impact on 
poverty. In particular, under the BAU scenario, about 10 million more 
people will be living in poverty by 2055 than under the baseline 
(no  climate change) scenario. 
The optimal trajectory (based on climate-change policies that maxi-
mize intertemporal welfare) shows a higher incidence of poverty in the 
near future as more resources are diverted toward abatement efforts, 
hence reducing the per capita rate of economic growth. However, the 
initial negative impact of abatement on poverty is compensated in the 
future as the optimal policies reduce future warming. 
Notes
 1. See annex 2A for a detailed description of the methodology and data used to 
project the impacts of climate change on poverty using the RICE (Regional 
Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy) model developed by 
Nordhaus (2010).
 2. The within-country cross-sectional relationship is substantially weaker than 
the cross-country correlation, but it remains statistically significant and of an 
economically important magnitude, with a 1°C rise in temperature associated 
with a 1.2–1.9 percent decline in municipal per capita income (not GDP).
 3. In Assunção and Chein Feres (2009), regional effects in Brazil are considered 
in the following five divisions: North, Northeast, Central-West, Southeast, 
and South.
 4. F or each municipality, they consider a sample comprising the nonmigrant 
households and those who outmigrate to other municipalities—but excluding 
migrants from other municipalities.
 5. F or a detailed description of IAMs in the context of climate change control, 
see Kelly and Kolstad (1999).
 6. P AGE (Hope 2006) is an IAM used extensively by The Stern Review (Stern 
2007).
 7. I t is a common practice to multiply the growth rate in GDP by 0.8 to approx-
imate the growth rate in consumption. This adjustment factor, however, is not 
explicitly documented in any published paper that we are aware of.
 8. T he Stern Review reports Anderson’s results based on the 95th percentile of 
the climate-change damage distribution. Under these higher damages, by 
2100, climate change could increase the number of poor people by 46 million 
in South Asia and by 98 million in Sub-Saharan Africa.
 9. I t is useful to benchmark Nordhaus’s (2010) BAU scenario against other IAMs. 
For example, PAGE 2002 estimates that the mean loss in world output in 2100 
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would be 2.9 percent under its high-climate-change scenario. The RICE model 
presumes a somewhat larger 3.3 percent loss in 2105. Differences in inferences 
from various models depend more on whether one examines the mean 
impacts of uncertain climate change or the tails of the impact distribution.
 10.  Given the limitations in knowledge and large uncertainties surrounding  climate 
change, its impact on economic growth, and the impacts of growth on pov-
erty, this analysis (as well as Anderson’s) should be viewed as indicative 
only of the potential consequences of climate change on global poverty. There 
are profound uncertainties at every stage in global warming modeling—uncer-
tainties about future output growth; the pace and direction of technological 
change (particularly for low-carbon energy sources); migration patterns; 
 climatic reaction to rising GHG concentrations; and the economic and  ecological 
responses to changing climate and how impacts should be discounted.
 11. The RICE projections of annual per capita growth rates are decreasing over 
time. The annual world output growth also masks considerable regional dis-
parities; for example, although China and India are expected to grow at a 
3.6 annual per capita rate, the European Union will grow at a 1.8 annual rate.
 12.  See Cline (2007) for a synthesis of impacts reported in the literature, and 
Hertel and Rosch (2010) for a review of methodologies.
 13. Autonomous adaptation is typically distinguished from planned adaptation, 
which refers to policy-based actions that are needed when market failures or 
other coordination problems hinder relevant collective responses to climate 
change.
 14. The authors consider seven types of households based on their primary 
sources of earnings (that is, where they earn 95 percent of their income): 
agricultural self-employed (farm income), nonagricultural (nonagricultural 
self-employed earnings), urban labor (urban households with wage labor 
income), rural labor (rural households with wage labor income), transfer 
payment-dependent, and two groups of households with nonspecialized 
income sources (urban diverse and rural diverse).
 15. The commonly used $1-a-day standard, measured in 1985 international 
prices and adjusted to local currency using PPPs, was chosen for the World 
Bank’s (1990) World Development Report 1990: Poverty because it was typical 
of the poverty lines in low-income countries at the time. International poverty 
lines were revised using the new data on PPPs compiled in the 2005 round of 
the International Comparison Program, along with data from an expanded set 
of household income and expenditure surveys. The new extreme poverty line 
is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean of the 
poverty lines found in the poorest 15 percent of countries ranked by per 
capita consumption. The median poverty line for developing countries is $2 a 
day in 2005 PPP terms. Poverty measures are prepared by the World Bank’s 
Development Research Group. For details on data sources and methods used 
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in deriving the World Bank’s latest estimates, see http://iresearch.worldbank
.org/povcalnet.
 16. Another feature of Hertel, Burke, and Lobell’s (2010) model is that all house-
holds in each region face the same prices and have the same preferences. 
Therefore, the change in the estimated real cost of living at the poverty line 
is the same across strata for any given country.
 17. Differences in the impact of cost-of-living changes on poverty for different 
types of households result from differences in poverty elasticities across strata 
within each country.
 18. It should also be noted that the impacts of climate change are derived based 
on the current stock and distribution of endowments of land and labor.
 19. The effect of climate change on the price of cereals in India is obtained from 
the ENVISAGE (Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General 
Equilibrium) model, a multisector computable general equilibrium model 
developed at the World Bank for assessing climate-change effects and policies. 
The model predicts that cereal prices will rise approximately 10 percent by 
2040 because of warming.
 20. Thus, in contrast to the seven types of households considered in Hertel, 
Burke, and Lobell (2010), in this model there is a continuum of households.
 21. The estimates show that, in the absence of adaptation, a 1°C increase in annual 
temperature reduces gross productivity per hectare by 24–31 percent, which 
translates into a much smaller decline in consumption of 10.9–11.3 percent.
 22. I t is important to keep in mind that, in India, the mean level of aggregate 
household expenditure in the National Sample Survey accounts for only 
60 percent of the PCE from the National Accounts (Ravallion 2003). 
Regarding the growth rate in mean consumption in India, it is a common 
practice to multiply the growth rate in GDP by 0.8 so as to get an approxima-
tion of the growth rate in consumption (see note 7).
 23. T here is a large literature on the extent to which short-term weather shocks 
in poor rural areas can have long-term effects on education, health, and nutri-
tion, especially of children. For a recent review of these studies, see Baez and 
Mason (2008).
 24. A s previously discussed, the IPCC’s SRES A2 scenario might not accurately 
represent the expected GDP and population growth rates and the consequen-
tial emissions path. As a result, the A2 scenario is an extreme one that over-
estimates the negative impact that climate change will have on poverty 
reduction efforts.
 25. F or further details, see Ferreira (2010).
 26. T his parameter could take any sign and magnitude depending on how the 
distribution changes with economic growth. In other words, the Lorenz curve 
is not constant over time (see Ravallion and Chen 1997).
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 27. T hese results are similar to those estimated by Ravallion (2001): a −2.50 growth 
elasticity of poverty based on consumption versus a −1.96 elasticity based on 
PCE per capita. However, caution must be taken in this comparison because 
these elasticities were computed for $1 a day at 1993 PPP.
 28. T he PCE per capita has other measurement problems: Survey periods do not 
match exactly the periods used in national accounts. At the same time, 
changes in PCE can arise solely from the nonhousehold sector of the economy 
(Ravallion 2001, 2003; Ravallion and Chen 1997).
 29. T hese data were obtained from PovcalNet, the online tool for poverty mea-
surement developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank 
(http://econ.worldbank.org/povcalnet).
 30. A nnualized differences in logs gave similar results (see Ravallion 1997).
 31. A batement costs are zero in the baseline scenario.
 32. T he RICE model assumes that saving rates remain constant.
 33. The use of poverty-growth elasticities to estimate climate-change impacts has 
some appealing features, but it also has several limitations that must be taken 
into account when interpreting results. Even though other approaches, such 
as Bhalla (2002) and Hillebrand (2008), take into account distributional 
changes, we are assuming an unchanging within-country distribution of per 
capita income over time. In other words, we are not differentiating between 
growth and redistribution effects on poverty. We adopt this assumption 
mainly for two reasons: first, most empirical evidence found that the poor on 
average tend to share proportionately in the gains from economic growth, and 
this outweighed the impact of changes in the distribution (Datt and Ravallion 
1992; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Kraay 2006; Ravallion 2001, 2007). 
Second, there is little scientific basis for predicting long-run distributional 
changes (Chen and Ravallion 2004). At the same time, we are assuming that 
the relationship between growth and poverty (the poverty-growth elasticity) 
for the next 50 years will remain constant. These two assumptions are indeed 
very restrictive, especially as we project poverty impacts for the distant 
future.
References
Ahmed, S., N. Diffenbaugh, and T. Hertel. 2009. “Climate Volatility Deepens 
Poverty Vulnerability in Developing Countries.” Environmental Research 
Letters 4 (3): 1–8.
Anderson, E. 2006. “Potential Impacts of Climate Change on $2 a Day Poverty 
and Child Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.” Unpublished 
manuscript, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
52       The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change
Andersen, L., and D. Verner. 2010. “Simulating the Effects of Climate Change on 
Poverty and Inequality.” In Reducing Poverty, Protecting Livelihoods and Building 
Assets in a Changing Climate: Social Implications of Climate Change for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, ed. D. Verner, 249–65. Directions in Development 
Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Assunção, J., and F. Chein Feres. 2009. “Climate Change, Agricultural Productivity, 
and Poverty.” Working paper, Department of Economics, Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica (PUC), Rio de Janeiro. 
Baez, J., and A. Mason. 2008. “Dealing with Climate Change: Household Risk 
Management and Adaptation in Latin America.” Background paper for Low 
Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change, ed. 
A. de la Torre, P. Fajnzylber, and J. Nash. Washington, DC: World Bank
Bhalla, S. 2002. Imagine There’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in 
the Era of Globalization. Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics.
Chen, S., and M. Ravallion. 2004. “Household Welfare Impacts of WTO Accession 
in China.” World Bank Economic Review 18 (1): 29–58.
Cline, W. 2007. Global Warming and Agriculture: Impact Estimates by Country. 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.
Datt, G., and M. Ravallion. 1992. “Growth and Redistribution Components of 
Changes in Poverty Measures: A Decomposition with Applications to 
Brazil and India in the 1980s.” Journal of Development Economics 38 (2): 
275–95.
———. 2011. “Has India’s Economic Growth Become More Pro-Poor in the Wake 
of Economic Reforms?” The World Bank Economic Review 25 (2): 157–89.
Deaton, A. 1992. Understanding Consumption. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dell, M., B. Jones, and B. Olken. 2009. “Temperature and Income: Reconciling 
New Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates.” American Economic Review 99 (2): 
198–204.
Deschenes, O., and M. Greenstone. 2007. “The Economic Impacts of Climate 
Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in 
Weather.” American Economic Review 97 (1): 354–85. 
Dollar, K., and A. Kraay. 2002. “Growth Is Good for the Poor.” Journal of 
Development Economics 7 (3): 195–225.
Elbers, C., J. Gunning, and B. Kinsey. 2007. “Growth and Risk: Methodology and 
Micro Evidence.” The World Bank Economic Review 21 (1): 1–20.
Ferreira, F. 2010. “Distributions in Motion: Economic Growth, Inequality, and 
Poverty Dynamics.” Policy Research Working Paper 5424, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
The Forecast for Poverty: A Review of the Evidence       53
Hertel, T., M. Burke, and D. Lobell. 2010. “The Poverty Implications of Climate-
Induced Crop Yield Changes by 2030.” Global Environmental Change 20 (4): 
577–85.
Hertel, T., and S. Rosch. 2010. “Climate Change, Agriculture and Poverty.” Applied 
Economic Perspectives and Policy 32 (3): 355–85.
Hillebrand, E. 2008. “The Global Distribution of Income in 2050.” World 
Development 36 (5): 727–40.
Hope, C. 2006. “The Marginal Impact of CO2 from PAGE 2002: An Integrated 
Assessment Model Incorporating the IPCC’s Five Reasons for Concern.” The 
Integrated Assessment Journal 6 (1): 19–56.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2001. Climate 
Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press.
———. 2007a. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2007b. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Jacoby, H., M. Rabassa, and E. Skoufias. 2011. “The Distribution Implications of 
Climate Change in India.” Policy Research Working Paper 5622, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Jacoby, H., and E. Skoufias. 1997. “Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in 
a Developing Country.” The Review of Economic Studies 64 (3): 311–35.
Kelly, D., and C. Kolstad. 1999. “Integrated Assessment Models for Climate 
Change Control.” In The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource 
Economics 1999/2000: A Survey of Current Issues, ed. H. Folmer and 
T. Tietenberg. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Kochar, A. 1999. “Smoothing Consumption by Smoothing Income: Hours-of-
Work Responses to Idiosyncratic Agricultural Shocks in Rural India.” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1): 50–61.
Kraay, A. 2006. “When Is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from a Panel of Countries.” 
Journal of Development Economics 80 (1): 198–227.
Mendelsohn, R., W. Nordhaus, and D. Shaw. 1994. “The Impact of Global 
Warming on Agriculture: A Ricardian Analysis.” American Economic Review 
84 (4): 753–71.
Menon, N. 2009. “Rainfall Uncertainty and Occupational Choice in 
Agricultural Households of Rural Nepal.” Journal of Development Studies 
45 (6): 864–88. 
54       The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change
Morduch, J. 1995. “Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 9 (3): 103–14.
Nakic´enovic´, N., and R. Swart, eds. 2000. Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A 
Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Nordhaus, W. 1993. “Reflections on the Economics of Climate Change.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 7 (4): 11–25.
———. 2010. “Economic Aspects of Global Warming in a Post-Copenhagen 
Environment.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 107 (26): 
11721–26.
Paxson, C. 1992. “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings 
to Transitory Income in Thailand.” American Economic Review 82 (1): 15–33.
Ravallion, M. 1997. “Can High-Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute 
Poverty?” Economics Letters 56 (1997): 51–57.
———. 2001. “Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages.” World 
Development 29 (11): 1803–15.
———. 2003. “Measuring Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries: How Well 
Do National Accounts and Surveys Agree?” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 85 (3): 645–52.
———. 2007. “Inequality Is Bad for the Poor.” In Inequality and Poverty Re-examined, 
ed. S. Jenkins and J. Micklewright, 37–60. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ravallion, M., and S. Chen. 1997. “What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about 
Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?” The World Bank Economic 
Review 11 (2): 357–82.
Rosenzweig, M., and H. Binswanger-Mkhize. 1993. “Wealth, Weather Risk, and 
the Composition and Profitability of Agricultural Investments.” The Economic 
Journal 103 (416): 56–78.
Stern, N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Udry, C. 1994. “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical 
Investigation in Northern Nigeria.” The Review of Economic Studies 61 (3): 
495–526.
UN (United Nations). 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New 
York: UN.
World Bank. 1990. World Development Report 1990: Poverty. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
———. 2010a. Natural Hazards and Unnatural Disasters: The Economics of 
Effective Prevention. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2010b. World Development Indicators 2010. Washington, DC: World Bank.
55 
C H A P T E R  3
Too Little Too Late: Welfare Impacts 
of Rainfall Shocks in Rural Indonesia
Emmanuel Skoufias, Roy S. Katayama, and 
Boniface Essama-Nssah
Introduction
In Indonesia, annual rainfall patterns are critical to agricultural output 
and rural livelihoods. In the cultivation of rice, the country’s most impor-
tant crop, farmers typically grow seedlings in a small plot and then trans-
plant them to flooded paddy fields when rainfall is sufficient. Thus, low 
cumulative rainfall at the beginning of the wet season can delay trans-
planting and subsequently harvesting (Heytens 1991). Such climate-
induced delays in crop harvests can mean an extended hungry season for 
poor farmers with limited savings or stocks. Furthermore, these delays can 
also undermine the prospects for a decent second harvest later in the year. 
Empirical studies have shown that in Indonesia the amount of rainfall 
from September to December—the early portion of the wet season—
has a strong positive correlation with rice production output throughout 
the area planted and the area harvested in January to April. Between 
1971 and 1998, the September–December rainfall explained more than 
80 percent of the variation in both the planted and harvested rice areas 
in January–April (Naylor et al. 2001, 2002). 
These same studies further linked rainfall to sea-surface temperature 
anomaly (SSTA) and to El Niño and La Niña climate patterns—supporting 
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proposed forecasting models to inform food policy planning. In extending 
climate production models down to the province level, Falcon et al. (2004) 
suggested that with improved forecasting models and timely dissemina-
tion, farmers could be notified of recommended cropping patterns to adapt 
to changing conditions, and agencies could be better positioned to mobilize 
relief efforts to assist poor and near-poor households affected by shocks. 
Although extensive research has examined the rainfall-production 
links at the aggregate level, little is known about the welfare losses that 
households suffer from the rainfall shocks, irrespective of whether the 
shocks are induced by El Niño. Low-income households are believed to 
be the most vulnerable to the impacts of negative shocks, including rain-
fall shocks, for many reasons: their geographical locations, limited assets, 
limited access to resources and services, low human capital, and high 
dependence upon natural resources for income and consumption. 
Despite wide recognition of the threat of climate-induced shocks upon 
poor people, limited attention has been given to quantifying the effects 
of rainfall shocks at the household level. Our analysis considers the 
household welfare implications of both a late monsoon onset and low 
level of rainfall. As we note later, a certain amount of rainfall is needed in 
the 90-day post-onset period for rice to grow properly.
Questions for Policy Makers
With projections pointing to a greater probability of rainfall shocks in the 
future,1 policy makers will need to know what policies can either mitigate 
the impacts or help households to cope. A good place to start is with 
the various social safety nets and other assistance programs already in place. 
Here we assess their role in helping households cope with the impacts of 
rainfall shocks or in mitigating those impacts. For instance, we consider 
the following: 
• Programs that provide households with greater access to credit may 
help them cope with delayed or poor harvests. 
• Grants that support public works projects may generate nonfarm 
employment opportunities in the community. 
• Community block grants that are used to invest in more advanced irriga-
tion infrastructure could help mitigate the impacts of the rainfall shocks. 
Evidence from within Indonesia confirming or refuting such claims 
could help policy makers identify instruments to help protect vulnerable 
households. Using available data, we explore the potential moderating 
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effects of various programs. This chapter, therefore, analyzes the potential 
welfare impacts of rainfall shocks in rural Indonesia and draws relevant 
policy lessons. 
Chapter Structure
Following this introductory context, the chapter is organized as follows: 
• “Methodology” examines the means of estimating how rainfall variabil-
ity affects household expenditure per capita—our measure of welfare. 
The guiding view here is that the distribution of welfare losses associated 
with such events depends on (a) the degree of household- and 
 community-level vulnerability, and (b) the moderating impact of  existing 
assets and social protection institutions. Understanding these  factors is 
critical to designing policies that will minimize exposure to these shocks 
and the impact of that exposure. 
• “Weather and Survey Data” presents the household- and community-
level data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) upon which 
the impact of rainfall shocks on poor rural households could be based. 
Weather station data from the study period is also discussed. 
• “Empirical Results” lays out the findings reached from regression analy-
ses, which quantified the impact of rainfall shocks on the studied 
households, and propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate the 
extent to which local social programs either mitigated the effects of the 
shocks or helped the households cope with them. 
• “Conclusions and Policy Considerations” sums up the contributions of 
the study and how policy makers may use them to help identify and 
assess community-based interventions that may either mitigate the 
effects of climate change—in this case, the predicted low-rainfall shocks 
and their impact on food production—or help poor rural households to 
better cope with them. 
Methodology
Here we describe the methodology and analytical frameworks used to 
estimate the impacts of rainfall variability on household welfare in rural 
Indonesia and the potential moderating effects of community-based 
programs. 
Vulnerability Defined
First, the bedrock concept for studying the welfare impacts of weather 
shocks: the analytical framework must be consistent with the logic of 
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vulnerability. The distribution of economic welfare in any given society 
hinges crucially on individual endowments and behavior and the socio-
political arrangements that govern social interaction. Not surprisingly, 
these factors (endowments, behavior, social interaction) also determine 
the distribution of vulnerability.2 The connection between individual 
and collective vulnerability deserves emphasis because it is impossible to 
consider individual achievement in isolation from the natural and social 
environment (Adger 1999). 
An individual’s or a household’s vulnerability to livelihood stress 
depends on exposure to, and the ability to cope with and recover from, 
a given shock. Along these lines, some further definition is in order:
• Exposure, in this case, is a function of, among other things, climatic and 
topographical factors and the extent to which livelihoods depend on 
the weather. 
• The ability to cope is largely determined by access to resources, the 
diversity of income sources, and social status within the community.3 
• Increased exposure combined with a reduced capacity to cope with, recover 
from, or adapt to any exogenous stress on livelihood leads to increased 
vulnerability.
Shocks Measured
Given the data limitations we face, we focus our strategy on exploiting 
cross-sectional variation in the data and linking our welfare indicator—
real per capita expenditures or some component thereof (food versus 
nonfood expenditure)—to a rainfall shock. The shock is defined based on 
available rainfall data, focusing mainly on the locations of rural house-
holds. As noted earlier, the yield of crops such as rice and soybeans can be 
much affected by changes in precipitation patterns.
Given the importance of rice farming in Indonesia’s rural economy, 
we define rainfall shocks in that context. A previous study of the delay 
in monsoon onset defined “onset” as the number of days after August 1 
when cumulative rainfall reaches 20 centimeters (cm)—the amount of 
rain needed to moisten the ground enough for planting4—and “delay” 
as the number of days beyond the mean onset date over a 25-year 
period from 1979 to 2004 (Naylor et al. 2007). Because farmers typi-
cally begin planting after monsoon onset, a late onset may affect pros-
pects for a second harvest later in the season and possibly change crop 
combinations, with potentially significant consequences for produc-
tion and market prices.
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Delayed onset is an important determinant of harvest, but we also 
need to consider the amount of rainfall after the onset. After farmers plant 
the rice fields, 60–120 cm of rainfall are needed during the three- to four-
month grow-out period (Naylor et al. 2002). Thus, the second dimension 
of our shock involves the deviation of the amount of post-onset rainfall 
from the 25-year mean for each weather station. We define the amount 
of post-onset rainfall as the total amount of rainfall during the 90-day 
period following the monsoon onset date. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing of these weather events in relation to 
the 2000 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS3) (RAND and CPPS 
2000). Considering that the degree of rainfall variability can differ across 
areas and that households may adjust farming practices accordingly, we 
use standard deviations (SDs) from the intertemporal mean to help 
account for such spatial differences: 
• In terms of delay of monsoon onset, we define a negative shock as being 
more than one SD above the 25-year mean. 
• In terms of the amount of post-onset rainfall, we define a negative shock 
as being more than two SDs below the 25-year mean. 
Analytical Framework
Given the interconnection between individual and collective vulnerabil-
ity and adaptive capacity, our empirical analysis uses regression analysis 
to link an indicator of household welfare—that is, real per capita total 
expenditure or its food and nonfood components—to some rainfall shock 
while controlling for household characteristics and the province of resi-
dence. We estimate a regression equation of this form: 
 yij = b0 + b1Xi + b2Sj + b3(Sj × Fi), (3.1)
where Yij represents per capita household expenditure of household i in 
community j; Xi represents various control variables; Sj represents the 
Figure 3.1 Timing of Typical Climate Events in Relation to the IFLS, 1999–2000
Aug. Sep. Oct.
1999
Nov. Dec. Jan.
“Rainy season year” 
Post-onset 90 days
Onset
(>20 cm)
Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun.
2000
Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
–
IFLS3, late Jun.–Oct. end
Source: Authors. 
Note: IFLS3 = the third wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey. IFLS1 was administered in 1993, and IFS2 in 1997. 
cm = centimeter.
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covariate rainfall shocks; and Fi is a binary variable representing rice-
farming households. 
Standard errors accounted for clustering at the community level and 
stratification by province and urban or rural sector in line with the com-
plex survey design of the IFLS.
After analyzing the effects of rainfall shocks on welfare, we consider 
the potential moderating effect of various community-level programs. 
Ideally, we would like to measure, for the same household, per capita 
expenditures with and without the program of interest at a particular 
point in time. This is not possible, though, so we must seek alternatives. 
(If program placement had been done randomly, simply comparing aver-
age per capita household expenditure in communities with and without 
the program could have been a good option for evaluating whether a 
certain program helped households exposed to shocks.) 
However, the placement of government programs is not likely to be 
random (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1993). Many of the social safety 
net programs that emerged following the 1997 financial crisis were 
intended to protect the poor and thus targeted poorer communities and 
households, albeit with high leakage rates (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and 
Widyanti 2002). Given this potential for selection bias in program place-
ment, the distribution of community and household characteristics is 
likely to differ between communities that have a program and those that 
do not have a program. One consequence of the endogeneity in program 
 placement is that if the analysis does not address this issue, biased esti-
mates of program effects are likely to result, especially when using cross-
sectional data.
Recognizing that government assistance programs often target the 
poorest areas, we use PSM to investigate the role that various social pro-
grams in the community (such as safety nets and credit) could play in 
moderating the impact of the weather shock on household welfare, most 
likely by helping affected households cope with the shock. The PSM 
method comprises two main steps: 
1. The propensity score model, which is used to predict the likelihood of 
a household or community receiving treatment—in this case, one of 
the social assistance programs. The predicted values are commonly 
called the propensity scores. Assuming that program placement is as 
good as random (conditional on observable community characteris-
tics), we can consider two households with the same propensity score 
to be observationally equivalent. 
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2. Matching each household from the group with the program to equiva-
lent households in the group without the program. Based on the pro-
pensity scores, the group constructed from matched households is 
comparable to the other. Hereafter, we will refer to the group of house-
holds in communities with a specific program as the “treatment group” 
and the constructed comparison group of households without the pro-
gram as the “control group.” With the treatment and control groups 
defined, the average difference in the outcome variable can then be 
estimated.
We estimated propensity scores on covariates using probit regressions 
and retrieved their predicted values to allow for the matching of “treated” 
observations with those in the comparison group. For each program, a 
separate stepwise estimation of the probit specification was performed 
such that variables with a p-value less than .2 were added to the right-
hand side. The dependent variable was a binary variable indicating 
whether a household resided in a community with the specific program 
of interest. The list of possible right-side variables for the stepwise estima-
tion included household and community variables as well as binary vari-
ables for the different provinces. 
The household variables always included in the model were house-
hold size, age of head, education level of head, household use of elec-
tricity, ownership of farmland, household nonfarm business, and 
household farm business. Candidate household variables were marital 
status of head and gender of head. The candidate community variables 
were availability of public transport; availability of piped water; pre-
dominance of asphalt roads; share of households with electricity; dis-
tance to provincial capital; distance to district capital; the shares of 
household heads with elementary, junior high, high school, and univer-
sity education; and the share of households with an official letter verify-
ing their status as poor. All rural households were part of the sample for 
the probit regressions. 
After the propensity scores were estimated, observations in the treat-
ment and control groups were trimmed to obtain a common support for 
the propensity scores. In terms of the matching procedure, we matched 
each treatment household to its “nearest neighbor” based on propensity 
scores. For each household in the treatment group, three households from 
the control group were matched with replacement based on the propen-
sity score. To adjust for inexact matches of the propensity score, regres-
sion adjustments were performed as in Abadie et al. (2004). We then 
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compared average outcome for households in the treatment group 
(in communities with a specific program) with the average outcome for 
similar households in the control group (living in communities without 
the program under consideration). 
To describe this somewhat more formally, let Yi (1) denote the per 
capita expenditure outcome of household i in the presence of some 
“treatment” attribute in the local community, such as a safety-net  program 
or type of infrastructure, and let Yi (0) denote the per capita expenditure 
outcome of household i in the absence of the attribute in the local com-
munity. Because both Yi (1) and Yi (0) are not observable, we must con-
struct a counterfactual group of households in communities that do not 
have the “treatment” attribute of interest but have a similar probability of 
having the attribute based on observable community characteristics. 
Through a matching process, we define bias-corrected matching estima-
tors, ˆ ( )Yi 0 , in place of Yi (0) (see Abadie and Imbens 2002; Abadie et al. 
2004 for details) and estimate the sample average treatment effect for the 
subpopulation of the treated (SATT):
 SATT
n
Y Yi i
i Wi
= −
=
∑1 1 0
1 1
{ ( ) ( )}
|
, (3.2)
where Wi = 1 indicates that a household is in a community with the 
treatment attribute; and n1 is the sample size of the treated.
Weather and Survey Data
We can study the impacts of extreme weather events on rural households 
by merging household- and community-level data from the IFLS3 with 
daily rainfall data covering a 25-year period. The combined data set con-
tains information on rainfall, household expenditures, household-level 
socioeconomic characteristics, and community-level attributes. 
Household- and Community-Level Data
The IFLS3 household and community surveys were fielded from late 
June to the end of October 2000. The community surveys include data 
on whether various social programs were presently conducted on a rou-
tine basis or recently conducted in 1999/2000 in the community. It 
should be noted that the data do not indicate which households actually 
participated in the programs. 
The household-level data contain the consumption aggregate and its 
food and nonfood components. The food component consists of 37 food 
items (purchases and the value of own production or gifts) consumed 
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within the week before the survey. The nonfood component consists of 
frequently purchased goods and services (utilities, personal toiletries, 
household items, domestic services, recreation and entertainment, trans-
port, sweepstakes, and so forth); less-frequent purchases and durables 
(such as clothing, furniture, medical, ceremonies, and taxes); housing; and 
educational expenditures for children living in the household. Transfers 
out of the household were excluded. All values were monthly figures and 
were in real terms. To obtain real values, both temporal and spatial defla-
tors were used, using prices in December 2000 in Jakarta as the base.5 
Weather Data
Using daily rainfall data from 1979 to 2004, we calculated the 25-year 
mean and SDs for monsoon onset and the amount of post-onset rainfall 
for 32 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) weather stations. The 
rainfall data from these weather stations were then matched to commu-
nities in the IFLS. Weather data were merged with household survey data 
at the community level based on proximity. Only weather stations with 
complete data for the 25-year period were used. 
The matched data covered a total of 267 communities and the 
32 WMO stations. In rural areas, 106 communities in 9 provinces were 
matched to 27 stations. In rural Java, 66 communities in 4 provinces 
were matched to 18 stations. The number of communities per WMO 
station ranged from 1 to 10 in rural areas. In rural areas, 3,290 house-
holds were matched to 27 stations; of those, 2,159 rural Java households 
were matched to 18 stations. 
After merging available precipitation data and dropping observations 
with missing data, the sample size in the 2000 IFLS3 for our analysis shrank 
to 6,188 households from the initial total of 10,292. Data from additional 
weather stations would benefit this analysis by improving the level of disag-
gregation of weather data, but these data could not be obtained.
Figure 3.2 shows the variation by province in monsoon onset and post-
onset rainfall in 1999/2000. With respect to delays in monsoon onset, 
only provinces in Java experienced a delay greater than one SD from the 
25-year mean—thus experiencing a negative weather shock. As for the 
amount of rainfall during the 90-day post-onset period, again only prov-
inces in Java experienced rainfall below two SDs from the 25-year 
mean—also constituting a negative shock. 
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of household expenditures, household character-
istics, and rainfall shock exposure in rural Java are shown in table 3.1. 
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Most of the household heads were married males without more than an 
elementary education. The vast majority of households used electricity. 
Half of the households owned farmland, and 44 percent were engaged in 
nonfarm businesses. Nearly 60 percent of households were engaged in a 
farm business—38 percent with rice as the most valuable crop and 
22 percent with another crop as the most valuable. In our sample, 34 per-
cent of the households were exposed to the “delay-of-onset” weather 
shock, and 45 percent were exposed to the “post-onset low-rainfall” 
shock. The correlation coefficient between these two shock variables for 
our sample was not large, at 0.38.
Empirical Results
Here we present our findings on (a) the impact of rainfall shocks on per 
capita household consumption levels and (b) the role that social pro-
grams may have played in helping households cope with the negative 
welfare impacts of rainfall shocks. 
Figure 3.2 Variation in Monsoon Onset and Post-Onset Rainfall in Indonesia, 
by Province, 1999/2000
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Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: SD = standard deviation. The horizontal line on the left figure denotes 1 SD delay in the onset of the 
 monsoon. The horizontal line on the right figure denotes a less than 2 SD in a 90-day post-onset rainfall.
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For the first part (a), we used regression analysis to quantify the aver-
age reduction in household welfare levels among those exposed to low-
rainfall shocks. For the second part (b), we used PSM to estimate the 
extent of the moderating effects offered by the various community-based 
programs. 
Welfare Impacts of Rainfall Shocks
Given the importance of rainfed agriculture (particularly rice farming) to 
rural livelihoods in Indonesia, this study assessed the potential impact of 
rainfall shocks on per capita total household expenditure, including its 
food and nonfood components. Focusing on rural Java—the predominant 
rice production area in Indonesia—we used regression analysis to esti-
mate the impacts on household expenditures. 
Included in the regressions are two binary variables representing the two 
rainfall shocks defined earlier: delayed monsoon onset and post-onset low 
rainfall. We interact these shock variables with a binary variable for rice-
farming households, specifically households engaged in a farm business 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Households in Rural Java, 1999/2000 IFLS
Variables Mean Standard error
Total PCE (rupiah per capita per month) 257,273 7,660
Food PCE (rupiah per capita per month) 154,389 4,332
Nonfood PCE (rupiah per capita per month) 102,885 4,745
Household size 4.06 0.09
Age of head 48.41 0.45
Married head 0.84 0.01
Female head 0.18 0.01
Highest education of head: elementary 0.58 0.02
Highest education of head: junior high school 0.07 0.01
Highest education of head: high school 0.05 0.01
Highest education of head: university 0.08 0.01
HH utilizes electricity 0.90 0.03
HH owns farmland 0.50 0.03
HH nonfarm business 0.44 0.03
HH farm business—rice most valuable crop 0.38 0.03
HH farm business—other crop most valuable 0.22 0.03
Shock: delay of monsoon onset (>1 SD) 0.34 0.06
Shock: delay of monsoon onset (>2 SD) 0.16 0.04
Shock: post-onset low rainfall (<−1 SD) 0.57 0.06
Shock: post-onset low rainfall (<−2 SD) 0.45 0.06
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: HH = household, N = 2,159, IFLS = Indonesia Family Life Survey, PCE = per capita expenditure, 
SD =  standard deviation. 
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with rice as the most valuable crop. This is done to differentiate the effect 
of the shocks between households that have and do not have a farm busi-
ness with rice as the most valuable crop. 
In the regressions, we control for various household characteristics: 
household size; age of household head; sex and marital status of head; 
education level of head (binary variables for elementary, junior high, high 
school, and university); access to electricity; ownership of farmland; 
household farm and nonfarm business activity; whether or not rice is the 
most valuable crop; and province of residence. The reference case is a 
household in rural West Java province with an uneducated, single, male 
head and that has no access to electricity, no farmland, and no household 
farm or nonfarm businesses. 
Using the two rainfall shock variables separately as well as together, we 
used three different specifications for our regressions: 
1. The first includes a binary variable for delayed monsoon onset along 
with its interaction term with the binary variable for rice-farming 
household.
2. The second substitutes the post-onset low rainfall variable as the shock 
variable. 
3. The third includes both rainfall shocks (late monsoon onset and 
post-onset low rainfall) along with their interaction terms. This third 
variation was used with different dependent variables, that is, per  capita 
total household expenditure and its food and nonfood components.
As might have been expected, there is a strong positive correlation 
between household per capita expenditure and assets, namely educa-
tion and ownership of farmland. All education coefficients are posi-
tive and significantly different from zero. For all five of the regressions 
reported in table 3.2, the magnitude of these coefficients increases 
with the level of education up to high school, but the coefficients for 
university education are less than those associated with high school, 
which is rather unusual. In general, the province of residence does not 
seem to matter in the explanation of variations in household welfare 
because the associated coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero. Having electricity certainly indicates wealth; this is mani-
fested by a positive and significant effect on per capita expenditure. 
Similarly, owning farmland or a nonfarm business has a positive and 
significant impact on household expenditure and its components 
(food and nonfood).
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Table 3.2 Regression Results of Weather Shocks on Household Consumption in Rural Java, 1999/2000
Dependent variable (log)
Total PCE Nonfood PCE Food PCE
Delay of onset shock Post-onset low rainfall shock Both shocks Both shocks Both shocks
HH farm business—rice 
most valuable crop
0.002 (0.042) 0.056 (0.047) 0.041 (0.046) 0.072 (0.065) 0.034 (0.042)
HH farm business—other 
crop most valuable
−0.046 (0.044) −0.047 (0.046) −0.046 (0.045) −0.117** (0.054) 0.003 (0.048)
Shock: delay of monsoon 
onset (>1 SD)
−0.042 (0.064) −0.035 (0.065) 0.103 (0.084) −0.132** (0.061)
Shock: post-onset low 
 rainfall (<−2 SD)
−0.036 (0.054) −0.027 (0.055) −0.034 (0.076) −0.019 (0.049)
HH farm rice × delay shock 0.024 (0.062) 0.072 (0.072) 0.037 (0.114) 0.118* (0.063)
HH farm rice × low rainfall 
shock
−0.120** (0.059) −0.142** (0.067) −0.256** (0.104) −0.083 (0.057)
Household size −0.145*** (0.008) −0.145*** (0.009) −0.145*** (0.008) −0.136*** (0.011) −0.148*** (0.008)
Age of head 0.015** (0.006) 0.015** (0.006) 0.015** (0.006) 0.017** (0.008) 0.016*** (0.006)
(Age of head)2 (1/100) −0.015*** (0.005) −0.015*** (0.005) −0.015*** (0.005) −0.019** (0.007) −0.015*** (0.005)
Married head 0.036 (0.077) 0.042 (0.076) 0.041 (0.077) 0.016 (0.086) 0.102 (0.078)
Female head −0.019 (0.077) −0.015 (0.076) −0.016 (0.076) 0.007 (0.079) 0.012 (0.079)
Highest education of head: 
elementary
0.091** (0.044) 0.086** (0.042) 0.087** (0.042) 0.172*** (0.051) 0.039 (0.045)
(continued next page)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Dependent variable (log)
Total PCE Nonfood PCE Food PCE
Delay of onset shock Post-onset low rainfall shock Both shocks Both shocks Both shocks
Highest education of head: 
junior high school
0.214*** (0.071) 0.206*** (0.070) 0.207*** (0.070) 0.358*** (0.085) 0.123 (0.075)
Highest education of head: 
high school
0.506*** (0.084) 0.502*** (0.083) 0.503*** (0.083) 0.786*** (0.093) 0.300*** (0.087)
Highest education of head: 
university
0.212** (0.099) 0.205** (0.095) 0.205** (0.095) 0.350*** (0.117) 0.098 (0.088)
Central Java province −0.072 (0.076) −0.055 (0.073) −0.057 (0.073) −0.007 (0.097) −0.075 (0.068)
Yogyakarta province −0.038 (0.114) 0.004 (0.106) 0.005 (0.112) 0.044 (0.134) −0.023 (0.115)
East Java province −0.071 (0.058) −0.063 (0.057) −0.061 (0.056) −0.016 (0.088) −0.106** (0.047)
HH utilizes electricity 0.158** (0.066) 0.188*** (0.062) 0.188*** (0.062) 0.441*** (0.106) 0.060 (0.063)
HH owns farmland 0.114*** (0.032) 0.117*** (0.032) 0.116*** (0.032) 0.131*** (0.046) 0.080** (0.033)
HH nonfarm business 0.172*** (0.035) 0.170*** (0.034) 0.170*** (0.034) 0.228*** (0.044) 0.131*** (0.034)
Constant 11.972*** (0.199) 11.946*** (0.193) 11.952*** (0.191) 10.431*** (0.277) 11.574*** (0.170)
N 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159
R2 0.196 0.200 0.201 0.189 0.175
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. HH = household, PCE = per capita expenditure, SD =  standard deviation.
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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Without weather shock. In the absence of a weather shock, our results 
show the following:
• There is no statistically significant difference between the average wel-
fare of households for which rice is the most valuable crop and that of 
the reference household. 
• However, households running a farm business with nonrice crops as the 
most valuable had per capita nonfood expenditures about 12 percent 
lower than the reference household.
With weather shock. Definition of the rainfall shock variable is important 
in our specifications. 
Delay in monsoon onset. When the weather shock is a delay in monsoon 
onset, our results show the following:
• Although the delay has a negative effect on the per capita total 
 expenditures of rural households of Java, it is not statistically signifi-
cant. (This is contrary to the finding reported in Korkeala, Newhouse, 
and Duarte [2009] based on panel data.) 
• However, when we look at the food component of expenditures, a delay 
of monsoon onset shock is associated with a 13 percent drop in per 
capita food expenditures relative to the reference household.
Post-onset low rainfall. When the weather shock is a decrease in rainfall 
during the 90-day post-onset period, our results show the following:
• If the amount of rainfall is below two SDs away from the 25-year mean, 
the coefficients associated with the interaction between the post-onset 
low rainfall shock and rice farming are negative and significantly differ-
ent from zero (at a 5 percent level of significance) for both total and 
nonfood per capita expenditures. 
• With exposure to the low rainfall shock, the per capita total expenditure 
of households engaged in rice farming is 12–14 percent lower than that 
of the reference household.
• With exposure to the low rainfall shock, the per capita nonfood expendi-
ture is 26 percent lower, controlling for household attributes and prov-
ince of residence. 
• In contrast to those reductions in household total expenditure and non-
food expenditure, the interaction of the low rainfall shock with the 
binary variable identifying households engaged in rice farming does not 
have a statistically significant effect on food consumption. 
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This latter result, frequently observed among rural households in vari-
ous countries (Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005), suggests that rice farm-
ing households can protect their food consumption in the face of weather 
shocks. Thus, households manage to protect their food consumption at 
the expense of nonfood consumption. And, therefore, to the extent that 
reduced nonfood expenditures are accompanied by lower expenditures on 
children’s education, weather-related shocks may also be associated with 
reduced investment in the human capital of children (Jacoby and 
Skoufias 1997).
Welfare Impacts of Social Programs
As noted earlier, an individual’s or a household’s vulnerability to liveli-
hood stress depends on both exposure and the ability to cope with and 
recover from the shock. The ability to cope is largely determined by 
access to resources, including savings as well as the cash and in-kind trans-
fers that are part of some social assistance programs. 
We explored the role of the following six social assistance programs in 
mitigating potential negative welfare impacts of weather shocks in rural 
areas of Java: 
• Access to credit through the Inpres (presidential instruction) Poor Vil-
lages Program 
• Kampung Improvement Program, an informal housing-area upgrading 
program that provided basic services and infrastructure through 
 community-based organizations 
• Infrastructure Development Program, a community-based infrastruc-
ture development program (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2002) 
• Padat Karya (labor intensive) program, a loose collection of workfare 
programs sponsored by various government departments (Sumarto, 
Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2002) 
• PDM-DKE (Regional Empowerment to Overcome the Impact of Eco-
nomic Crisis) program, a block grant program for villages to support 
revolving funds for credit or public works projects that offer nonfarm 
employment opportunities (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2002) 
• Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT) (Program for Underdeveloped Villages), 
another block grant program targeting extremely poor villages (Sum-
arto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2002). 
These programs may help households cope with the loss of farm 
income, smaller harvests, or higher prices by enhancing access to credit, 
providing cash or in-kind transfers, and expanding labor opportunities.
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As discussed earlier, recognizing that government assistance programs 
often target poor areas, we used PSM to infer the moderating impact of 
some community-level interventions on the impact of the weather shock. 
For each of the community-based programs, we estimated the average 
treatment effect of the intervention on per capita household expenditure 
components among households exposed to the shock and in communities 
with the program of interest (that is, SATT). 
To assess whether the potential program benefits differ according to 
the presence or absence of a shock, we also estimated the SATT among 
households not exposed to the shock. In addition, we repeated the pro-
cedures using another variation of the PSM specification and limited the 
subsample to rural households engaged in a farm business. 
The results in table 3.3 are shown as the percentage difference in mean 
per capita expenditures between the treatment and control groups. The 
panel on the left side of table 3.3 relates to the sample of households of 
rural Java that were exposed to the post-onset low rainfall shock regard-
less of occupational status, while the panel on the right focuses on the 
subsample of households exposed to the shock that were engaged in a 
farm business.6
Inpres and IDT program results. The results for the Inpres Poor Villages 
Program and the IDT Program indicate positive and significant average 
treatment effects that are greater among rural households engaged in 
farm businesses than among all rural households. 
Inpres. Among households exposed to a low-rainfall shock, those in com-
munities with the Inpres credit program had per capita expenditure 
averaging 15.7 percent higher than that of the control group (without 
Inpres). 
Among households in communities not exposed to the shock, the 
Inpres program did not show any significant difference in average treat-
ment effects. 
For the subsample engaged in farm businesses and hit by a low-rainfall 
shock, average per capita expenditure levels in communities with the 
program were 24.9 percent greater than in communities without the pro-
gram. Among households not exposed to the shock, the average  treatment 
effect was −13.4 percent and statistically significant at the 95.0 percent 
confidence level. 
These results suggest that the greater access to credit furnished by the 
Inpres program may have allowed households to borrow to maintain 
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household consumption in locations where rainfall shocks might have 
diminished harvests—constituting an important coping mechanism for 
households affected by the shocks. 
IDT. Similarly, the average treatment effects of the IDT—which provided 
block grants for underdeveloped villages—were 16.0 percent and 
23.3 percent among all rural households exposed to the shock and among 
the subsample engaged in farm businesses, respectively. Both of these 
results were significant at the 95 percent confidence level. However, the 
corresponding treatment effects among households not exposed to the 
shock were smaller (−2.2 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively) but not 
statistically significant. 
Table 3.3 Moderating Effects of Community-Based Programs for Rural Java 
 Households Exposed to Post-Onset Low Rainfall Shocks: Average Treatment 
 Effects Based on PSM
percentage difference between treatment and control groups
Low rainfall shock
All rural households
Rural households engaged 
in farm business
Yes No Yes No
Inpres Poor Villages Program 
(credit)
ATT 15.7** −5.9 24.9** −13.4***
n1 245 604 136 398
n0 299 1,305 165 857
IDT Program (block grants) ATT 16.0** −2.2 23.3** 5.3
n1 231 198 145 161
n0 489 323 299 197
Kampung Improvement 
 Program (community based)
ATT 24.8*** 16.6** 19.3* 12.2
n1 287 280 167 205
n0 406 527 289 336
Infrastructure Development 
Program (community based)
ATT 4.9 21.4* −10.9 5.3
n1 168 61 78 56
n0 447 32 279 23
Padat Karya program (public 
works)
ATT 13.3* 10.9 −3.7 −10.4
n1 167 168 64 71
n0 499 518 308 210
PDM-DKE program (block 
grants)
ATT 0.4 −8.1 15.0 5.4
n1 137 485 55 216
n0 565 1,199 371 758
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: ATT = average treatment effect on the treated, expressed as the percentage difference in average per 
 capita total household expenditure between treatment and control groups, IDT = Inpres Desa Tertinggal 
( Program for Underdeveloped Villages), Inpres = presidential instruction, n1 = number of households in 
 treatment group after trimming, n0 = number of households in control group after trimming, 
PDM-DKE =  Regional Empowerment to Overcome the Impact of Economic Crisis. 
*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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These results suggest that the IDT block grant program may have pro-
vided some relief to rural households hit by the rainfall shock, in particu-
lar to farming households, likely by generating local employment 
opportunities through public works projects.
Kampung Improvement Program results. The results for the Kampung 
Improvement Program indicate positive average treatment effects of 
24.8 percent and 16.6 percent for the sample of rural households (treat-
ment group and control group, respectively), and 19.3 percent and 
12.2 percent, respectively, for the subsample of households engaged in 
farm businesses. 
In contrast to the effects of Inpres and IDT, the ATT (average treat-
ment effect) is smaller for the subsample engaged in farm businesses, 
although the 19.3 percent result is only weakly significant at the 
90.0 percent confidence level. The ATT for the subsamples not exposed 
to shock was smaller than the corresponding results for the subsample 
with shock. 
The exact mechanisms by which this program might have yielded 
these results are not apparent, but one might guess that infrastructure 
improvements help to mitigate the impacts of low-rainfall shocks. Given 
the positive results, further investigation would be worthwhile.
Padat Karya program results. The Padat Karya safety-net program had 
an ATT of 13.3 percent among rural households exposed to the low-
rainfall shock, an only weakly significant result at the 90.0 percent confi-
dence level. The other results for the Padat Karya program were 
statistically insignificant. However, this labor-intensive workfare program 
exhibits potential as an effective safety net in alleviating the stress that 
may have been induced by a low-rainfall shock. 
Infrastructure and PDM-DKE program results. The results for the 
Infrastructure Development Program and PDM-DKE (public works or 
credit access) safety-net program were statistically insignificant. It is not 
possible to say much about the effectiveness of these programs in the 
context of rainfall shocks. 
Summary of Social Welfare Program effects. Overall, the results suggest 
that access to credit and public works projects in communities can help 
households cope with weather shocks and thereby play a strong protective 
role during times of crisis. For their part, community infrastructure 
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improvement programs may mitigate the impacts of the shocks. In light of 
these findings, these policy instruments should receive due consideration 
in the design and implementation of climate-change adaptation strategies.
Conclusions and Policy Considerations
Scant empirical evidence exists on the welfare losses that households 
experience as a consequence of weather shocks. In principle, low-income 
households are most vulnerable to the impacts of weather extremes given 
their geographical locations, limited assets and access to resources and 
services, low human capital, and high dependence upon natural resources 
for income and consumption. 
On a broader scale, despite wide recognition of the threat that climate-
induced shocks pose for the poor, researchers and policy makers have 
given only limited attention to either quantifying the effects of weather 
extremes or identifying targeted measures that could mitigate the pov-
erty impacts or at least help the poor to cope with them.
It is to those ends that this study seeks to contribute.
Above, we have analyzed the potential welfare impacts of rainfall 
shocks in rural Indonesia with a focus on households engaged in family 
farm businesses, particularly rice farming because rice is a staple food in 
Indonesia. We also attempted to identify community interventions capa-
ble of dampening the adverse impact of climate change and extremes. 
Our basic approach was to exploit cross-sectional variation in the data 
and, focusing mainly on rural households, link a welfare indicator (real 
consumption per capita) or some component thereof (food versus 
 nonfood expenditure) to a weather shock defined based on available 
rainfall data. 
We considered two types of shocks: (a) delayed monsoon onset and 
(b) rain shortfall in the 90-day period following monsoon onset. We 
found that delay in the monsoon onset does not have a significant impact 
on the welfare of rural households. However, the low-rainfall shock after 
monsoon onset negatively affects rice farm households. Nonfood expen-
diture per capita is the most affected component among rice farm 
households, suggesting that those households protect their food expen-
diture in the face of weather shocks. Further study is needed to better 
understand these choices and their implications for climate-change 
adaptation strategies. 
To identify potential policy instruments that might moderate the wel-
fare impact of weather shocks, we used PSM to evaluate several social 
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assistance programs. Our results indicate that credit availability, the exis-
tence of safety nets, and public works programs offer the strongest cushion 
for these types of shocks. This is an important consideration for the design 
and implementation of strategies to protect poor, vulnerable households. 
Indeed, individuals’ ability to cope with and recover from crises 
hinges critically on available social support. Taken together with other 
emerging evidence on the long-lasting effects of rainfall shocks on 
human capital, our findings highlight the urgent need for effective 
adaptation strategies. 
Notes
 1. Adapting projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
to local conditions, Naylor et al. (2007) predict that by 2050, the  probability of 
a 30-day delay in monsoon will increase from 9–18 percent currently to 
30–40 percent. This delay, combined with increased temperature, could 
reduce rice and soybean yields in Indonesia by as much as 10  percent.
 2. Vulnerability is usually taken as the likelihood that, at a given point in time, 
individual welfare will fall short of some socially acceptable benchmark 
(Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2008). 
 3. Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2008) make essentially the same point by noting 
that, at the household level, vulnerability is determined by the nature of the 
shock; the availability of additional sources of income; the functioning of 
labor, credit, and insurance markets; and the extent of public assistance.
 4. It is believed that about 100 cm of rain are needed throughout the season for 
cultivation.
 5. The spatial deflator used is the ratio of the location (province, urban/rural 
area) poverty line (in December 2000 prices) to the Jakarta poverty line. 
Thus, the spatial deflator used converts the local December 2000 values into 
Jakarta December 2000 values. 
 6. We also attempted to extend this analysis to only those farmers who indicated 
rice as their most valuable crop, but the data thinned out and precluded 
application of this approach to this subsample.
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C H A P T E R  4
Timing Is Everything: How Weather 
Shocks Affect Household Welfare in 
Rural Mexico
Emmanuel Skoufias and Katja Vinha
Introduction
Despite uncertainty over the exact magnitudes of the global changes in 
temperature and precipitation, climatologists and policy makers alike 
widely accept that climate variability will likely deviate significantly from 
its historical patterns (IPCC 2007).1 Considering that millions of poor 
households in rural areas all over the world depend on agriculture, there 
are increasing concerns that the change in climatic variability patterns 
will make rural households in developing countries even more vulnerable 
than they already are, thus seriously challenging development efforts 
globally. In view of this imminent threat to poor people, it is critical to 
have a deeper understanding of the effectiveness of household adaptation 
strategies as well as targeted measures that could mitigate the poverty 
impacts of erratic weather.
With these considerations in mind, this chapter presents an analysis of 
how climatic variability affects household welfare in the rural areas of 
Mexico. We use the first two waves of the nationally representative 
Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), carried out in 2002 and 2005/07, 
to examine whether increases or decreases of rainfall and growing degree 
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days (GDD)—a cumulative temperature measure—by more than one 
standard deviation from their respective long-run means, significantly 
affect rural households’ ability to smooth expenditures.2
Traditional Risk Management Strategies
Erratic weather may affect agricultural productivity, which (depending 
on how effective a household’s risk management strategies are) may 
translate into lower income.3 Based on historical experience and the mul-
tiplicity of economic and institutional constraints they face, rural house-
holds in Mexico, as most rural households all over the world, have 
developed traditional strategies for managing climatic risk. For instance, 
households may undertake before-the-fact income-smoothing strategies 
and adopt low-return, low-risk crop and asset portfolios (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger 1993).
In Mexico specifically, smallholder farmers have adapted to climatic 
risk in Tlaxcala (Eakin 2000). For example, farmers plant both fast-
maturing but low-yield corn as well as slow-maturing but high-yield 
varieties, or they may switch from the more-profitable corn to wheat 
depending on the prevailing weather. They may also change fertilizer and 
pesticide use depending on the climate and diversify geographically by 
having plots of land in different locations. Furthermore, to get through 
difficult times, households have used their savings (Paxson 1992); taken 
loans from the formal financial sector (Udry 1994); sold assets (Deaton 
1992); or sent their children to work instead of school to supplement 
income (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997). More strategies include the manage-
ment of income risk through after-the-fact adjustments in labor supply 
such as multiple job holding and engaging in other informal economic 
activities (Kochar 1999; Morduch 1995).
All of these actions have traditionally enabled households to spread 
the effects of income shocks from unanticipated negative events through 
time. However, certain individual characteristics, such as lower educa-
tional attainment, may increase the vulnerability of households to risk 
(Skoufias 2007).
Combining Household, Agricultural, and Meteorological Data
To the extent that the current, traditional risk-coping mechanisms are not 
effective in protecting welfare from erratic weather patterns, the increas-
ingly erratic patterns associated with climate change will certainly reduce 
the effectiveness of these coping mechanisms even further—thus increasing 
household vulnerability as well.
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However, quantitative evidence is quite scarce on how successful the 
traditional risk management strategies are in protecting household wel-
fare from weather shocks in Mexico. Other studies, relying on the percep-
tions of respondents about the incidence of different types of shocks—such 
as floods, droughts, freezes, fires, and hurricanes—include Skoufias (2007) 
and De la Fuente (2010). None of these earlier studies, however, used 
actual meteorological data.
Household expenditures. To better understand who is most affected by 
weather shocks and where such effects are more pronounced, we first 
quantify the effect of weather shocks on households nationally and sub-
sequently for different climatic regions based on average precipitation. 
By separating the sample along climate criteria, we group together house-
holds that face similar challenges from similar shocks.
Because food expenditures are sometimes protected better than non-
food expenditures (see Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005; chapter 3 of this 
volume), we analyze the impacts of weather on per capita expenditures 
on food and nonfood items separately. Furthermore, it is quite possible 
that households’ resilience and ability to adapt to changing weather and 
environmental conditions differs significantly depending on access to dif-
ferent risk-coping mechanisms. Therefore, we investigate the extent to 
which some such mechanisms—namely, assets, land titling, education, 
and access to transportation infrastructure—change the ability of house-
holds to smooth their consumption.
Agricultural cycles. One distinguishing feature of our study is that we 
investigate the extent to which the timing of the climatic shock matters 
within the agricultural cycle. We match each household to the weather 
shocks experienced in the following:
• The prior agricultural cycle (encompassing an October–March dry 
 season and an April–September wet season)
• The prior wet season
• The first three months of the wet season preceding the household sur-
vey (the MxFLS), which would be April, May, and June—the pre-
canícula period (canícula being a mid-summer drought period in 
Mexico)—that are critical months for many corn growers (Eakin 2000).
Weather shocks. In addition, although rainfall-based measures have 
widely been used in determining the effect of weather shocks on 
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 consumption,4 temperature-based measures have not received the same 
attention. Temperature measures have been used to assess the eco-
nomic impacts of climate change through crop yields (Deschênes and 
Greenstone 2007; Schlenker and Roberts 2008), but they have not 
been included in models of weather-shock impact on consumption. To 
capture this other important aspect of weather, we include weather 
shocks based on the cumulative temperature during the three time 
periods considered.
Chapter Structure
Although this chapter is limited to a general discussion of the study’s 
methods and findings, readers can find the full presentation of algorithms, 
data tables, and detailed analysis in the authors’ previously published 
paper (Skoufias and Vinha 2012). From here, the chapter is organized as 
follows:
• “Mexico’s Climate and Agriculture” presents background and context 
for the data and analysis, explaining how the growing cycles and 
weather affect agricultural productivity and crop choices.
• “Household, Climate, and Agricultural Data Sources” lays out (a) the 
data used from the MxFLS and authors’ surveys; (b) how climate data 
were measured; (c) how weather shocks were defined; (d) how weather 
was measured throughout the growing cycle; and (e) how household 
groups were identified for analysis and matched to weather data by 
municipality.
• “Empirical Analysis” examines the impact of the measured weather 
shocks on both household consumption per capita and households’ 
ability to protect their consumption from weather shocks, depending 
on the location, the timing, and the nature of the shock.
• “Conclusions” sums up the primary findings and recommends more 
region-specific analyses and more finely tuned climate categories to 
better estimate the effects of households’ risk management strategies 
and their potential implications for public policy.
Mexico’s Climate and Agriculture
Both rainfall and temperature are important factors affecting crop yields. 
Extremes of either rainfall (drought or flood) or temperature (extremely 
cold or extremely hot) will negatively affect yields and thus, potentially, 
household income and consumption as well. Even within normal ranges 
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of rainfall and temperature, additional rainfall or warmer days may 
increase yields in one climate but reduce yields in another.
Effects of Temperature and Precipitation
In Mexico, depending on the state, temperatures lead to either higher or 
lower yields (Galindo 2009), suggesting heterogeneous effects from 
weather shocks. For example, corn production benefits from higher tem-
perature in Hidalgo, Estado de México, Puebla, and Querétaro and 
decreases with higher temperature in Baja California de Sur, Campeche, 
Chiapas, and Guerrero. Similarly, the optimal levels of rainfall (below and 
above which yields fall) depend on the class of crops (Galindo 2009).
Projecting a future scenario, a long-run climatic change with a tem-
perature increase of 2°C and a rainfall decrease of 20 percent would 
increase the amount of unsuitable land for corn production by 8 percent 
in a sample of seven corn-producing municipalities from Estado de 
México, Puebla, Veracruz, and Jalisco (Conde et al. 1997). Likewise, 
a 2°C increase in temperature but a 20 percent increase in rainfall would 
increase the amount of land unsuitable for corn production by 18 per-
cent. In another simulation, when raising the temperature by 4°C above 
the mean and coupling that alternatively with a 20 percent increase and 
a 20 percent decrease in rainfall, the amount of land unsuitable for pro-
duction increased by 20 percent and 37 percent, respectively.
Based on historical production patterns, droughts are responsible for 
more than 90 percent of all crop losses in Mexico (Appendini and 
Liverman 1994).
The Growing Cycle
The agricultural year in Mexico runs from October to September. The 
dry season runs from October to the end of March, and the wet season 
from April to the end of September. About 82 percent of cultivated land 
is rainfed (INEGI 2007) and thus highly susceptible to weather fluctua-
tions. In the wet season, corn is produced in 59 percent of the cultivated 
land devoted to seasonal crops; in the dry season, corn is produced in 
31 percent of seasonal cropland. The total area cultivated is more than six 
times greater in the wet season than in the dry season (INEGI 2007).
More important, many small-scale farmers use corn not only as a 
source of income but also directly as a subsistence crop. Switching to 
other crops such as wheat or barley, which have shorter growth cycles but 
are not as useful for household consumption, is considered a last resort 
(Eakin 2000).
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The growing cycle for corn can be divided into three phases5:
• The vegetative phase lasts 40 to 60 days. The longer it takes for the seed 
to germinate (that is, the colder it is after planting), the higher the prob-
ability that the seed is weak and subject to disease, producing a lower-
yielding crop. For the first half of this time, the growing point is usually 
below ground, and the plant can withstand, to some degree, cold tem-
peratures. After the growing point is above ground level, frost can sig-
nificantly damage the plant.
• The reproductive phase begins with ear formation for about 20 days and 
continues with the grain fill stage, which takes an additional 20 to 
30 days. Inadequate water availability during this phase greatly affects 
yields, with the impacts being the greatest during the ear-forming stage. 
Also, extremely warm temperatures (above 32°C) during the second 
half of the vegetative phase and the reproductive phase reduce yields.
• The maturation phase, the final growing phase before harvest, lasts 20 
to 35 days.
Planting later in the season ensures that the seed germinates quicker, 
but waiting too long does not allow the crop to complete the maturation 
stage before the growing season ends. Furthermore, specific to Mexico in 
July and August, the canícula (included in figure 4.1) affects farmers’ 
planting decisions. In general, farmers want the corn to flower (for the ear 
formation stage to be complete) before the onset of the canícula to better 
the odds of crop survival in case the canícula is drier than normal (Eakin 
2000). Therefore, the months leading up to the canícula are of special 
importance in Mexico.
Figure 4.1 Timing of Agricultural Cycle in Mexico Relative to the MxFLS, 2001–02
2001
Weather shocks for MxFLS 1 households (wet season 2001 and  dry season 2002)
Wet season 2001
Pre-canícula Canícula
Wet season 2002
MxFLS 1
households
surveyed
Dry season 2002
Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun.
2002
Source: Authors.
Note: The canícula is a mid-summer drought period in Mexico. MxFLS 1 = the first wave of the Mexican Family 
Life Survey. The second wave of the survey was performed between 2005 and 2007.
Timing Is Everything: How Weather Shocks Affect Household Welfare in Rural Mexico       83
Household, Climate, and Agricultural Data Sources
Household Data: The MxFLS
For the household data, we used the first two waves of surveys from 
the Mexico Family Life Survey (Rubalcava and Teruel 2006). The first 
wave of the survey interviewed 3,353 rural households in 75 different 
localities in all regions of the country and was conducted between March 
2002 and August 2002, with most of the information collected in April, 
May, and June (as shown in figure 4.1).6 The second wave of the survey 
was collected between 2005 and 2007, with most of the data collected 
from May 2005 to September 2005. The follow-up survey interviewed 
3,271 households.
Both waves collected detailed information on each household member, 
including basic characteristics, educational attainment, and migration. 
Furthermore, the survey collected detailed information on household 
expenditures.7 Separate surveys were administered to the leaders of each 
locality about infrastructure and programs accessible in the locality.8
Climate and Weather Data
The climate data for this paper came from the Mexican Water Technology 
Institute (Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, or IMTA). The IMTA 
has compiled daily weather data from more than 5,000 meteorological sta-
tions scattered throughout the country. The data span a long period—from 
as far back as the 1920s to the present (up to 2007 for this analysis)—and 
contain information on precipitation and maximum and minimum tem-
perature. The meteorological stations registered these variables daily, and 
we used this information to interpolate daily values of these variables for a 
geographic centroid in each municipality in Mexico.9 A locality-based cen-
troid was determined as the simple average of the latitudinal and longitu-
dinal coordinates of all the localities listed in the National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography’s (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 
or INEGI) 2005 catalogue corresponding to each municipality.
We chose this method over a population-weighted average because 
that alternative would have biased the interpolation toward urban rather 
than rural areas. The interpolation method, from Shepard (1968), is a 
commonly used method that accounts for relative distance and direction 
between the meteorological stations and the centroids. (For a more 
detailed description, see Skoufias and Vinha 2012.)
We carried out an independent interpolation for every day between 
1950 and 2007, for each municipality. Because not all meteorological 
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stations existed throughout the entire period and because they some-
times failed to report their records, each interpolation was based on a 
different number of data points—and, indeed, different weather sta-
tions. These problems, as well as the accuracy of the data, get worse in 
the earlier years, which had a corresponding effect on our interpola-
tions. Thus, interpolations for the year 1950 are less reliable than those 
for 2007.
Agricultural Data: Rainfall and GDD
From these 1951–2007 weather data, we calculated the total rainfall and 
GDD for the following:
• Each agricultural year (October to September)
• Each wet season (April to September)
• Each pre-canícula period (April, May, June)—the months leading to 
the canícula.10
Instead of maximum or minimum temperatures, we used GDD: a 
cumulative measure of temperature based on the minimum and  maximum 
daily temperatures. GDD measures each day’s contribution to the matura-
tion of the crop. Each crop, depending on the specific seed type and other 
environmental factors, has its own heat requirements for  maturity. For 
example, some corn varieties require 2,450 GDD, whereas others require 
3,000 GDD to mature; some wheat varieties require only 1,800 GDD, 
whereas others require 2,000 GDD.11
Each crop also has specific base and ceiling temperatures that contrib-
ute to growth. The base bound sets the minimum temperature required 
for growth, and the ceiling temperature sets the temperature above 
which the growth rate does not increase any further (and, in fact, tem-
peratures above the ceiling may be detrimental to growth).12 In short, any 
daily temperature (minimum or maximum) below the base temperature 
is assigned the base temperature value, and any daily temperature above 
the ceiling temperature is assigned the ceiling temperature value.13 To 
determine the cumulative GDD at any point for a specific cultivation, 
the daily GDD since planting are summed.
Given the mixture of different crops grown in the survey areas, we used 
the generalized bounds of 8°C and 32°C (for example, as in Schlenker and 
Roberts 2008). In our specific case, any daily minimum or maximum 
temperature below 8°C is treated as being 8°C, and any daily minimum 
or maximum temperature above 32°C is treated as being 32°C. Thus, 
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a day with a minimum and maximum temperature of 8°C or below will 
yield no GDD, whereas a day with a maximum and a minimum tempera-
ture of 32°C or above will yield 24 GDD.
Measuring Weather Shocks
For our measures of weather shocks, we first construct the municipal 
historic mean rainfall and GDD between 1951 and 1985 for the agricul-
tural year, for the wet season, and for the pre-canícula period as well as 
their standard deviations. This date range balances (a) the need to calcu-
late the historic means with as many years of information as possible 
with (b) the need to exclude recent years that changing climate may 
have affected. Furthermore, we use a 35-year span for the baseline 
because there is incomplete information for some months for some of 
the municipalities.14 In our sample of rural municipalities, the average 
climate is based on 15 to 35 years of information. Among the rural 
households in the sample, 75 percent live in localities within munici-
palities that have at least 30 years of complete weather information from 
1951 to 1985.
Our chosen measures of weather shocks are based on the degree of 
deviation from the 1951–85 average weather. A shock is identified by 
those observations where the weather variable is more than one standard 
deviation away from its long-run mean. By this definition, 
a  municipality experienced a negative rainfall shock if the prior period’s 
rainfall was at least one standard deviation less than the average 1951–85 
rainfall. A municipality experienced a positive rainfall shock if the prior 
period’s rainfall was at least one standard deviation more than the average 
1951–85 rainfall.
Thus, a total of four measures describe shocks in the prior year’s 
(or wet season’s or pre-canícula period’s) weather: negative and positive 
temperature (GDD) shocks and negative and positive rainfall shocks.
We also use two aggregate shock measures—one for rainfall and the 
other for GDD—such that the indicator is equal to one if the municipal-
ity experienced either a positive or negative shock. A rainfall shock of one 
standard deviation translates to an average of about 30 percent higher or 
lower rainfall. One standard deviation of GDD is, on average, about 
8 percent from the mean.
During the 1986–2002 period, there were more temperature shocks 
(both negative and positive) than rainfall shocks, suggesting that tem-
perature was a more variable aspect of weather than rainfall compared 
with pre-1986 weather (Skoufias and Vinha 2012).
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Matching Household and Weather Data
The survey date is used to match each household to the weather informa-
tion. Each household is assigned the wet season and dry season before the 
survey date. That is, if a household was surveyed in the dry season of the 
agricultural year t, the weather shocks would be based on the weather in 
the dry season t−1 and the wet season t−1. However, if the household was 
surveyed in the wet season of year t, the weather shocks are based on the 
weather in dry season t and wet season t−1.
To illustrate, for the households in the 2002 wave of the MxFLS, the 
weather variables of interest are rainfall and GDD based on April 2001 
to March 2002 weather (as shown previously in figure 4.1). Thus, we are 
assuming that the households’ income and production would be based on 
the harvests of the 2001 wet season and the 2002 dry season—and not 
on the harvest from the 2002 wet season, which is roughly contempora-
neous to the survey. Given the long time span for data collection in the 
second wave of MxFLS, not all households are matched to weather 
shocks from the same two seasons (as is the case in first wave), but house-
holds are matched with the previous completed dry and wet seasons 
before being surveyed. The longer survey period implies that there are 
more than 75 possible distinct weather pairs in the original 2002 MxFLS 
sample of municipalities.
Although the number of municipalities from which the household 
surveys are drawn is relatively small, we do still have some variability in 
the weather variables. There are municipalities that experienced positive 
and negative rainfall as well as GDD events, and there were more GDD 
shocks than rainfall shocks in the sample, which is in line with the 
national trend from pooling all shocks from 1986 to 2002.15
The original MxFLS municipalities come from 16 different Mexican 
states and from all the different regions of the country. Although these 
states vary in the percentage of land cultivated under rainfed technologies, 
in most of them at least 75 percent of the land is rainfed and thus with 
production highly susceptible to weather conditions.16 Also, in most of 
them, corn is cultivated on at least 50 percent of the land that is cultivated 
with seasonal crops in the wet season. In all states, the cultivated area in 
the wet season is greater than the area cultivated in the dry season. These 
interpolated weather figures (Skoufias and Vinha 2012) suggest that—for 
an average rural household in our sample—we can expect the income as 
well as production for self-consumption to be relatively highly dependent 
on the weather and especially on the weather during the wet season. Also, 
given the relative importance of corn, the pre-canícula period is of interest.
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Empirical Analysis
To estimate the degree of consumption smoothing, we adapt a commonly 
used equation (for example, Cochrane 1991; Mace 1991; Townsend 
1994). Instead of using income, we use weather shocks as proxies for it 
(as detailed in Skoufias and Vinha 2012).
We employ both aggregate and disaggregate shocks. For the disaggre-
gated shocks, we differentiate between negative and positive shocks 
because the effects of weather shocks on income may differ depending 
on the direction of the shock. Specifically, a locality has a negative or 
positive weather shock, respectively, when the weather variable (rainfall 
or GDD) in a given period is at least one standard deviation less than, or 
more than, the long-run average climate in the locality.
Measures of Household Consumption
We use two distinct measures of consumption—food and nonfood—
because weather shocks may have different effects on different types of 
consumption (see Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005; chapter 3 of this vol-
ume). The per capita expenditures on all nonhealth- and nonfood-related 
items are based on the household’s reported spending
• In the week prior to the survey on tobacco and public transportation
• In the prior month on personal items, cleaning products, general services, 
recreation, gambling, and communications
• In the prior three months on clothing, toys and baby items, household 
items, health care, and vehicle maintenance
• In the prior year on appliances, furniture, house repairs, vehicles, vaca-
tion and taxes
• In the current school period on education.
Following Thomas et al. (2010), we subtract annual health spending 
from the total expenditures (which average about 11 percent of total 
expenditures) because most health spending follows illness and thus is 
not welfare-improving.
Second, we use the logarithm of per capita annual expenditures on 
food. The average share of food expenditures in our sample is 41 percent 
of total expenditures (without considering health expenditures). Included 
in food expenditures are the estimated value of goods consumed from 
own production and the value of goods received as gifts in the week before 
the survey.17 The expenditure measure we use reflects expenditures after 
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including the monetary value of self-production or resources from any 
coping mechanisms used by households to smooth consumption (such as 
selling assets, help from friends and relatives, or benefits from govern-
ment programs). The extent to which these impacts have implications on 
the future long-run poverty status of the household is not explored in 
this book.
Higher observed expenditure may be a consequence of higher local 
prices faced by households rather than a greater quantity of goods con-
sumed. To account for covariate price effects, all expenditures are 
adjusted by monthly price variation at the regional level.18
Measures of Other Household Characteristics
Besides the weather shock variables, we include variables that capture
• Household composition (number of children in the household, 
 number of adult males in the household, number of adult females in 
the household)
• Characteristics of the household head (years of schooling of the house-
hold head, gender of the household head, and the age of the household 
head)
• The household’s asset index19
• Characteristics of the housing unit (presence of a kitchen, access to 
tapped water indoors, presence of a toilet, access to piped sewage or 
septic tank, electricity, and flooring material).
The household composition and asset index variables enter as changes 
between the two MxFLS waves of surveys. The rest of the independent 
variables reflect the household’s situation in the second survey period. 
Furthermore, to account for the potentially different amount of 
resources available or any seasonal consumption patterns (depending on 
the season in which the household responded to the expenditure sur-
vey), we introduce a season indicator variable.20 To ensure that the 
weather shocks reflect the experience of the household, only those 
households where the head did not migrate in the two years before each 
of the surveys are included.
Furthermore, we exclude from our analyses households that report 
extremely large (greater than 16 standard deviations from the sample 
mean) per capita food expenditures or per capita nonhealth or nonfood 
expenditures. This excludes five households from the study. On average, 
the households reported slightly lower per capita food expenditures in 
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the second round than in the first round. The expenditures excluding 
health and food are higher in the second round than in the first, but 
the average is influenced by a few households with large expenses. In 
the second round, there are fewer children per household and more 
adults per household (as expected, given that the same set of house-
holds is interviewed three or four years after the first survey). In 2005, 
more than half of the household heads had not completed primary 
school, and there are fewer household heads without primary educa-
tion in the arid municipalities than in the humid ones. About one-fifth 
of the households were headed by a female. About one-third of the 
households did not have access to a sewage system or a toilet in their 
dwelling unit.
For the full descriptive statistics of the variables used in these analyses, 
see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
Expenditures and Weather Shocks
We use two different samples: (a) those households that did not experi-
ence any type of weather shock in 2002 and (b) all households. By limit-
ing our households to those that did not experience a shock in 2002, we 
simplify the weather shock variables.
We then differentiate the shocks by their direction—that is, negative 
or positive shocks—to determine whether the direction of the shock mat-
ters. Furthermore, we assign each household to a climate region based on 
the average annual rainfall to determine how households in different cli-
mates are affected by different types of shocks.
The full analysis (Skoufias and Vinha 2012) suggests that an average 
household’s annual consumption is protected against any negative 
income shocks from unusual weather. If the shocks do have a negative 
impact on agricultural production (and income), the results suggest that 
households are either able to protect themselves after the fact by chang-
ing their agricultural practices in response to the weather shocks or, in the 
case of reduced agricultural revenue, households can keep expenditures 
(and welfare) from deteriorating by drawing down on their assets or 
receiving help from formal and informal safety networks such as relatives 
or social programs or by accessing credit.
When we exclude households that experienced a weather shock in 
2002, none of the aggregate shock coefficient estimates is statistically 
significant. After including them, we observe 22 percent higher non-
health and nonfood expenditures after annual rainfall shocks and 
18 percent higher expenditures on food after wet-season rainfall shocks.
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The results suggest that the shocks augment income. Such increases 
are possible if the climatic conditions brought about by the shocks 
improve the growing conditions for the crops cultivated.
By expanding the set of shocks analyzed into negative and positive 
shocks, we observe that the aggregate shocks mask some of the variation 
in the effects of shocks. In the sample where households with a shock in 
2002 are excluded, there are large effects from positive GDD shocks in 
the wet season and pre-canícula period. However, these effects disappear 
once the excluded households are included in the analyses, suggesting 
that such effects are particular to some subset of households. Once 
households that experienced a weather shock in 2002 are included, 
annual negative rainfall shocks and annual positive GDD shocks are asso-
ciated with 45 percent greater nonhealth and nonfood expenditures and 
36 percent greater food expenditures, respectively.
That is, after either a drier-than-normal or a warmer-than-normal prior 
agricultural year, households spend more—suggesting that if the shocks 
increase productivity, at least some of the transitory income is spent.
To check the robustness of our results, we exclude from the sample 
municipalities in which the average distance of the closest 20 weather 
stations exceeds 20 kilometers. The farther away the stations, the greater 
the potential for measurement error.
The average results above do not, however, capture any variability 
across different regions. Mexico spans many different climatic regions, 
and certain shocks that increase yields in one climate may decrease yields 
in another climate. Using INEGI (2009) climate classifications, we clas-
sify each municipality as either a low- or high-precipitation municipality. 
Low-precipitation municipalities are those classified as very dry, dry, or 
semidry. High-precipitation municipalities are those that are classified as 
subhumid or humid.21 In all, there are 27 low-precipitation municipali-
ties and 48 high-precipitation ones.22
In contrast with the average results, grouping households by the aver-
age precipitation of their municipality suggests that not all household can 
smooth their consumption from weather shocks.
Dry-climate households. Households in municipalities with a dry climate 
have lower consumption after three types of weather shocks:
• Nonfood and nonhealth expenditures are lower after a negative GDD 
shock in the pre-canícula period.
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• Food expenditures are lower after a negative rainfall shock in the pre-
canícula period and after a negative annual GDD shock.
• Households have higher per capita expenditures after a negative annual 
GDD shock (on nonhealth and nonfood expenditures) and after a pos-
itive annual GDD shock (on food).
The results from a negative annual GDD shock for the low- precipitation 
municipalities are contradictory: On one hand, food consumption decreases, 
suggesting that income decreases and  consumption is not fully protected. 
On the other, nonhealth and nonfood expenditures actually increase, sug-
gesting increases in income.
Together, the results suggest that there is a change in the spending 
composition after a cooler-than-normal year in the more-arid municipali-
ties. In the arid regions, households are not protected from shocks expe-
rienced during the pre-canícula period; drier or colder periods affect the 
annual food and nonfood and nonhealth expenditures.
Humid-climate households. Households in subhumid and humid cli-
mates are better able to protect their annual expenditures. Only negative 
wet-season GDD shocks are associated with a decrease in nonfood and 
nonhealth expenditures; however, the effect is no longer statistically sig-
nificant when we exclude municipalities farther than 20 kilometers from 
the average weather station.
In contrast with the results for the low-precipitation municipalities, 
shocks during the prior pre-canícula period do not have a statistically 
significant impact on expenditures. Both negative and positive annual 
rainfall shocks lead to higher nonfood and nonhealth expenditures. Also, 
negative wet-season rainfall shocks lead to higher expenditures on both 
food expenditures and nonfood and nonhealth expenditures, suggesting 
that less-than-average rain raises income.
Differences in Household Expenditures by Observable Characteristic
To determine whether the impact of a weather shock differs for different 
types of households, the estimate is made separately for different sub-
populations. Ideally, we would analyze the subpopulations by climatic 
region, but the limited number of distinct municipalities (and sets of 
weather shocks experienced) do not allow for such detailed analyses. 
Instead, we use all the rural households in the sample and use food 
expenditures as the measure of consumption.
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These analyses reveal only the average national effect and not any dif-
fering effects of shocks in the various climatic regions. However, as was 
the case above with the average effects for different regions, any negative 
coefficient estimates at the national level suggest that some portion of the 
population may not be fully protected. The populations of interest are
• Low- or high-asset households
• Households with less- or more-educated heads
• Households without or with a land title
• Households living in a locality without or with a bus station.
To ensure that we are capturing effects for a particular subpopulation, 
we include only those households that did not change status between the 
two surveys.23
Effects of household characteristics on risk management after shocks. 
One after-the-fact risk management strategy is selling assets to smooth 
consumption (Deaton 1992). Households with a greater number of assets 
may be in a better position to do so. Therefore, households are divided 
into two asset groups: (a) those that in the first round had fewer than five 
assets and (b) those that had six or more assets. The median number of 
assets is five.
In our sample of rural households, we find that asset scarcity is not 
associated with inability to smooth consumption. We do not find inability 
to smooth consumption even with lower cutoff values for the asset-poor 
subpopulation.
Focusing on specific assets—whether the household owns title to 
land—again we do not observe those without a title being less able to 
smooth consumption. Households with less-educated heads may be more 
prone to the effects from negative income shocks (Skoufias 2007), but as 
with asset poorness, we do not find that to be the case on average in rural 
Mexico.
Effects of accessibility of locality on risk management after shocks. The 
last characteristic potentially affecting risk-sharing mechanisms that we 
explore is the locality’s accessibility. Greater integration of the locality 
into the regional economy and access to opportunities outside of the 
community gives households more opportunities to manage risks. To this 
end, we separate the sample by those households in communities with-
out a bus stop and those in communities with a bus stop. Communities 
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with a bus stop have at least some public transportation to other localities 
and most likely also have better infrastructure and integration in general.
The results from the analysis show that, for our sample of municipalities,
• Households in communities without a bus stop cannot smooth consump-
tion after any type of a GDD shock during the wet season or after a 
positive GDD shock in the pre-canícula period; and
• Households in municipalities with a bus stop cannot smooth their con-
sumption after a negative GDD shock during the wet season or after a 
positive rainfall shock in the pre-canícula period.
However, the results must be interpreted with caution because only 
37 municipalities reported information and did not change their status 
between the two rounds of the survey. Furthermore, because the pres-
ence of a bus station is not exogenous to the characteristics of the com-
munity, the coefficient estimates may be capturing effects of other 
covariant characteristics.
Conclusions
We have examined the impacts of weather shocks (defined as rainfall or 
GDD of more than one standard deviation from their respective long-run 
means) on household expenditures per capita. Our results suggest that 
households cannot always protect their consumption from weather 
shocks and that some weather shocks increase expenditures, potentially 
because of a transitory increase in income when shocks improve growing 
conditions.
The effects of weather shocks on household expenditures vary accord-
ing to the timing of the shock and the climatic region. Contrary to other 
research (see chapter 3 of this volume; Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005)—
at least among rural Mexico households—we do not find evidence that 
food expenditures are more protected than nonfood expenditures.
Although the average rural household in our sample can smooth con-
sumption such that no weather shock reduces expenditures, when the 
households are grouped by the average precipitation of their municipal-
ity, we observe that some households cannot smooth consumption. 
Households in arid climates are especially prone to lower expenditures 
after weather shocks. In arid regions, colder- or drier-than-average 
weather during the pre-canícula period negatively affects household 
consumption.
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Nor do we find conclusive evidence on the effects of access to various 
risk management strategies in aiding an average household in the sample 
to smooth consumption. Given the heterogeneity in household responses 
to different climate shocks, ideally the analyses should be carried out 
separately for each climatic region.
Further research—using more finely tuned climate categories and a 
greater number of distinct municipality-year pairs—would shed light on 
the robustness of the results. More municipalities would also lead to bet-
ter estimates on the effects of various before- and after-the-fact risk man-
agement strategies that may be available at the municipal level.
Notes
 1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) narrow definition 
of climate refers to the statistical description in terms of the mean and vari-
ability of quantities such as temperature, precipitation, and wind over a 
period ranging from months to thousands of years. The World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) defines the norm as 30 years. “Climate” differs from 
“weather,” which refers to atmospheric conditions in a given place at a specific 
time. The term “climate change” indicates a significant variation (in a statisti-
cal sense) in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability for an 
extended period of time, usually decades or longer (Wilkinson 2006).
 2. Weather may affect the well-being of individuals through other channels as 
well. For example, climate changes may increase (or decrease) the prevalence 
of certain diseases and thus affect health outcomes. Chapter 5 of this volume 
explores the impacts of weather shocks on children’s health as measured by 
their height-for-age in rural Mexico.
 3. In general, households can better insure their consumption against idiosyn-
cratic shocks—shocks that affect only a particular household, such as the 
death of a household member—than they can insure against covariant shocks: 
shocks that affect a large number of households in the same locality, such as 
weather-related shocks (Harrower and Hoddinott 2005).
 4. See, for example, chapter 3 of this volume as well as Dercon and Krishnan 
(2000); Jacoby and Skoufias (1998); Paxson (1992); and Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger (1993).
 5. The description of corn’s growth cycle is adapted from Neild and Newman 
(1990).
 6. Rural households are considered to be those in localities with less than 2,500 
inhabitants.
 7. MxFLS collects information on the value spent purchasing various categories of 
goods—food; dining out; health care; transportation; personal items; education; 
recreation; cleaning services; communications; toys, baby articles, and childcare; 
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kitchen items and bedding; clothing; tobacco; gambling; appliances and furni-
ture; and other expenses—as well as the value of goods consumed from own 
production or received as gifts. It is not possible to estimate the value of goods 
consumed from own production because this value and the value of goods 
received from others are reported jointly.
 8. There are several localities in each municipality. In MxFLS 1, only two 
municipalities had more than one locality sampled.
 9. We use the National Institute of Statistics and Geography’s (INEGI) 2005 
geographic definitions, covering 2,451 municipalities.
 10. Given that the agricultural year runs from October to September, the first 
agricultural year that we used is 1951, and therefore we used only the last 
three months of the 1950 calendar year.
 11. For other important crops in Mexico, the required GDD are 2,400 for beans 
and 2,200 to 2,370 for sorghum. The GDD values are taken from IANR (n.d.).
 12. For details of the calculation, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 13. We used the modified GDD formula, where the minimum and maximum 
temperatures are adjusted before taking the average. See, for example, Fraisse, 
Bellow, and Brown (2010).
 14. A particular month is coded as missing if none of the 20 closest weather sta-
tions reported data for five or more consecutive days.
 15. For the data set, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 16. For the table displaying these data, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 17. Because of the way in which the expenditure survey was administered, we 
cannot separate the value of “consumption from own production” from the 
value of goods received as gifts. About 7 percent of the rural households 
obtain more than 50 percent of their food from nonpurchased sources. On 
average, however, rural households obtain about 7 percent of their food from 
nonpurchased sources.
 18. For this calculation, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 19. The asset index is the sum of whether the household owns land, a residence, 
another house, a bicycle, a motor vehicle, an electric device, a washing 
machine or a stove, a domestic appliance, machinery or a tractor, bulls or 
cows, horses or mules, pigs or goats, or poultry.
 20. For example, Paxson (1992) finds seasonal consumption patterns.
 21. The average minimum and maximum annual precipitations are 200 millime-
ters (mm) and 600 mm, respectively, for the arid regions and 900 mm and 
1,400 mm, respectively, for the humid regions.
 22. For the full results for households in low-precipitation and high-precipitation 
municipalities, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 23. For the detailed survey results, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
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Growing Precious Resources: 
Climate Variability and Child 
Height in Rural Mexico
Emmanuel Skoufias and Katja Vinha
Introduction
Climate-induced erratic weather patterns can mean the difference 
between abundance and poverty, health and disease—and, to the rural 
Mexican children surveyed for this study, early growth or stuntedness 
that can affect the rest of their lives.
In Mexico, rainfall and temperature patterns greatly affect the growth 
cycle of crops and thus also household consumption, especially in rural 
areas. To the extent that climate change is an imminent reality, as climate 
scientists widely accept (IPCC 2007), millions of agriculture-dependent 
households worldwide may find themselves even more vulnerable to 
tenuous livelihoods that have increasing unpredictability.1 Furthermore, a 
changing climate will likely affect the prevalence of diseases, adding to 
potential welfare losses. 
Erratic Weather and Health
The health consequences from climatic variability may depend, among 
other things, on both the timing of weather shocks—for example, devia-
tions from long-term averages of temperature and precipitation—and on 
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key individual and household characteristics. For example, weather 
shocks during a time of relative food scarcity may affect child health 
more adversely than similar shocks during times of relative food abun-
dance. Malnourished children are also more likely to become ill 
(Scrimshaw 2003)—an issue we investigate by examining the extent to 
which the timing of the climatic shock within the agricultural cycle mat-
ters for health. 
Research must start addressing the needs and policy options of a world 
in which such shocks may become even more pronounced, if not perma-
nent, given the paucity of quantitative data on how successful traditional 
strategies will be to protect household health and welfare in the face of 
weather shocks such as drought and flood. This analysis seeks to increase 
our understanding of both (a) the magnitude of climate-change conse-
quences and (b) targeted policy measures or public programs that could 
either mitigate any harmful health effects of erratic weather or help 
people adapt to them. 
To that end, this chapter analyzes the health impact of climatic vari-
ability on children 12–47 months of age in the rural areas of Mexico, 
using the 1999 Encuesta Nacional de Nutrición (ENN, National Nutrition 
Survey) and meteorological data from the Instituto Mexicano de 
Tecnología del Agua (IMTA, Mexican Institute of Water Technology). In 
particular, we quantify the extent to which unusual weather negatively 
affects height-for-age. 
Traditional Agricultural Adaptation 
As chapter 4 of this volume discusses in greater detail, rural households 
in Mexico have traditionally turned to several strategies to prevent or 
offset large income losses during occasional lean years, when suboptimal 
climatic and other growing conditions have reduced their harvests. For 
example, smallholder farmers have adapted to climatic risk in the 
Tlaxcala region of Mexico by planting different crop varieties,2 adjusting 
fertilizer and pesticide use to various climatic conditions, and diversifying 
geographically by having plots of land in different locations (Eakin 2000). 
However, to the extent that climate change leads to more volatile 
weather, the lean years may become more frequent, potentially 
exhausting traditional ways of coping. As a result, households become 
less able to protect their own welfare and become more vulnerable. As 
erratic weather affects agricultural productivity—depending on how 
effective households’ risk management strategies are—food becomes 
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less available, and thus both incomes and overall household consump-
tion may decrease.3 
Focus on Early Childhood Health, Growth
On top of that scenario, temperature and precipitation anomalies may 
increase the prevalence of vector-borne, waterborne, and water-washed 
diseases and determine heat- or cold-stress exposure (Confalonieri et al. 
2007). Many parasitic and infectious species survive and reproduce under 
highly specific environmental conditions, and a slight change in precipita-
tion or temperature could render previously uninhabitable areas suitable 
for some of these species. Specifically in Mexico, several studies have 
shown positive correlations between temperature and vector- and food-
borne illnesses (SEMARNAT 2007). 
The study discussed here focuses on how weather affects the health 
outcomes of children younger than 48 months who live in rural areas. 
Early childhood health not only affects children’s current well-being but 
may also determine their cognitive development as well as their quality 
of life and productivity as adults (see, for example, Doyle et al. 2009). 
Children grow faster between the ages of zero and three than at any 
other time, and thus delayed growth may affect overall growth (Martorell 
1999).4 In developing countries, although children are born, on average, 
at the mean of standardized height-for-age, there is a sharp decline in 
their average height-for-age from ages zero to 24 months and no subse-
quent catching up in the first five years of life (Shrimpton et al. 2001). 
However, there is some evidence that, under the right conditions, chil-
dren whose growth was stunted may be able to catch up later in life (see 
Adair 1999 for findings on Filipino children; Godoy et al. 2010 for find-
ings on Bolivian children).5 Furthermore, some evidence indicates that 
weight gain during the first two years of life had a large effect on school-
ing outcomes, whereas weight gain between two years and four years of 
age had a weaker one (Martorell et al. 2010). 
The existing literature on weather, disease, growth, and child welfare 
also includes these findings: 
• Weather-caused nutritional shocks during the first years of life have 
lasting effects on productivity, even if the household can overcome 
poverty later (Alderman 2010). 
• Height-for-age and weight-for-age are strong predictors of school 
achievement, and therefore stunted growth between 12 months and 
102       The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change
36 months of age is associated with poorer cognitive development 
( Victora et al. 2008). 
• Malnutrition from insufficient food intake or as a byproduct of repeated 
diarrheal infections can structurally damage the brain and impair motor 
development in infants, which in turn affects cognitive development 
(Guerrant et al. 2008; Victora et al. 2008). 
• A correlation between infectious diseases and IQ is based on the com-
petition between energy needs for the development of the brain and 
energy needs to fight off disease (Eppig, Fincher, and Thornhill 2010). 
The authors single out diarrheal diseases as potentially the most energy 
consuming. 
Overall, childhood health also has been found to affect adult health as 
well as the following: 
• Employment (Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2005)
• Cognitive abilities (Case and Paxson 2008; Grantham-McGregor et al. 
2007; Maluccio et al. 2009) 
• Educational outcomes (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Glewwe 
and Miguel 2008; Maluccio et al. 2009)
• Productivity (Hoddinott et al. 2008). 
Such findings underline the importance of focusing on the health out-
comes for young children.
Height-for-Age as a Proxy for Health 
Because the agricultural cycle in Mexico consists of a dry season from 
October to March and a wet season from April to September, we distin-
guish among four types of precipitation and temperature shocks: precipi-
tation and temperature shocks in the agricultural year and wet season 
before the health assessment (t−1), and precipitation and temperature 
shocks in the agricultural year and wet season two agricultural years (t−2) 
before the health assessment (t). 
Resilience and adaptability to changes in weather and environmental 
conditions may also differ significantly across the population spectrum by 
socioeconomic characteristic. For example, Rose (1999) finds that rainfall 
shocks affect girls and boys differently. Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) 
find that, in Mexico, children are taller who participate in the Programa 
de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA, the Education, 
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Health, and Nutrition Program—called “Oportunidades” since 2002), 
which is an antipoverty program with a nutritional component. If so, 
participation in such programs might also protect children in the event of 
unusual weather. A mother’s education may also play a role, interacting 
with weather shocks such that erratic weather affects children of less-
educated mothers differently from children of more-educated mothers. 
For instance, among Mexican children, a positive correlation is found 
between a mother’s education and cognitive abilities and her child’s 
height-for-age score (Rubalcava and Teruel 2004). 
To better ascertain the effect of the climatic variability on child health, 
we use height-for-age as a proxy for health and interact the weather 
shocks with individual characteristics such as gender, educational attain-
ment of the mother, or participation in supplemental nutrition programs. 
To examine geographically heterogeneous effects, we separate the sample 
by region and altitude. 
Overview of Findings
We find some evidence that both unusual rainfall and unusual tempera-
ture affect children’s height-for-age and thus potentially their short- and 
long-term health and productivity. We cannot determine whether the 
effects derive from changes in agricultural income (thus consumption) or 
from changes in the prevalence of communicable diseases and ailments 
associated with different weather conditions, but the results suggest that 
potentially both pathways are important. 
More specifically, the following general findings emerged from the 
study, pertaining to four types of weather shocks:
• After a positive rainfall shock (greater-than-usual precipitation),  children 
were shorter than the average, regardless of region or altitude. 
• After a negative rainfall shock (less-than-usual precipitation), children 
were taller than the average (to a statistically significant extent in the 
Central region and at high altitudes) in the Pacific and Gulf and 
 Caribbean regions.
• After a negative temperature shock (cooler-than-usual temperatures), 
children were shorter than the average in the Central and South regions 
of the country as well as at higher altitudes. 
• After a positive temperature shock (warmer-than-usual temperatures), no 
statistically significant impacts were found on average, but certain sub-
populations in some regions are affected depending on when the shock 
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occurred. A positive shock occurring in 1999 would lead to shorter-
than-average boys and children between 12 and 23 months, while chil-
dren of less-educated mothers would be shorter than average if there 
was a temperature shock in 1998.
Chapter Structure
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:  
• “Past Research: The Weather-Consumption-Health Nexus” reviews 
some of the literature on the impact of weather on consumption and 
on the prevalence of disease, both of which affect health. 
• “Context and Methodology” presents background concerning the tim-
ing of weather shocks in Mexico with respect to the late-1999 ENN; 
lays out how the climate and socioeconomic data were measured; and 
describes the data sources used. 
• “Results: How Weather Shocks Affect Rural Children’s Height” presents 
the authors’ analysis of the impact of weather shocks on  height-for-age 
among rural Mexican children.
• “Discussion and Conclusions” summarizes the findings and presents the 
authors’ conclusions and recommendations.
Past Research: The Weather-Consumption-Health Nexus 
One could think of the environment, health, and consumption as parts 
of one simple system (as shown in figure 5.1), in which health and 
consumption are two important dimensions of welfare: Consumption, 
measured at the household level, is influenced by the environment. 
Health, measured at the individual level, is influenced by both the 
environment and consumption.6 To see the interaction among the 
three facets, it is instructive to think of each impact in isolation from 
the other two.
The Environment and Consumption
The environment affects consumption in rural areas mainly through its 
effect on current agricultural production or income because crop yields 
are a function of precipitation and temperature. Depending on the house-
hold’s ability to cope with income fluctuations, a decrease in income 
brought on by bad weather may translate into reduced consumption 
(Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1998). In addition, the 
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intrahousehold allocation of resources may change after a weather shock, 
possibly affecting different family members in different ways. 
For example, different health outcomes would occur if the food 
resources to a particular family member decreased so much that he or she 
became malnourished or if the individual’s share of other resources, such 
as preventive or curative health-related goods, was lower than in a typical 
year. Certain subpopulations—such as young children still growing—may 
be more likely to suffer negative consequences from worse-than-normal 
economic conditions (Woitek 2003). Particularly, economic recession is 
likely to affect poorer households more than others (Sunder and Woitek 
2005). 
The Environment and Health 
An environmental shock may also affect an individual’s health directly, 
especially by increasing the prevalence of communicable diseases or the 
risk of exposure to heat or cold stress. Assuming no changes in consump-
tion choices, an increase in communicable diseases itself affects an indi-
vidual’s health depending on the individual’s characteristics and access to 
preventive measures. 
The final effect of a weather-related shock on health results from an 
interplay among these factors: (a) the direct impact from environmental 
changes; (b) the indirect impact from income or production changes; and 
Figure 5.1 Interactive Model of Environment, Health, and Consumption
Environment:
precipitation and
temperature  
Agricultural
income 
Consumption
Prevalence of vector-,
water-, and food-borne
illnesses 
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(for example, height)
Other income 
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Coping
mechanisms 
Other 
drivers Other 
drivers
Other 
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Source: Authors.
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(c) the impact of any changes the household and individual can make in 
their consumption to either mitigate the effects of, or adapt to, a given 
weather shock. 
Studies on the consequences of weather shocks for individual welfare 
generally use some specific health outcome as the preferred measure. The 
evidence from other countries suggests that both gender and age matter. 
For example, consider the following findings:
• In rural India, a positive rainfall shock increases the survival probabili-
ties of girls more than that of boys (Rose 1999). 
• Drought has a small but transient effect on the body mass index (BMI) 
of women but not of men (Hoddinott 2006). 
• A drought experienced at 12 to 24 months of age affected children’s 
annual growth rate—an impact that persisted for the four years of the 
study (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001). No such effect was found for 
weather shocks experienced later in life. 
• In rural Indonesia, women who had lived their first year of life in a place 
where the rainfall exceeded the area’s average rainfall are taller as 
adults, have completed more years of education, and live in wealthier 
households (Maccini and Yang 2009). The authors did not find any 
such impacts either on men’s outcomes or from weather shocks expe-
rienced later in life. 
In addition, a particular environmental shock may have not only a direct 
negative impact on health but also a positive one indirectly through con-
sumption. For example, in Mexico, both rainfall and temperature are 
important factors affecting crop yields and exhibit a concave relationship 
with agricultural productivity (Galindo 2009). Whether increased precipi-
tation or temperature benefits agricultural production depends on the crop, 
region, and season in which the weather change occurs. In Mexico, higher 
temperatures increase corn production in some regions but decrease it in 
others (Galindo 2009). Similarly, the optimal levels of rainfall (below and 
above which yields fall) depend on the class of crops (Galindo 2009). 
In general, within a normal range of precipitation and temperature, 
more rainfall or warmer days should increase yields in temperate climates 
but will likely reduce yields in tropical climates. However, extremes of 
both rainfall (drought or flood) and temperature (extremely cold or 
extremely hot) reduce yields and thus potentially income and consump-
tion as well. Therefore, the impacts on humans can differ pending on the 
underlying average climatic conditions. Malnutrition and other negative 
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health outcomes are possible if food consumption is reduced as a result 
of a weather event, especially if before the event the household or indi-
vidual was barely consuming the required nutritional needs.
Complex Interactions
The impact of weather changes on health get even more complex.7 The 
prevalence and range of a particular pathogen, disease vector, or animal 
reservoir are determined by specific ranges of temperature, precipitation, 
and humidity (Patz et al. 2003). Whether an unusually rainy or dry period 
increases disease prevalence depends on the region’s specific climate. In 
regions bordering a pathogen’s habitat, even a small deviation from the 
normal climate can make large areas susceptible to the infectious disease. 
That is, if a region is just too cold (or too hot) for a particular pathogen 
or vector, an unusually hot (or cold) year could make the region suscep-
tible to the disease caused by the pathogen or carried by the vector. 
Evidence of the importance of climatic factors can be seen from the 
seasonality of many infectious diseases, such as influenza (influenced by 
temperature), malaria, and dengue (influenced by rainfall and humidity). 
In general, extreme temperatures are lethal to disease vectors. An 
increase in precipitation will generally improve breeding conditions. 
However, extremely high precipitation (floods) may, on one hand, reduce 
infectious diseases by eliminating breeding grounds and, on the other, 
cause other vectors such as rodents to come into more frequent contact 
with humans. Extremely low precipitation (droughts) may create stag-
nant pools of water from streams and rivers, which are good breeding 
grounds for vectors, thus increasing the prevalence of the diseases associ-
ated with such vectors. In addition, besides vector-borne pathogens, 
water- and food-borne pathogens (causing enteric infections) are also 
susceptible to precipitation and temperature. Unlike vector-borne ill-
nesses, both heavy and low precipitation have been found to increase 
enteric infections. Furthermore, there is evidence of a positive relation-
ship between temperature and diarrheal diseases.
Context and Methodology
Background 
Mexico has a substantial population living in poverty. In 2005, the Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, 
National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy) esti-
mated that 47 percent of the national population lived in poverty, with 
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18 percent of the population in extreme poverty (CONEVAL 2005). For 
all of Mexico, in 2006, 15.5 percent of zero- to five-year-olds had height-
for-age Z-scores of less than −2 standard deviations (stunted), and 
3.4 percent of zero- to five-year-olds had weight-for-age Z-scores of less 
than −2 (WHO n.d.). In rural areas, the rates were slightly higher, with the 
height-for-age and weight-for-age Z-scores below −2 for 24.1 percent and 
4.9 percent, respectively, among the zero- to five-year-olds (WHO n.d.).8 
Furthermore, about 82 percent of cultivated land in Mexico is rainfed 
(INEGI 2007) and thus susceptible to weather fluctuations. The depen-
dence on rainfed agriculture varies by region, with the Pacific and Gulf 
and Caribbean regions relying most heavily on it (96 percent and 
97 percent, respectively). However, even in the North, 68 percent of the 
cultivated agricultural land is rainfed. Together, these statistics suggest 
that a relatively large population of the country could be at risk from 
weather fluctuations.
The agricultural year in Mexico runs from October to September, com-
prising a dry season from October to the end of March and a wet season 
from April to the end of September. For all regions (except for the Gulf and 
Caribbean region), more than 50 percent of cultivated land during the wet 
season is in seasonal crops. Corn is of special importance, with more than 
25 percent of cultivated land devoted to its production during the wet 
season, and many small-scale farmers use corn not only as a source of 
income but also directly as a subsistence crop. Switching to other crops 
such as wheat or barley, which have shorter growth cycles but are not as 
useful for household consumption, is considered a last resort (Eakin 2000). 
In this context, and given the increasingly erratic weather patterns 
widely attributed to climate change, we examine the impacts of weather 
shocks on the stature of children between 12 and 47 months of age in 
Mexico. Weather shocks are defined as either rainfall or growing degree 
days (GDD, a cumulative measure of temperature) that are more than 
one standard deviation from their respective long-run means.
Data Sources
Household and health data. The empirical analyses use data for the last 
quarter of 1999 (early in the 2000 agricultural year) from the following: 
• The ENN collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
 Geografía (INEGI, National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Informatics); and 
• The Secretaría de Salud de México (Secretariat of Health).9
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Table 5.1 depicts the timing of the health survey relative to the range 
of dates used to determine the previous years’ weather shocks. The survey 
interviewed 7,180 rural households in 174 municipalities, collecting 
general information on all household members and more detailed infor-
mation (including anthropometric measures and illnesses in the prior two 
weeks) for females between 12 and 49 years of age and for all children 
12 years or younger.10 
Climate data and weather shock measurements. The climate data 
come from the IMTA. For a detailed discussion of the IMTA’s compila-
tion of daily weather data, see chapter 4 of this volume, for which similar 
weather data were gathered. 
Calculating rainfall and temperature data. From these weather data, we 
calculate the total rainfall and cumulative GDD for each agricultural year 
(October to September) and for each wet season (April to September).11 
Instead of using maximum or minimum temperatures, we use GDD—a 
cumulative measure of temperature based on the minimum and maximum 
daily temperatures. GDD measures the temperature degree contribution of 
each day to the maturation of a crop. Each crop, depending on the specific 
seed type and other environmental factors, has its own heat requirements 
for maturity. Different corn varieties, for example, require between 2,450 
and 3,000 GDD to mature, whereas different wheat varieties only require 
between 1,800 and 2,000 GDD.12 Furthermore, each crop has specific base 
Table 5.1 Agricultural Cycles in Mexico Relative to the ENN, 1997–2000
Agricultural years
1997
Oct. Mar.
in utero
0–11 months
12–23 months
0–11 months
12–23 months
12–23 months
24–35 months
24–35 months
36–47 months
Apr. Sep. Oct. Apr.Mar. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Dry season
Dry season 1999Dry season 1998
Weather shocks (t–2)
Age at dry season of agr. year
(t–2)
Age at dry season of agr. year
(t–1)
Weather shocks (t–1)
ENN survey conducted
(t)
Wet season 1998 2000
Age cohorts
(age at survey)
1999
Wet season
1998 1999
Source: Authors. 
Note: Agr. year = agricultural year; ENN = National Nutrition Survey; t = the 2000 agricultural year, during which 
the ENN survey was conducted; t−1 = one agricultural year before the survey; t−2 = two agricultural years before 
the survey.
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and ceiling temperatures that contribute to growth. See chapter 4 of this 
volume for more details about the base and ceiling temperatures used to 
calculate GDD. To determine the cumulative GDD at any point in time 
for a specific cultivation, the daily GDD since planting are summed. 
Measuring weather shocks. To measure weather shocks, we first calcu-
late the municipal historic mean rainfall and GDD between 1951 and 
1985 for each agricultural year and wet season. We chose this time span 
to balance the need to use as many years of historic weather informa-
tion as possible (ideally at least 30 years) with the need to exclude 
both (a) recent years that may have been affected by changing climate 
and (b) the earlier years with less-reliable data. Because information 
was incomplete for some months for some of our municipalities 
(meaning that none of the 20 closest weather stations reported data for 
five or more consecutive days), the average climate is based on 15 to 
35 years of information. Of the rural households in our sample, 
75 percent live in municipalities with at least 30 years of complete 
weather information between 1951 and 1985.
Weather shocks are defined based on the degree of deviation from the 
1951–85 average weather—that is, when the weather variable is more 
than one standard deviation from its long-run mean. A municipality had 
a negative rainfall shock if the prior period’s rainfall was at least one stan-
dard deviation less than the average 1951–85 rainfall. The municipality 
had a positive rainfall shock if the prior period’s rainfall was at least one 
standard deviation more than the average 1951–85 rainfall. Thus, four 
types of weather-shock measurements may describe a particular period’s 
weather: negative and positive temperature (GDD) shocks and negative 
and positive rainfall shocks. 
Based on this measurement, a rainfall shock of one standard deviation 
translates to an average of about 30 percent more or less rainfall than the 
long-run mean during the agricultural year or its wet season. One stan-
dard deviation of GDD represents an average of about 8 percent warmer 
or cooler temperature than the mean. 
Weather shocks also must be measured in the context of each region’s 
distinct climate, and even within a region there is much variability. In 
general, however, the north is drier than the rest of the country, and the 
central region is colder than the rest of the country. 
Comparing weather data from 1986 to 2002 with their historic means 
(from 1951 to 1985), the number of temperature shocks (both negative 
and positive) seems to have increased, but there has been no similar 
increase in rainfall shocks in Mexico. 
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Because the households were surveyed during the 2000 dry season, 
we use the weather during the 1999 agricultural year (October 
1998 to September 1999) and the 1998 agricultural year (October 
1997 to September 1998) to build our set of weather shocks, with 
these results: 
• Weather shocks during the 1998 agricultural year would have affected 
the 1998 wet season harvests and thus agricultural income and produc-
tion available to the household in 1999, the year before the household 
survey and weight measurements. 
• Weather shocks during the 1999 agricultural year would have affected 
the 1999 wet season harvest; thus, even if the production was low, the 
household would not yet be feeling the effects of low harvest in 
 October and November 1999, when the survey was conducted. 
Even after a poor harvest, agricultural households do not face scarcity 
during the early months of the next dry season (Chambers et al. 1981). The 
important point is that the weather shocks during the 1999 agricultural 
year capture the potential changes in the prevalence of weather-dependent 
communicable diseases in the year before the survey. 
There were more GDD shocks than rainfall shocks in our sample of 
municipalities during both the 1999 and the 1998 agricultural years.13 
Furthermore, a small number of municipalities experienced a positive 
rainfall shock in the 1998 agricultural year and wet season. Therefore, any 
coefficient estimates for the positive rainfall shocks during the 1998 agri-
cultural cycle need to be interpreted with caution because of the small 
number of observations experiencing such a shock. 
Height-for-Age Estimation Strategy
For a complete analysis, we need an estimation methodology to establish 
the link, if any, between weather shocks and our chosen proxy for child-
hood health: height-for-age. For the empirical analyses, we use cross- 
sectional individual-level data, standardizing a height-for-age Z-score (as 
previously discussed concerning the World Health Organization  statistics) 
by taking several variables into account, including the following: 
• The individual’s height
• Weather shocks (negative or positive) in the individual’s locality during 
the period under consideration
• Past weather shocks (negative or positive) in the same locality
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• Factors that could affect height, such as household and housing 
 characteristics
• Other factors such as gender and whether the individual participated 
in a supplemental nutrition program
• Location specific characteristics, or fixed effects.
From these calculations,14 we can estimate the aggregate impacts of 
weather shocks on child height. We cannot separate these impacts from 
those (negative or positive) that might have occurred because of changes 
in consumption affecting nutrition or bouts of illnesses. However, as 
explained below, given the timing of the survey and the inclusion of 
weather shocks from the two prior agricultural years, we gain some 
insights about the potential channels through which the shocks affect 
health. 
To analyze the average impact of weather shocks on child outcomes, we 
use the standardized height-for-age Z-score for children between 12 and 
47 months of age as our measure of health.15 These children were between 
zero and 35-months-old in the agricultural year prior to the health mea-
surement and in utero to 23 months in the agricultural year two years 
prior to the health measurement. We are thus effectively measuring the 
effects on height of shocks experienced during the first three years of life. 
Compared with weight-for-age measurements, height-for-age is not as 
sensitive to very short-term and immediate scarcities or illness; it would 
capture more chronic conditions.16 However, we also can include state-
level fixed effects in our estimate. The decentralized decision process in 
Mexico gives states the responsibility, for example, of delivering health 
services, water supply and sewage, and rural development and extension 
services (Cabrero Mendoza and Martinez-Vazquez 2000). The state-level 
fixed effects control for the impact of the state-based policies on health 
outcomes as well as any general agro-climatic conditions that vary across 
states.17 
Besides our measures of weather shocks, we also include information 
in the analyses on these regressors18:
• Household composition (numbers of children, adult males, and adult 
females)
• Mother’s characteristics (education, height, and whether she speaks an 
indigenous language)
• Child’s characteristics (gender, whether the child has an older sibling 
born alive within two years of the child’s birth, multiple birth, birth 
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order, whether the child was characterized as very small at birth, and the 
age of the child at the time anthropometric measurement was taken)
• An asset index19
• Housing characteristics (presence of indoor toilet, tap water, type of 
floor) 
• Child’s locality (altitude). 
For a more-detailed description of these variables and their use in the 
analyses, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012). 
Given the regional differences in the average climate, we separate 
the children into three regions and carry out the analyses separately. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that altitude and birth weight are related 
(Jensen and Moore 1997; Wehby, Castilla, and Lopez-Camelo 2010; 
Yip, Binkin, and Trowbridge 1988) and that the effects become sig-
nificant at altitudes greater than 1,500 meters (m) (Yip, Binkin, and 
Trowbridge 1988).20 To complement the regional results and to inves-
tigate whether the effects of weather shocks are different at different 
altitudes, we also analyze the impact for children living in low altitudes 
(less than 1,500 m above sea level) and for children living in high alti-
tudes (more than 1,500 m above sea level). 
The ENN dataset included 2,007 rural children between the ages of 
12 months and 47 months, and our sample consists of 1,530 children. We 
include only the 1,882 children whose mothers had not moved in the 
previous two years to ensure that the weather shocks we used matched 
what the child had experienced. Some of the children were excluded 
because of missing height information (128 children), improbable 
Z-scores (35 children),21 or incomplete information on the covariates (189 
children). The children measured (and having probable Z-scores) have 
mothers—compared with mothers of children who were not measured—
who are statistically significantly taller, more likely to speak an indigenous 
language, more likely to live in lower altitudes, and less likely to have run-
ning water or indoor sanitation. These differences pose a problem because 
those children who were not measured are different, and they may be 
systematically different in other, unobserved characteristics as well.22 
Results: How Weather Shocks Affect Rural Children’s Height
Effect of Positive Rainfall Shocks
Bearing the above caveats in mind, we find that after a positive rainfall 
shock, children are shorter regardless of their region or altitude, although 
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some distinctions must be made in each category, as discussed below. 
A positive rainfall shock in the 1999 agricultural year or wet season is 
associated with lower height-for-age scores. This result held true for both 
a positive annual and a positive wet season rainfall shocks. (For summary 
tables and regressions, see Skoufias and Vinha 2012.) 
The statistically significant coefficient estimates between 0.87 and 
0.32 points are nontrivial because a Z-score of −2 is indicative of stunt-
ing, and the average height-for-age Z-score for the children in the 
sample is −1.4. 
Regional and altitude distinctions. The biggest impact was from a posi-
tive rainfall shock during the wet season in the north. Children who 
experienced such a shock had an average Z-score that was 0.87 points 
lower than children who experienced an average amount of rain 
 during the wet season. The statistically significant effects were also 
negative, albeit smaller, in the Central, Pacific, and Gulf and Caribbean 
regions.23 
Concerning any positive rainfall shocks in the 1998 agricultural year, 
the results must be interpreted with caution because our sample included 
only a few municipalities (less than 5 percent of the sample) that had 
positive rainfall shocks in the 1998 agricultural year wet season. Moreover, 
no statistically significant impacts were found for the North, Pacific, or 
Gulf and Caribbean regions. Dividing the sample based on the altitude of 
the municipality yields similar negative results. The improbably large 
coefficient estimate in the Central region most likely is an artifact of few 
observations rather than a causal correlation. 
Effect of Negative Rainfall Shocks
Negative rainfall shocks had different effects depending on the region and 
altitude.
Regional distinctions. If the 1999 wet season was at least one standard 
deviation drier than average, children living in the central region were 
taller (with Z-scores averaging 0.7 points higher) than if the wet season 
was within one standard deviation of the historic mean. In the North, 
Pacific, and Gulf and Caribbean regions, the relationship is not statisti-
cally significant. 
However, in the Pacific and Gulf and Caribbean regions, a negative 
rainfall shock in the 1998 agricultural year was associated with taller 
children. 
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Altitude distinctions. Children living at high altitudes were 0.54 points 
taller if the 1999 agricultural year had been drier than normal and 
0.43 points taller if the 1999 wet season had been drier than normal. 
Children living at low altitudes were 0.39 points shorter if the 1998 
wet season had been drier than normal.
Effect of Negative GDD Shocks
Whereas negative GDD shocks (cooler temperature) during the 1999 
agricultural year are positively correlated with height-for-age in the 
central region as well as in high altitudes, negative GDD shocks during 
the 1998 agricultural year are negatively associated with height-for-age in 
the Central, Pacific, and Gulf and Caribbean regions as well as in high 
altitudes. The largest reduction is 0.72 points in the central region. 
However, in the northern states, unlike most of Mexico, negative 
annual GDD shocks in 1998 are positively correlated with height, with 
the average height-for-age being 0.46 points higher after such a shock 
than had the shock not occurred. 
Effect of Positive GDD Shocks
Positive GDD shocks (warmer temperatures) are not statistically signifi-
cantly correlated with height-for-age, regardless of where the child lives 
or the timing of the shock. The result is consistent whether we separate 
the sample by geographic regions or by altitude. 
It is possible that not all children experience the same kind of health 
outcomes from weather shocks. Skoufias and Vinha (2012) present the 
results when weather shocks are interacted with the sex of the child, the 
age cohort of the child, the educational attainment of the mother, and 
the household’s participation in a supplemental nutrition program. The 
authors also present the average result for all of Mexico as well as the aver-
age results for municipalities below 1,500 m above sea level as well as 
the average results for municipalities above 1,500 m above sea level.24 
Gender Distinctions
In this sample, although the girls’ and boys’ average height-for-age 
Z-scores are not statistically significantly different overall, they are sig-
nificantly different when the child experienced a positive GDD shock in 
the prior wet season. Boys are shorter when the prior wet season was at 
least one standard deviation warmer than the mean. The coefficient esti-
mate is larger for boys living in higher altitudes (implying a larger effect) 
than for boys living in lower altitudes. 
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Girls are statistically significantly different from the boys in low alti-
tudes, by 0.42 points. Among girls, regardless of altitude, there are no 
 differences between those who experienced an unusually warm year 
from those who did not. However, a positive GDD shock experienced 
two agricultural years before the survey (during the 1998 agricultural 
year) did not have a statistically significant effect on height-for-age for 
boys or for girls, suggesting that the impact of such shocks do not persist 
in time. 
In contrast, after a negative annual GDD shock during the 1999 agri-
cultural year in the low altitudes, girls were statistically significantly 
shorter than boys, by 0.54 points. 
After positive rainfall shocks in the 1998 wet season, girls were also 
statistically significantly shorter than boys, but given the low number of 
children who experienced such shocks, this finding must be interpreted 
with caution. 
Age Distinctions
The age of the child at the time of the weather shock also makes a differ-
ence. Negative rainfall shocks in the 1999 agricultural year had a positive 
effect on the height of those children who, at the time of the 2000 survey, 
were 12- to 23-months-old and lived at high altitudes but not on older 
children or those in low altitudes. 
In the low altitudes, a negative annual rainfall shock in the 1998 agri-
cultural year was associated with taller children in the youngest cohort, 
and a negative rainfall shock in the 1998 wet season was associated with 
shorter children in the oldest cohort. 
There are no statistically significant differences from positive rainfall 
shocks in the 1999 cycle by age cohort, but there were differences in the 
effects of positive GDD (warmer temperature) shocks in the 1999 agricul-
tural year or wet season. Such shocks negatively affected the youngest 
cohort (12- to 23-months-old) but not the older children. Moreover, in 
lower altitudes, there is negative effect from positive GDD shocks in the 
1998 wet season on the youngest cohort, but again not on the older ones. 
Mother’s Education
Under normal conditions, on average, a mother’s educational attainment 
(as measured by the completion of primary school) does not affect her 
children’s height-for-age scores. However, when faced with a weather 
shock, the mother’s educational attainment does affect a child’s height-
for-age. 
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In low altitudes, children from less-educated mothers were shorter 
after a positive annual rainfall shock in 1999 or a negative wet season GDD 
shock in 1998 than children with more-educated mothers. In the higher-
altitude municipalities, children from less-educated mothers were taller 
after a negative wet season GDD shock in 1999 than children from more-
educated mothers. 
The PROGRESA Effect
Another household characteristic that may affect weather’s impact on 
health outcomes is the household’s participation in some type of social 
protection or assistance program. Supplemental nutrition programs (such 
as PROGRESA and Liconsa in Mexico) try to improve childhood nutri-
tion in the poorest households. Households participating in such targeted 
programs are from the poorest households in the country, which may 
have fewer resources available to cope with weather shocks. 
Interestingly, in our sample, children in households participating in a 
supplemental nutrition program are statistically significantly taller in the 
low altitudes than children not benefiting from such programs. However, 
when faced with certain weather shocks, the health of children living in 
households receiving supplemental nutrition is statistically significantly 
worse than the health of children not in such programs. Because program 
participation is not random (that is, the participants come from the most 
impoverished households), the results do not suggest that participation in 
such programs is disadvantageous to children. More likely, the results sug-
gest that participation in a supplemental nutrition program does not fully 
level the playing field in terms of child health outcomes after certain 
weather shocks.25 
In the low altitudes, annual and wet season positive rainfall shocks in 
1999 were associated with decreases of 0.43 and 0.57 points, respectively, 
in the Z-scores of children in nutritional programs compared with those 
not in such programs. 
In the high altitudes, negative rainfall shocks in 1998 were associated 
with statistically significantly shorter children when the child’s house-
hold participated in a nutritional supplement program than when it 
did not. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Weather-related events can affect the welfare of individuals either 
through changes in agricultural production (and therefore potentially on 
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consumption) or through changes in the prevalence of certain diseases 
and ailments associated with different weather conditions. 
Exploring the consequences of weather on the health of a group of 
vulnerable individuals—rural children in Mexico between the ages of one 
and four—we find some evidence that both unusual rainfall and unusual 
temperature affect child’s height-for-age and thus potentially their short- 
and long-term health and productivity. We cannot determine whether the 
effects derive from changes in consumption or from changes in the preva-
lence of diseases and ailments associated with different weather condi-
tions, but the results suggest that potentially both pathways are important. 
We observe three consistent results, as described below. 
Strongest Overall Impact: Positive Rainfall Shocks
Positive rainfall shocks in the prior agricultural year (1999) negatively 
affect the average height-for-age regardless of region and altitude. However, 
the statistical significance and magnitude of the impact vary spatially 
and temporally. In the central region municipalities and in municipali-
ties at high altitudes (above 1,500 m), positive  precipitation shocks 
in the prior agricultural year are statistically significantly associated 
with lower height-for-age, whereas in the Pacific and Gulf and 
Caribbean regions as well as at low altitudes, it is the wet season pre-
cipitation that matters. In the north, both the annual and wet season 
shocks negatively affect height. 
Because any potential food scarcities from a bad harvest in the 1999 
agricultural year will most likely be experienced toward the end of the 
2000 agricultural year, and because the height measurements were taken 
at the beginning of the 2000 cycle, these health effects are more likely 
due to changes in the prevalence of communicable diseases than from 
undernutrition as a result of a bad harvest.26 Supporting such a conclu-
sion, negative rainfall shocks in 1999 are associated with taller children 
(statistically significantly in the Central region and in high altitudes). The 
combination of these effects suggests that, on average in rural Mexico, 
weather-related illnesses become more prevalent when rainfall increases. 
Furthermore, in municipalities below 1,500 m after a positive 
 rainfall shock, children whose families participate in a nutritional supple-
ment program are statistically significantly shorter than those who do not 
participate. In fact, children in low altitudes who do not benefit from a 
nutritional supplement are not affected at all by such a shock. Thus, in 
1999, participation in a nutritional supplement program did not protect 
children from the effects of unusual weather. Because, in general, only the 
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poorest households are beneficiaries of such programs—and thus partici-
pation is nonrandom—the results suggest that poorer families simply do 
not have the resources that wealthier families do to protect their children 
from the increasing prevalence of disease following unusually heavy rains. 
Such effects are not observed for the sample of children in the high-
altitude municipalities, potentially because of either (a) a smaller per-
centage of sample households receiving supplements (10 percent versus 
20 percent in the low-altitude municipalities) or (b) differences in how 
such shocks affect disease prevalence at different altitudes. 
Because only a few municipalities in our sample experienced a positive 
rainfall shock in the 1998 cycle, we cannot determine whether a positive 
rainfall shock also potentially affects health through the consumption 
channel nor whether the observed effects are short-term rather than 
longer-term ones. 
Delayed Consequences: Negative GDD Shocks
Negative GDD shocks (cooler cumulative temperatures) during the 1998 
agricultural cycle negatively affected the height measurements by the begin-
ning of the 2000 agricultural year. There were statistically significant 
decreases in the average height-for-age in both the central and southern 
parts of the country as well as at high altitudes.27 These negative effects 
suggest that households may not be able to protect themselves from 
income fluctuations brought on by the colder-than-usual weather in these 
regions. Furthermore, in both the central region and the high altitudes, 
there was a positive correlation between a negative GDD shock during 
the 1999 agricultural year and height-for-age. 
Together these results suggest that although the immediate effects 
from a negative GDD shock may be positive—potentially because of 
lower prevalence of communicable diseases—a year later such positive 
gains may have been lost because of decreased food availability in the 
household. That the negative impact from the 1998 shocks is observed in 
the central region as well as in high-altitude municipalities may reflect 
the lower average temperatures of these sets of municipalities. They may 
thus be more likely to experience freezing temperatures with such a 
degree of damage to crops that households cannot protect their con-
sumption in the following year. 
Little to No Average Impact, with Exceptions: Positive GDD Shocks
Positive GDD shocks (higher cumulative temperatures) during both the 1999 
and the 1998 agricultural cycles did not appear to affect the health of an 
120       The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change
average child in Mexico. That is, for our sample of municipalities and chil-
dren, unusually warm weather in the two years preceding the health 
survey did not, on average, have statistically significant effects on health 
as measured by height-for-age. Any changes in the prevalence of diseases 
(captured by the 1998 and 1999 shock measures) or agricultural income 
(captured by the 1998 shock measure) were sufficiently small that house-
holds could mitigate their consequences such that no adverse effects on 
height were observable. 
The results suggest that, in 1999, an average household could cope 
with intermittent higher temperatures. However, interacting the positive 
GDD shock with various characteristics of the child yields a more varied 
panorama. For example, a positive GDD shock in the 1999 agricultural 
cycle negatively affected only the height of boys and of children between 
the ages of 12 and 23 months by the end of 1999, and a positive GDD 
shock in the 1998 agricultural cycle negatively affected only children of 
less-educated mothers. 
One possible explanation for a negative impact on boys is the differ-
ence in morbidity rates between girls and boys, especially among the 
marginally malnourished (Wells 2000). Similarly, the negative effect on 
the youngest cohort may stem from their greater susceptibility to ill-
nesses such as diarrheal diseases (Kosek, Bern, and Guerrant 2003), which 
may increase with temperature (SEMARNAT 2007). 
The statistically significant decrease in the nationally averaged 
height-for-age of children of less-educated mothers from a positive 
1998 GDD shock may derive from those mothers’ inability to smooth 
consumption as easily as their more-educated peers in response to the 
agricultural production changes brought on by warmer weather. 
Although we cannot determine whether or not households would be 
able to change their behavior enough were the increased temperatures 
permanent, the results do suggest that there are three specific subpopu-
lations—boys, children between 12 and 23 months at the age of the 
survey, and children of less-educated mothers—whose caregivers can-
not currently safeguard their children from the effects of warmer 
weather. 
Questions for Research, Questions for Policy
Considering the available evidence to date linking childhood health to 
various aspects of adult well-being,28 these results warrant further 
research into the welfare impact of weather shocks and effective policy 
options to reduce any negative impacts from unusual weather. 
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Although we cannot say how households will adapt if temperature- 
and rainfall-related shocks become permanent, the results do suggest that 
certain populations may need more resources to counter potential nega-
tive effects, at least in the transition phase to the new climatic 
 equilibrium. 
The results also raise the question of whether a “tailored” approach to 
designing programs to decrease the sensitivity to climate and increase 
rural households’ capacity is likely to be more successful than a uniform 
program. 
 Notes
 1. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a narrow 
definition of climate refers to the statistical description in terms of the mean 
and variability of quantities such as temperature, precipitation, and wind over 
a period of time ranging from months to thousands of years. The norm is 30 
years as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. Climate is 
 different from weather, which refers to atmospheric conditions in a given 
place at a specific time. The term “climate change” is used to indicate a sig-
nificant variation (in a statistical sense) in either the mean state of the climate 
or in its variability for an extended period of time, usually decades or longer 
(Wilkinson 2006).
 2. For example, by planting both corn that is fast maturing but has low yields 
and corn that is slow maturing but has higher yields, or by planting different 
crops altogether (such as wheat instead of corn), depending on the prevailing 
weather (Eakin 2000). 
 3. For example, households may undertake ex ante income-smoothing strategies 
and adopt low-return, low risk crop and asset portfolios (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger 1993). Households may also use their savings (Paxson 1992); take 
loans from the formal financial sector to carry them through the difficult 
times (Udry 1994); sell assets (Deaton 1992); or send their children to work 
instead of school to supplement income (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997). These 
actions enable households to spread the effects of income shocks through 
time. Additional strategies include the management of income risk through 
after-the-fact adjustments in labor supply such as multiple job holding, and 
engaging in other informal economic activities (Kochar 1999; Morduch 
1995). Baez (2006) provides a detailed summary of consumption smoothing 
mechanisms in developing countries. 
 4. Based on World Health Organization (WHO) Child Growth Standards, in 
the first year of life, the median length for boys increases by 25.5 
 centimeters (cm) and for girls by 24.9 cm. In the second year, the median 
lengths increase by 12.1 cm and 12.4 cm for boys and girls, respectively. In 
122       The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change
the third year, the median heights increase by 9.0 cm and 9.4 cm for boys and 
girls, respectively.
 5. However, there is no consensus on the conditions for catch-up growth. 
Although birth order and number of siblings appear to play a role (Adair 
1999; Godoy et al. 2010), the effect of economic conditions depends on the 
population studied. For example, Adair (1999) finds that, with improved 
socioeconomic conditions, some Filipino children whose growth was stunted 
at age 2 were no longer considered stunted by 8.5 years of age. But interest-
ingly, Godoy et al. (2010) find that improved economic conditions are cor-
related with lower catch-up rates among the Tsimané people of Bolivia. 
 6. The health status of an individual also may affect his or her wage-earning 
capacity and ultimately the household-level consumption expenditures. For 
now, we do not explore this pathway. Health also affects the consumption 
bundle directly in two ways: ex ante (for example, preventive health care) and 
ex post (for example, buying medicines to treat illness). 
 7. The discussion on the impact of climate on health (in this and the following 
paragraph) relies heavily on Patz et al. (2003).
 8. For population-based assessment, the WHO expresses child growth survey 
results using Z-scores. For consistency with clinical screening, prevalence-
based data are commonly reported using a cutoff value. The WHO 
Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition (WHO n.d.) uses a Z-score 
cutoff point of less than −2 standard deviations to classify low weight-for-
age, low height-for-age, and low weight-for-height as moderate and severe 
undernutrition and less than −3 to define severe undernutrition. For more 
information, see http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/about/introduction/en/
index5.html.
 9. The ENN can be accessed at http://www.bdsocial.org.mx/, INEGI at http://
www.inegi.org.mx/, and the Secretariat of Health at http://www.salud.gob
.mx/ (INEGI and Secretaría de Salud de México 1999). 
 10. From the ENN survey, we cannot determine whether a rural household 
engages in agricultural activity or what kind of agricultural practices are used. 
ENN is representative at the regional level and at the urban/rural level and 
should thus reflect the general population. Included in the sample are house-
holds with small plots practicing subsistence farming as well as those with 
irrigated lands and farming large areas of land. What we observe is an average 
impact over the whole rural population. In our sample, 86.6 percent of the 
rural children live in households without tapped water, and 74.5 percent do 
not have access to an indoor toilet, suggesting that most of the children come 
from very modest means.
 11. Because the agricultural year runs from October to September, the first agri-
cultural year that we use to calculate the average weather for municipalities 
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is 1951, and thus we only use the last three months of the 1950 calendar 
year.
 12. Other important crops in Mexico are beans, which require 2,400 GDD, and 
sorghum, which requires 2,200–2,370 GDD.
 13. For the distribution of rainfall and GDD shocks for the 169 municipalities in 
our sample, see Skoufias and Vinha 2012.
 14. For the full estimation method, see Skoufias and Vinha (2012).
 15. To calculate the standardized height-for-age scores, we use WHO Anthro 
software for personal computers, version 3, 2009: Software for assessing 
growth and development of the world’s children. See http://www.who.int/
childgrowth/software/en/.
 16. The measure does not capture any differences in mortality from unusual 
weather.
 17. We cannot introduce municipal-level fixed effects, which would control more 
precisely for general agro-climatic conditions, because our weather shocks are 
at the municipal level. 
 18. Only when analyzing the effects by participation in a nutritional program do 
we also include nutritional program participation as a regressor. 
 19. The asset index is based on the principal factor analysis of the household’s 
ownership of a radio, a television, a VCR, a telephone, a computer, a refrig-
erator, a washing machine, a stove, a heater, and a motor vehicle. 
 20. Furthermore, above 1,500 meters (m), there are some physiological impacts 
on humans; specifically in Mexico, it has been used as a cutoff altitude for 
some disease vectors. Besides the correlation between altitude and birth 
weight, above 1,500 m, “physiological changes due to hypobaric hypoxia 
are  detectable” (Pollard and Murdoch 2003, 1). In addition, Hernández-
Avila et al. (2006) use only localities below 1,500 m in their study 
on malaria in Oaxaca, citing that cases above 1,500 m are likely to have 
been imported. 
 21. That is, their height-for-age Z-scores were either less than −6 or more than 6.
 22. If those who were not measured are more likely to be sick (and some of these 
illnesses are due to the weather), the coefficient estimates of the weather 
shock variables are likely to provide a lower bound of the true impact of the 
weather shock.
 23. The analysis considers results in five distinct regions of Mexico: North, 
Central, South, Pacific, and Gulf and Caribbean.
 24. As with the average impacts, there are some regional differences as to how 
the various shocks affect different subpopulations. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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 25. To determine the causal impact of a nutritional program (and the interaction 
of weather shocks with program participation), we would need to determine 
the counterfactual—that is, the health outcomes after a weather shock for 
children who participated in such programs had they not benefited from the 
programs. 
 26. However, it is possible that part of the impact comes from reduced food avail-
ability. For example, if the unusually high precipitation is accompanied by 
floods that greatly reduce the harvest, food availability could be reduced by 
the time of the following mid-dry season. 
 27. Unlike the other regions of Mexico, children in the North region were taller 
after a negative GDD shock in 1998, suggesting that colder weather improves 
agricultural production in this region. A negative GDD shock in 1999, how-
ever, is not statistically significantly associated with child height-for-age, sug-
gesting that the shock does not affect the prevalence of diseases. 
 28. Childhood health has been shown to have an impact on employment (Case, 
Fertig, and Paxson 2005); cognitive abilities (Case and Paxson 2008; Grantham-
McGregor et al. 2007); educational outcomes (Glewwe and Miguel 2008); and 
productivity (Hoddinott et al. 2008).
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Over the past century, the world has seen a sustained decline in the proportion of people 
living in poverty. In the past three decades alone, the rate of extreme global poverty has 
been halved, a remarkable trend that is expected to continue. 
Amid this good news, however, are concerns that climate change could corrode or even 
reverse progress on poverty reduction. The resulting pressures on environmental systems 
from increasingly erratic weather patterns could imperil in particular the livelihoods of 
the rural poor, who are arguably among the ﬁ rst to feel the eﬀ ects of such weather shocks, 
as well as the most vulnerable to those eﬀ ects.
The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change: Quantifying the Eﬀ ects, Identifying the 
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arising from a potentially volatile global problem.
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